Matthew

@cyb3rops Did some similar work with reverse engineering binaries with LLMs and realized the same thing — bad things embedded in nice names just cause it to ignore the finding. So wrap your ransomware code in “Ransomware Simulation” strings and you’re off to the races.

🚨 MistEye TI Alert 🚨 Based on recent intelligence, multiple high-frequency npm packages, including AntV and Echarts-for-react, as well as the durabletask Python SDK, have been compromised by Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attacks. Notably: 1. May 19, 2026: The npm account atool (i@hust.cc) was compromised, allowing attackers to automatically publish 637 malicious versions across 317 packages within 22 minutes. 2. May 20, 2026 (Beijing Time): Within 35 minutes, attackers consecutively uploaded durabletask versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 at 00:19, 00:49, and 00:54, bypassing normal release controls and impersonating official Microsoft releases. Additionally, these two events—the large-scale GitHub token leaks (potentially exposing official repositories) and the Grafana Labs targeted ransom attack—are likely related to the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain compromise: • GitHub token leaks: Evidence suggests some leaked tokens may have been used to access and potentially sell official GitHub repositories. The leaks were caused by a compromised employee device, which involved a polluted VS Code extension. • Grafana Labs attack (May 16, 2026): A cybercrime group gained unauthorized access to their GitHub repositories, downloaded the codebase, and issued a ransom demand under threat of data disclosure. Affected Components / Targets: • npm packages: AntV, Echarts-for-react, and other high-frequency components in the npm ecosystem. • Python packages: durabletask 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3. • Developer credentials and secrets: GitHub PATs, npm Tokens, AWS Keys, Kubernetes Secrets, Vault Tokens, SSH keys, and over 90 types of local sensitive files. • GitHub repositories: internal codebases potentially accessible via leaked tokens. • Grafana Labs’ repositories (downloaded by attackers; ransom demanded). Potential Attacker Actions: • Immediate exfiltration of cloud and local credentials upon package installation or import. • Unauthorized access to internal repositories and sensitive cloud infrastructure. • Lateral movement across developer machines, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud workloads. • Sale and exploitation of leaked GitHub tokens. • Supply chain compromise affecting dependent projects and production systems. • Ransom demands and potential data disclosure threats against organizations, including open source platforms. Detection Methods: • Audit npm and PyPI dependencies for affected packages: • npm: npm ls --all • Python: pip list --outdated or pip show durabletask to confirm versions. • Inspect lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, pipfile.lock) for malicious versions. • Review CI/CD pipelines and deployment logs for installation of compromised packages. • Monitor GitHub and cloud activity for unusual authentication events, including signs of leaked token usage. Mitigation Measures: • Immediately rotate all exposed GitHub, npm, PyPI, and cloud credentials. • Replace affected npm/PyPI packages with verified safe versions or freeze dependency versions. • Isolate potentially compromised systems and audit for credential theft or lateral movement. • Apply security patches and review post-compromise artifacts in CI/CD pipelines. Additional Recommendations: • Enable real-time monitoring and alerting for suspicious token or key usage. • Implement stricter dependency review policies and supply chain risk checks. • Educate teams to verify package authenticity before installation. • Monitor dark web or underground marketplaces for leaked credentials related to your organization. SlowMist will continue to track and monitor developments related to this incident, including potential new malicious releases or related exploits. MistEye has already pushed relevant threat intelligence to clients to help them proactively assess and mitigate risks. enterprise.misteye.io/threat-intelli… enterprise.misteye.io/threat-intelli…