abu bouli al boulali

j’ai taffé en compta au château de versailles mdmdmdr si vous saviez le prix pour louer une nuit #wow

@sebp888 People have been buying Proton VPN with Monero since September. We also added Proton Mail, Proton Unlimited, etc into the mix as well for good measure. x.com/davidgpeterson…

It's not easy to visualize the relay attack against the #EU #AgeVerification app from a user's perspective, so here it is. Even if the app works exactly as designed, the website & verification process is entirely decoupled & 'anonymous' The architecture assumes you'll send the request to your device, which contains your biometric data. But, it can go to any device, anywhere in the world... and because the phone has no way to know who initiated the process, the child still passes age verification. The assertion is the user is over 18. In reality, the app is responding to say the owner of this Android device is over 18. It doesn't know who the user is... how can it know their age? This is the current design, not a bug. They thought the ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C/DC API upgrade would protect against this, but CTAP only protects against external attackers, not the user wanting to bypass the system themselves - hence my description that we've replaced "I am over 18" with "someone is over 18" and it's supposedly better. If (more likely when) this is exploited, will company Directors/staff still face fines, legal action or imprisonment for not protecting children? Once you've signed in, websites are highly unlikely to ask for age verification again... so this attack, even if it could be mitigated in some way (I can't see how) only applies to new verifications. The EU #AgeVerification Relay Attack:

Hacking the #EU #AgeVerification app in under 2 minutes. During setup, the app asks you to create a PIN. After entry, the app *encrypts* it and saves it in the shared_prefs directory. 1. It shouldn't be encrypted at all - that's a really poor design. 2. It's not cryptographically tied to the vault which contains the identity data. So, an attacker can simply remove the PinEnc/PinIV values from the shared_prefs file and restart the app. After choosing a different PIN, the app presents credentials created under the old profile and let's the attacker present them as valid. Other issues: 1. Rate limiting is an incrementing number in the same config file. Just reset it to 0 and keep trying. 2. "UseBiometricAuth" is a boolean, also in the same file. Set it to false and it just skips that step. Seriously @vonderleyen - this product will be the catalyst for an enormous breach at some point. It's just a matter of time.