Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante
482 posts

Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet

Not the French fault that the British never fielded a proper expeditionary army until Waterloo. That's definitely the correct strategic move by the coalition to ensure that their decisive battle was fought under circumstances of their choosing.
Another Pezzonovante@everyonesheroo7
By the time Britain is really fielding a large, first‑rate expeditionary army, the Grande Armee has already been bled in Spain and then in Russia. The Grand Armee as we think of it when we hear that word, never fought the British.
English

The British were so focused on naval war and subsidising coalitions that their only land clashes are mostly in peripheral theatres like Calabria 1806 and the peninsular campaign, which is of course not the Grande Armee.
Another Pezzonovante@everyonesheroo7
Napoleon’s army in its 1805- 1807 apex virtually never met the British in a stand‑up continental battle. Instead, it destroyed Austrians, Prussians, and Russians instead.
English
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet
Another Pezzonovante retweetet

Why was Caesar Rome's Greatest General?
(new Cost of Glory video)
I think the best illustration may be his Pharsalus campaign, where he faced Pompey and the combined grand army of his optimate antagonists, in the Civil War.
It began with Caesar's humiliating strategic loss at Dyrrhachium.
But one of Caesar's master strokes:
In a campaign in which everyone else (including most historians today) thought Caesar had time working against him. He *kind of* did, since Pompey was vastly better provisioned with food, money, ships, etc.
But Caesar realized an opportunity to turn the tables:
When he retreated to the wide plains of Thessaly, great cavalry country, he was luring Pompey into a position where Pompey was obviously superior (Pompey had 7x the cavalry that Caesar did).
Pompey kept refusing battle, knowing Caesar's great strength, while trying to make it look like Caesar was the one refusing battle (really Pompey was just offering it on insane terms, outside his fort, up on a hill).
But Caesar was just waiting for the pressure to build on Pompey (much of the senate was literally watching, while camped out with Pompey, and getting impatient).
Caesar at last called Pompey's bluff, and packed up to retreat. Now, if Pompey let Caesar go when he had him on easy territory, he'd be revealed as timid.
Caesar knew that, to stay at the top of Rome's leadership, Pompey couldn't just wear Caesar down in a war of attrition. He had to challenge him man to man.
The whole campaign came down not so much to military supremacy, as to a clash of egos, of politics, and Caesar exploited this fact to the maximum.
To settle it then and there was militarily and strategically unnecessary, the military risk/reward calculation was bad.
But Caesar offered a temptation too great to refuse for someone whose objective was not pure victory, but securing his reputation.
Not unlike Alexander's approach to Darius III!
Pompey marched out, fought, and lost.
Battle details herein:
English








