Michael Bohnert

2.1K posts

Michael Bohnert

Michael Bohnert

@mbohnert

Husband | Father | Engineer @RANDCorporation | Researcher | Skier | My views are my own. RT≠endorsement. Following≠agreement.

انضم Mart 2009
441 يتبع1.8K المتابعون
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
Hi Twitter—longtime lurker and @RANDCorporation researcher, ready to tweet. My research focuses on maritime and air systems and operations as well as industrial base management. Follow me for insights, facts, and analysis of these and other topics.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@TrentTelenko I think Russia is inflating the overall numbers. Ukraine has no reason to correct them.
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Trent Telenko
Trent Telenko@TrentTelenko·
Saturation of a missile based air defense is simple arithmetic. The number of ready fire missiles is know as is the reload rate. You just send enough more drones and missiles than the calculated interceptor number to destroy your target. In 2026, Ukraine has enough drones to do this.
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert

Hundreds of Ukrainian drones overwhelmed Moscow’s layered air defenses on June 17-18. Russia claims it downed 555+ UAVs that night alone, yet multiple struck the Kapotnya oil refinery for the second time erupting massive fires. This wasn’t luck. It was engineered saturation. The math tells the story. Ukraine launched massive coordinated waves, mixing armed drones with decoys that carry adjustable radar signatures to mimic real threats. Russian systems, optimized for fewer high-value missiles or aircraft, faced dozens arriving simultaneously from different angles. Even a 90%+ interception rate (per some Russian milbloggers) still left enough penetrators to hit the target. This breakthrough built on years of preparation. Ukrainian forces systematically targeted Russian air defense radars, launchers, and electronic warfare modules across multiple sectors. By hitting dispersed sites and forcing Russia to spread its best systems thin, Kyiv created exploitable gaps even around the heavily defended capital region. The provided inage shows how air defense locations are roughly 5 to 10 miles apart. For reference, an air defense can see drones at 100 ft about 5 miles away due to the radar horizon. This leaves at most three overlapping systems over a single target with roughly 4-32 interceptors available for use, easily overwhelmed. Flight paths were meticulously planned — sometimes J-shaped routes that circled defenses before final approach. Advanced Ukrainian drones, including faster jet-powered variants alongside propeller-driven models, complicated tracking. Decoys drew fire while real munitions pressed through. Going back to our map, buildings can be used as cover, although one drone hit a crane while flying low. The result: visible “oil rain,” refinery fires, and all four major Moscow airports grounding flights. Specific damage at Kapotnya included the combined oil refining unit, a secondary processing unit, and tank farm. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged strikes on the refinery and minor damage elsewhere. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported broad intercepts, but geolocated footage and official admissions confirmed real effects deep inside the capital’s defensive bubble. Compare the scale: Ukraine fired over 1,000 drones toward Russia in the broader operation that day. Even partial success against the most protected targets demonstrates a repeatable capability. Low-cost mass + prior attrition of defender systems + adaptive routing = a template that exposes vulnerabilities in legacy air defense doctrine. These aren’t one-off raids. They’re the product of sustained tactical evolution. Ukraine is proving it can impose real costs on Russia’s rear areas despite heavy defenses. Full details and context in the original report. Image via @Telegraph

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Malcontent News
Malcontent News@MalcontentmentT·
I did not have a Spanish company developing a laser-guidance kit for legacy 122mm Grad rockets that improves the CEP to 3 meters, on my BINGO card.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@zubapita Well, fancy tech helps, but yes planning and preparation definitely take you very far when planning strikes.
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根岸智幸
根岸智幸@zubapita·
敵の防空ミサイル網をかいくぐるのに必要なのは、映画みたいな気合いと根性と運命の女神じゃなくて、綿密な調査と計画と飽和攻撃なのですね。そりゃそうだ。
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert

