Richard Casey

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Richard Casey

Richard Casey

@Richard_Casey

Macro/EM Strategist/Economist/PM. Ex a lot of places but not Bridgewater 🇺🇸🇪🇸🇬🇧

London Katılım Haziran 2018
975 Takip Edilen4.1K Takipçiler
Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Part of the business. Once worked at an EM hedge fund and one month when we were down 20% on a big EM sell-off we got big inflows and investors calling us to add risk. At another fund, we correctly predicted the GFC and made a ton of money but got redeemed out of existence because investors needed liquidity when other funds that suffered big losses restricted redemptions
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Bubble watch: $ 2 trillion valuation? 🤔
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
"Luke Gromen has never been this scared" 😂 Is this a parody account. The guy has been selling doom since forever
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Rather than rationalize the core business, pivot to a hot new industry and add to growing overcapacity there as well... Xiaomi Corp pushing deeper into China’s competitive electric vehicle market as its mainstay smartphone business falters. caixinglobal.com/2026-05-22/xia…
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Part of strategic economic plan rather than state subsidies, capital controls, financial repression removing hard budget constraints.. Unprofitable property companies see their shares skyrocket after announcing investments in “chipmaking” sc.mp/a22r0?utm_sour… via @scmpnews
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Why root causes of trade imbalances go much deaper than CNY/USD valuation... China has been waging intense campaign to eliminate severe overcapacity in solar industry. Firms built new factories anyway despite widespread industry losses sc.mp/oldxk?utm_sour… via @scmpnews
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
at an expensive spread of 500bps+ to CGBs to cover the rapidly growing fiscal deficit. Russia will be borrowing yuan export revenues from Russian banks and exporters. Coupon payments and principal paid in yuan or rubles, supposedly at investors choice.
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
This will generate usual yuan internationalization posts. However, Xi wont allow his BFF Putin or Russian corporates to sell yuan bonds in China because of fear of violating US sanctions. So Russia is doing a second issuance of yuan bonds in Moscow 1/2 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
@Brad_Setser @marcmakingsense @sobel_mark Capital controls allow the means to offset the impact of FX appreciation on exports. Even at current FX rate, a lot of exports are not profitable but that doesn’t stop them
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Brad Setser
Brad Setser@Brad_Setser·
a) yes, the core problem is an undervaluation and exports that outperform global trade while imports wildly lagged China's DD growth until q1 b) I have never advocated eliminating China's controls and certainly don't advocate it now. i have taken heat for this, but my clear view is that China needs to lower its savings rate and clean up its banks first c) within the existing system of controls there is clear pressure for appreciation -- settlement is a good tell
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Michael Pettis
Michael Pettis@michaelxpettis·
1/10 Important FT article by Mark Sobel, Brad Setser and Robin Brooks. They make the seemingly counterintuitive point that while incremental trade agreements, in which one side or the other agrees to buy a little more of this or a little less of... ft.com/content/b600db…
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Determining if a currency is "undervalued" is always subjective, especially so in the case of China. The managed FX rate is just one of many factors in China's mercantilist industrial policy that result in the current account surplus. What would happen if China stopped managing the FX rate and also removed capital controls, allowing a more market determined FX rate? CNY would likely depreciate sharply. So is the main issue really just an "undervalued" Fx rate? Of course this would send interest rates much higher and force the end of much of the fiscal/monetary support of industrial policy, which is why China wont do it. Just allowing some nominal appreciation of CNY without deeper structural change wont likely reduce much the current trade imbalances. Problem was the conditions under which China was allowed to join WTO and lack of enforcement of trade policies when the west had leverage to do so
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
In case you are wondering why China has built up such large strategic stockpiles of many commodities Indonesia announced a plan to require all shipments of key commodities to go through a government-created company bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
@gonglei89 If you don’t know that low bond yields in China are the result of capital controls and buying by mostly state owned banks you probably shouldn’t be commenting on matters of finance and economics
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Lei Gong
Lei Gong@gonglei89·
Uhh if you don’t know that low bond yields mean high demand for bonds (your bonds are so attractive I’m willing to accept a lower payout to hold them) you probably shouldn’t be commenting on matters of finance and economics.
Bob Elliott@BobEUnlimited

While most global bond markets are under pressure, Chinese bond yields are still sitting at multi-decade *lows*. While the government can make the stats look better than reality (like the 5% growth nonsense), the market pricing suggests the economy is very weak.

