Institute for the Study of War

NEW: The Iranian political officials who will reportedly negotiate with the United States in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 21 neither have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions nor are driving decision-making in Tehran. Other Key Takeaways: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will attend the talks. Iran’s negotiating delegation is expected to include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The upcoming talks appear focused on extending the ceasefire, which is set to expire on April 22. Iranian sources familiar with the negotiations stated that Iran expects that the ceasefire will be extended and that additional talks will occur if the negotiations on April 21 go well. The Iranian negotiating team does not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions, however. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior members of the IRGC have consolidated control and wielded significant influence over the negotiations process thus far. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to consolidate the IRGC’s control over the strait and gain leverage over the United States in negotiations. Iran has reportedly decided to give vessels that pay a “security” fee and adhere to Iranian protocols priority to transit through the strait. The IRGC has continued to prevent traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy reportedly forced two oil tankers attempting to transit through the strait to change course. Many vessels that intended to transit through the strait have turned around.

NEW: Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.

NEW: Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.

NEW: Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.

NEW: Russian forces conducted four platoon-sized or smaller mechanized and motorized assaults across the theater in the last 48 hours, but these assaults are unlikely to bolster the ongoing Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Additional Key Takeawys: The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) employed an unmanned surface vessel (USV)-launched interceptor drone to intercept a Russian Shahed long-range strike drone for the first time and are creating USF naval drone battalions. A Russian defense industrial enterprise director criticized how the Russian government’s adopted economic policies have overcooled the Russian economy to the detriment of Russia’s import substitution efforts. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces launched 236 drones against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces struck the Atlant Aero drone development and production plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast. (1/2)

NEW: The Iranian political officials who will reportedly negotiate with the United States in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 21 neither have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions nor are driving decision-making in Tehran. Other Key Takeaways: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will attend the talks. Iran’s negotiating delegation is expected to include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The upcoming talks appear focused on extending the ceasefire, which is set to expire on April 22. Iranian sources familiar with the negotiations stated that Iran expects that the ceasefire will be extended and that additional talks will occur if the negotiations on April 21 go well. The Iranian negotiating team does not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions, however. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior members of the IRGC have consolidated control and wielded significant influence over the negotiations process thus far. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to consolidate the IRGC’s control over the strait and gain leverage over the United States in negotiations. Iran has reportedly decided to give vessels that pay a “security” fee and adhere to Iranian protocols priority to transit through the strait. The IRGC has continued to prevent traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy reportedly forced two oil tankers attempting to transit through the strait to change course. Many vessels that intended to transit through the strait have turned around.

NEW: Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. Other Key Takeaways: Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense failures on the heels of the successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure. Russia appears to be leveraging Russian SIM cards with international roaming data capability in Ukrainian border areas to support its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. The United States extended on April 17 the waiver allowing Russia to sell its existing seaborne oil until May 16. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces launched 219 long-range drones against Ukraine.

NEW: Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. Other Key Takeaways: Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense failures on the heels of the successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure. Russia appears to be leveraging Russian SIM cards with international roaming data capability in Ukrainian border areas to support its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. The United States extended on April 17 the waiver allowing Russia to sell its existing seaborne oil until May 16. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces launched 219 long-range drones against Ukraine.

MORE: The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently does. The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. CTP-ISW recently assessed that the United States is negotiating with a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive, unified position. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. Araghchi and Ghalibaf’s negotiating team reportedly did not have full authority to finalize a deal with the United States in Islamabad, for example.

NEW: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands. Other Key Takeaways: Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran’s negotiations after the Islamabad talks. The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. The IRGC attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran’s negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver. The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran’s negotiations policy. The US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place as of April 18. US CENTCOM said that it forced two ships to turn around and return to Iran between April 17 and 18. The US Navy has forced 23 ships to turn back since the United States began the blockade. No Iranian vessels have attempted to approach or test the blockade line as of this writing.

MORE: The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently does. The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. CTP-ISW recently assessed that the United States is negotiating with a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive, unified position. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. Araghchi and Ghalibaf’s negotiating team reportedly did not have full authority to finalize a deal with the United States in Islamabad, for example.