Hundreds of Ukrainian drones overwhelmed Moscow’s layered air defenses on June 17-18. Russia claims it downed 555+ UAVs that night alone, yet multiple struck the Kapotnya oil refinery for the second time erupting massive fires. This wasn’t luck. It was engineered saturation. The math tells the story. Ukraine launched massive coordinated waves, mixing armed drones with decoys that carry adjustable radar signatures to mimic real threats. Russian systems, optimized for fewer high-value missiles or aircraft, faced dozens arriving simultaneously from different angles. Even a 90%+ interception rate (per some Russian milbloggers) still left enough penetrators to hit the target. This breakthrough built on years of preparation. Ukrainian forces systematically targeted Russian air defense radars, launchers, and electronic warfare modules across multiple sectors. By hitting dispersed sites and forcing Russia to spread its best systems thin, Kyiv created exploitable gaps even around the heavily defended capital region. The provided inage shows how air defense locations are roughly 5 to 10 miles apart. For reference, an air defense can see drones at 100 ft about 5 miles away due to the radar horizon. This leaves at most three overlapping systems over a single target with roughly 4-32 interceptors available for use, easily overwhelmed. Flight paths were meticulously planned — sometimes J-shaped routes that circled defenses before final approach. Advanced Ukrainian drones, including faster jet-powered variants alongside propeller-driven models, complicated tracking. Decoys drew fire while real munitions pressed through. Going back to our map, buildings can be used as cover, although one drone hit a crane while flying low. The result: visible “oil rain,” refinery fires, and all four major Moscow airports grounding flights. Specific damage at Kapotnya included the combined oil refining unit, a secondary processing unit, and tank farm. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged strikes on the refinery and minor damage elsewhere. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported broad intercepts, but geolocated footage and official admissions confirmed real effects deep inside the capital’s defensive bubble. Compare the scale: Ukraine fired over 1,000 drones toward Russia in the broader operation that day. Even partial success against the most protected targets demonstrates a repeatable capability. Low-cost mass + prior attrition of defender systems + adaptive routing = a template that exposes vulnerabilities in legacy air defense doctrine. These aren’t one-off raids. They’re the product of sustained tactical evolution. Ukraine is proving it can impose real costs on Russia’s rear areas despite heavy defenses. Full details and context in the original report. Image via @Telegraph

