Zitzwitz that the accuracy of prices depends on the volume of retail traders creating noise trading. Without this noise, the maker cannot make money on the spread and compensate for its risks. The Glosten-Milgrom model proves: The spread compensates the maker for the inverse
A deep analysis of the zero-fee mechanism in the HIP-4 specification reveals the first structural compromise of the study: the complete, uncompromising dependence of market accuracy on external market makers. It is known from the theory of predictive markets by Wolfers and
The Fee Structure of the platform defines the entry barriers for capital. A comparison of Polymarket, Kalshi, and HIP-4 reveals drastic differences in monetization and trading costs for the end user. Kalshi operates according to the classic derivatives exchange model: the
The second axis of comparison is the Pricing Mechanism. Historical platforms (Augur v1) relied on automated market makers like Robin Hanson's LMSR. Modern players have bet on stock exchange glasses. Polymarket uses a hybrid model: the Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) is combined
Traditionally, it is believed that the contract price in the forecast market (for example, 0.70) is a direct reflection of the subjective probability of an event (70%). Academic research refutes this illusion. According to Manski's research, the equilibrium price reflects the
Dispute resolution and final settlement is the first and key axis of forecasting platform design. The way the system determines whether an event has occurred divides markets into reliably neutral and authoritarian ones. Polymarket trusts the decentralized optimistic oracle of