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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
A few years ago I was about to hit my tee shot on the first hole of Trump National Doral in Miami when the starter came running out to tell me the shorts I was wearing had too many pockets, which he explained Mr Trump doesn’t allow. I had to quickly go into the golf shop to buy some horrible overpriced polyester Sergio Garcia Adidas shorts which met Trump’s standards of good taste. Makes me chuckle when I read the news of the new 15 foot gold Trump statue by the first tee at Doral
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Brazil being Brazil....BRL assets getting crushed after a news website linked right-wing presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro to Daniel Vorcaro, the former chief executive of a failed bank at the center of a massive fraud probe. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Santiago Capital
Santiago Capital@SantiagoAuFund·
@DanielSLoeb1 @HandlerRich I was living in San Francisco several years ago and went to Church at Grace Cathedral. One Sunday, to my surprise...the sermon was handed off to a guest speaker. And guess who it was? Tom Steyer. 😅 The guy was literally out there trying to do God's work...
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Daniel S. Loeb
Daniel S. Loeb@DanielSLoeb1·
His firm Farallon was one of the most savvy firms in the space of “event-driven” investing including risk arbitrage and bankruptcies. He was surrounded by an excellent team of professionals. In 1991-2, I was a distressed security analyst at Jefferies (working for @HandlerRich) and responsible for the Drexel bankruptcy, as well as the trade claims trader, meaning that I’d go though a 4 foot stack of printed computer paper and cold call the holders of claims for a particular security to purchase them on behalf of clients. Farallon feasted hungrily on the carcass of Drexel Burnham—many of which claims I sold them—making a significant fortune for them in the process. I fear I bear some responsibility in contributing to Steyer’s wealth and funding of his campaign!
John Arnold@johnarnold

So funny that for California governor, the Democratic Socialists of America endorsed billionaire Tom Steyer, whose resume includes Stanford MBA, Morgan Stanley, Goldman, private-equity, and hedge-fund founder whose firm invested in private prisons and coal.

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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
Maybe this is because most analysts and investors realize that collateral may reduce the credit risk of the loan but it is still a dollar loan.
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Richard Casey
Richard Casey@Richard_Casey·
@TotemMacro @LukeGromen @DarthTraderzzz That isn’t what is shown in the chart or in any of Setser’s work. Do you agree with Luke that China making dollar loans, regardless of the type of collateral, is a form of dedollarization?
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Whitney Baker
Whitney Baker@TotemMacro·
@LukeGromen @DarthTraderzzz Dude so many people point to FX assets on the SOE balance sheets without realising they are the other side of FX liabs, not a net increase in dollar exposure.
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DarthTrader
DarthTrader@DarthTraderzzz·
Does this change anything? @LukeGromen
UnveiledChina@Unveiled_ChinaX

China has been telling the world it is abandoning the dollar. The Council on Foreign Relations just published a detailed analysis showing that China may actually hold more dollars off its official books than on them. The de-dollarization story is largely a magic trick. Here is how it works in plain terms. China's official foreign exchange reserve, managed by an agency called SAFE, used to hold about 79% of its assets in US dollars back in 2005. By 2019, that number had dropped to 55%. That is the number that gets reported. That is the number that generates headlines about China dumping the dollar. But while China was reducing the dollar share of its official reserves, it quietly stopped growing those official reserves altogether. They have been stuck at roughly $3.3 trillion for eight years. All the new money China accumulated went somewhere else entirely, into the foreign lending of state-owned policy banks like the China Development Bank, into the foreign assets of state commercial banks, and into various state investment funds. None of this is fully disclosed. None of it shows up in the headline de-dollarization numbers. CFR senior fellow Brad Setser ran the math. China's official reserves hold approximately $1.8 trillion in dollars. But Chinese state commercial banks hold an estimated $1 trillion in dollar assets abroad. The policy banks hold close to another $1 trillion in foreign claims, most denominated in dollars. The China Investment Corporation, the country's sovereign wealth fund, holds roughly $450 billion in foreign assets, the majority in dollars. Add it all up and China's total dollar holdings across all state entities likely exceed $4 trillion, more off the official books than on them. Every debt restructuring case where China's policy banks were involved, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Angola, involved dollar-denominated loans. Not yuan. Not euros. Dollars. The de-dollarization narrative serves a specific purpose for Beijing. It signals geopolitical independence from the US financial system, which is valuable messaging for domestic audiences and Global South partners. But the actual financial behavior of Chinese state entities tells a different story. China's banks are still borrowing and lending predominantly in dollars. China's investment funds are still holding predominantly dollar assets. The label changed. The exposure did not. China is telling the world it is exiting the dollar while quietly holding more of it than ever. That is not de-dollarization but a very well-executed press release. #China #CCP #Dollar #DeDollarization #Geopolitics #Finance #CFR #Economy #GlobalFinance #SAFE

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