Meguro-ku, Tokyo 🇯🇵 日本語
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@Arthur_Foxache @Oglokoog Well, given how many missiles use the same launch setup, hard to tell which one. But yes, something is clearly amiss. That being said, Pansirs underperformed in Libya and elsewhere.
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Arthur Foxache 1776 - 2024
Arthur Foxache 1776 - 2024@Arthur_Foxache·
@mbohnert @Oglokoog If so, that makes it even more comical. Aren't the 57E6 radar-guided? Meaning they locked on to the oil tank, or the missile's components are so poor it went completely stupid on launch.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
Now that the oil and ash have somewhat settled from this week's Ukrainian strikes on Moscow, I want to make a few updates. Earlier I had commented on the quality of Russian air defenses, there is much to unpack. What was surprising was how high some of the Ukrainian drones and missiles flew. Many were flying what appeara to be between 100 and 300 feet. At this altitude radar visibility should have been in the dozens of miles, even in a city with buildings. This leads to my first observation, many of the Russian fire units appear to be unready for the incoming drones. Many of the shots are inly after the drone has passed. Either the operators are untrained (highly likely), the command and control is poor (I have yet to hear radios in the background of fire teams shot videos), or there is next to no early warning. The lack of early warning is of particular interest. Ukraine has spent significant effort targeting Russian air defenses over the past +4 years. Russia may have lost many more radars than we realized or they are intentionally keeping them off to protect them. Very hard to tell at this time, but worth monitoring. The command and control is very hard to accurately assess remotely, but there does seem to be a lack of planning and coordination of air defenses. Numerous videos show Russia air defense teams in odd locations such as low points. Now these are near roads, so it could be a choice for mobile air defense or to make up for a lack of capacity. However, having air defense units at highr elevation would support better early warning by the local air defense if broader early warning is unavailable. It is very hard to separate poor training from poor equipment. The image I attached has become widely viewed. It shows a Russian air defender shoot a man portable air defense (MANPAD). The missile immediately veers off somewhere else. It could be operator error either with poor shot selection or general procedures. It could be faulty systems providing poor feedback. It could be older systems that can't handle saturation well and detected a larger heat source offbore (noted by @TrentTelenko) . The missile that cause the iconic fuel tank discussion was a stray missile where the intended target isn't visible. More images of these failures keep pouring in. Regardless of the reason, there is something fundamentally wrong with Russian air defense. It wasn't just Ukraine's use of overwhelming raids, good route planning, and long term preparations. We may have to wait for the next bug strikes to get more information. We probably won't have to wait long. Image source @Osinttechnical
Michael Bohnert tweet media
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@morganlinton @elonmusk @nikitabier I appreciate the freedorm nature. It has definitely been nice using X to interact with new people. Especially helpful to keep share knowledge about rapidly changing AI topics.
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Morgan
Morgan@morganlinton·
For years, I was hesitant to post a lot on X, afraid of what people might think if I was just totally myself, and said what was on my mind. But I have to say, with @elonmusk buying X, and adding @nikitabier to the team, it is the best it has ever been. And I think this has empowered me, and many others, to feel comfortable, just being ourselves, in public, and it feels really good. Thanks to both of you for making X a place where quirky people like me, can find other quirky people like me, that seem to get excited about the same weird stuff. There is no close second to X right now, it is the place to find your people.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@RichardfromSyd1 One thing to think about is because Ukraine was being struck from day one, they burned through their legacy stuff quickly and have been iterating since. Russia really didn't have to increase air defense investments until recently. They clearly failed to plan.
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Richard from Sydney
Richard from Sydney@RichardfromSyd1·
@mbohnert At least initially, Ukraine was using the same or older kit, yet don’t seems to have had the same issues or resolved them quickly.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@Arthur_Foxache You and me both. A few of the others may make sense as they might veer off to other heat sensors if the sensor was dirty. But yes, it is baffling.
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Arthur Foxache 1776 - 2024
Arthur Foxache 1776 - 2024@Arthur_Foxache·
@mbohnert What I don't understand is how an IR head MANPAD can go so stupid it ignores the target and instead locks on to a giant oil storage tank.
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Clément Molin
Clément Molin@clement_molin·
We have so much videos of Ukrainian 🇺🇦 middle-strikes now that Magyar is posting nearly one per day, not counting other units. We can easily estimate that more than 100 mid-range strikes are happening everyday in Russia's rear with at least 10 trucks hit a day (minimum)...
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Olivier Bonnefon
Olivier Bonnefon@BonnefonO·
@mbohnert I just finished reading your analysis. Either this is incompetence on a staggering scale or evidence of a deeper institutional breakdown. My time in Russia left me with the impression of a country so brutal and so thoroughly corrupted that its institutions barely function anymore
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
Hundreds of Ukrainian drones overwhelmed Moscow’s layered air defenses on June 17-18. Russia claims it downed 555+ UAVs that night alone, yet multiple struck the Kapotnya oil refinery for the second time erupting massive fires. This wasn’t luck. It was engineered saturation. The math tells the story. Ukraine launched massive coordinated waves, mixing armed drones with decoys that carry adjustable radar signatures to mimic real threats. Russian systems, optimized for fewer high-value missiles or aircraft, faced dozens arriving simultaneously from different angles. Even a 90%+ interception rate (per some Russian milbloggers) still left enough penetrators to hit the target. This breakthrough built on years of preparation. Ukrainian forces systematically targeted Russian air defense radars, launchers, and electronic warfare modules across multiple sectors. By hitting dispersed sites and forcing Russia to spread its best systems thin, Kyiv created exploitable gaps even around the heavily defended capital region. The provided inage shows how air defense locations are roughly 5 to 10 miles apart. For reference, an air defense can see drones at 100 ft about 5 miles away due to the radar horizon. This leaves at most three overlapping systems over a single target with roughly 4-32 interceptors available for use, easily overwhelmed. Flight paths were meticulously planned — sometimes J-shaped routes that circled defenses before final approach. Advanced Ukrainian drones, including faster jet-powered variants alongside propeller-driven models, complicated tracking. Decoys drew fire while real munitions pressed through. Going back to our map, buildings can be used as cover, although one drone hit a crane while flying low. The result: visible “oil rain,” refinery fires, and all four major Moscow airports grounding flights. Specific damage at Kapotnya included the combined oil refining unit, a secondary processing unit, and tank farm. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged strikes on the refinery and minor damage elsewhere. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported broad intercepts, but geolocated footage and official admissions confirmed real effects deep inside the capital’s defensive bubble. Compare the scale: Ukraine fired over 1,000 drones toward Russia in the broader operation that day. Even partial success against the most protected targets demonstrates a repeatable capability. Low-cost mass + prior attrition of defender systems + adaptive routing = a template that exposes vulnerabilities in legacy air defense doctrine. These aren’t one-off raids. They’re the product of sustained tactical evolution. Ukraine is proving it can impose real costs on Russia’s rear areas despite heavy defenses. Full details and context in the original report. Image via @Telegraph
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Caroline Bajada🌻🇺🇦🇺🇦🌻
@mbohnert The team really is dedicated I’ve been listening to them since day one Their principles, their moral compass, all their work & words are brilliant! It’ll be great to listen to you again, next time you’re on… In the meantime—keep up your amazing work! Truly well done🇺🇦
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
And I am so glad you liked it. The team there is really dedicated and great to work with. Not sure when I will be on next. We always plan it when a new technology or capability affects the war. The Ukrainian logistics strikes with "AI" and the talk of AI with air defenses was this catalyst
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Caroline Bajada🌻🇺🇦🇺🇦🌻
@mbohnert 😁 I’m sure! Hope your flight was good and you arrived back safe and well Thank you again for coming on Ukraine: the latest It was great listening to all your very interesting insights Hope to hear you again very soon! 🇺🇦
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@BonnefonO Russia should have been. They have had 2 years of strikes. There is something structurally wrong with their system. It is worthwhile to understand why it is so brittle.
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Olivier Bonnefon
Olivier Bonnefon@BonnefonO·
@mbohnert Outstanding analysis. Thank you, @mbohnert. Ukraine has pioneered a new operational model that is reshaping the battlefield and leveling the playing field. Russia wasn’t ready for it. Europe and the United States probably aren’t either.
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@Deadlyey5 Given the terrain, peoplex and satellites , probably not hard to keep up to date with minimal effort
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dealyey5
dealyey5@Deadlyey5·
@mbohnert It also seems like western intelligence has some program that effectively provides Ukraine with a Real time map of air defense systems and coverage so Ukraine go through gaps or oversaturate less defended areas
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Michael Bohnert
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert·
@kenul1_ken They would need something similar to that. Ukraine uses their microphone system
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ken mac
ken mac@kenul1_ken·
@mbohnert They need a modern day observer corps if they lack radar early warning
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Ian Worrell
Ian Worrell@muswell_boy·
@mbohnert @MarioNawfal If a drone strikes the front of the convoy - say 2 tankers , at that speed, it would double bubble trouble?
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Mario Nawfal
Mario Nawfal@MarioNawfal·
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Russian fuel trucks in Crimea are now moving with armed military escorts and rapid-response fire teams deployed along the roads to protect them from Ukrainian drone attacks It means the logistics situation is genuinely bad and getting worse. This is crisis management dressed up as procedure. Source: @TabzLIVE on Telegram / Writer: Oliver
Mario Nawfal@MarioNawfal

