AgentOps Security

Your AI agents are running shell commands, editing code, opening PRs with zero local guardrails. That is insane. We just dropped a full open source local-first #AgentStack for orchestration. One CLI for scanning, firewall policy, sandboxing, cost checks, review. Works standalone or as a full kit. This is the layer nobody is building and everybody needs. Agents without local guardrails will blow up on you. It's not a question of if. Works with Codex, Claude, Gemini, OpenCode, Cursor, MCP-heavy repos. All outputs stay in local repo files. No hosted service. This is how it should work. The orchestra layer is the actual #AgentOps bottleneck right now. If you're running agents without this you're flying blind. github.com/AgentOpsSec/st…

What's the worst thing your agent has done unsupervised?

Local-first, open-source guardrails between agents and tools are the missing layer. No SaaS dependency. No black box. Just visibility, control, and auditability on your machine. We're building this at agentopssec.com

Your AI agent has root and no supervision. Right now most developers give their coding agents more access than they'd give a new hire. Shell commands. File system writes. API keys. All behind a single "approve" click. Let that sink in. #ZeroTrustAI #AIHasRoot

If you're running scattered agent security tools with no shared context right now, take a look.

The #AIAgentOps security stack should work the same way. Local-first. Composable. No coupling. No SaaS middleman where one isn't needed. We're building toward this at agentopssec.com/stack

Your agent stack isn't insecure because you're missing a tool. It's insecure because your tools don't talk to each other. This is the real #AgentSecurity gap right now and almost nobody is addressing it.

If you're ignoring #AIAgentRisk by wiring MCP servers into production without auditing permissions, you're one bad tool away from a real incident. Check it out: agentopssec.com/mcp-doctor What does your MCP audit process look like right now?

4. Log every tool call. Make it replayable. 5. Review the surface before you run. This is exactly what we built MCP Doctor to solve. Scan before trust. Policy before access. Logs before assumptions.

Most devs plugging MCP servers into their agents right now have zero idea what permissions those tools actually have. Filesystem access. Shell execution. Network calls. All invisible by default. This is a #MCPSecurity blind spot begging to be exploited. Let me break it down.