🇺🇦🇷🇺 Ukrainian drones struck the Tavricheskaya Thermal Power Plant near Simferopol in Russian-occupied Crimea overnight. NASA FIRMS satellite data detected heat signatures at the plant, indicating a significant portion of it was on fire. Source: @Osinttechnical / Writer: Ian

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Ulrïc Eriksson
Ulrïc Eriksson@ErikssonUlric·
Tl;dr: still unclear what air defense doing.
Michael Bohnert@mbohnert

Now that the oil and ash have somewhat settled from this week's Ukrainian strikes on Moscow, I want to make a few updates. Earlier I had commented on the quality of Russian air defenses, there is much to unpack. What was surprising was how high some of the Ukrainian drones and missiles flew. Many were flying what appeara to be between 100 and 300 feet. At this altitude radar visibility should have been in the dozens of miles, even in a city with buildings. This leads to my first observation, many of the Russian fire units appear to be unready for the incoming drones. Many of the shots are inly after the drone has passed. Either the operators are untrained (highly likely), the command and control is poor (I have yet to hear radios in the background of fire teams shot videos), or there is next to no early warning. The lack of early warning is of particular interest. Ukraine has spent significant effort targeting Russian air defenses over the past +4 years. Russia may have lost many more radars than we realized or they are intentionally keeping them off to protect them. Very hard to tell at this time, but worth monitoring. The command and control is very hard to accurately assess remotely, but there does seem to be a lack of planning and coordination of air defenses. Numerous videos show Russia air defense teams in odd locations such as low points. Now these are near roads, so it could be a choice for mobile air defense or to make up for a lack of capacity. However, having air defense units at highr elevation would support better early warning by the local air defense if broader early warning is unavailable. It is very hard to separate poor training from poor equipment. The image I attached has become widely viewed. It shows a Russian air defender shoot a man portable air defense (MANPAD). The missile immediately veers off somewhere else. It could be operator error either with poor shot selection or general procedures. It could be faulty systems providing poor feedback. It could be older systems that can't handle saturation well and detected a larger heat source offbore (noted by @TrentTelenko) . The missile that cause the iconic fuel tank discussion was a stray missile where the intended target isn't visible. More images of these failures keep pouring in. Regardless of the reason, there is something fundamentally wrong with Russian air defense. It wasn't just Ukraine's use of overwhelming raids, good route planning, and long term preparations. We may have to wait for the next bug strikes to get more information. We probably won't have to wait long. Image source @Osinttechnical

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