Unit Observer

In this thread we will present the source lists for our other threads:

@AndruhaK66412 Rubizh originally belongs to 2nd Corps, but is currently deployed in 1st Corps area (where you can see it on the map)

@WarUnitObserver Hi, do I read it wrong but on your map 4th brigade rubizh is present on this axis, whereas you mention that 4th is currently fighting along 2nd corps

🇺🇦Brigade swap on the frontline - 1st "Azov" Corps of the National Guard now has four of its five organic brigades operating in its sector. As we reported in collaboration with @tochnyi last week, the 33rd Mechanized Brigade left the Dobropillya axis in February and transferred to the Kupyansk direction. Recent footage posted by the NGU's 1st "Bureviy" Brigade indicates that the unit swapped positions with the 33rd Brigade, joining its parent 1st "Azov" Corps east of Dobropillya.

Additional resources: - 1st NGU "Bureviy" Brigade strikes geolocated to Nove Shakhove x.com/moklasen/statu… - Thread by Clement Molin on Dobropillya's critical role x.com/clement_molin/… - Our recent article on the transfer of the 33rd Mechanized Brigade to Kupyansk tochnyi.info/2026/03/frontl…

Dobropillya axis overview Out of the five full brigades currently operating under 🇺🇦"Azov" Corps, four are organically part of it - the 14th, 20th, 1st and 12th. Additionally, the 4th "Rubizh" Brigade is currently attached from the NGU's 2nd "Khartia" Corps. These units are involved in the defense of the key Dobropillya direction, north of Pokrovsk, where the entire Russian 🇷🇺51st Combined Arms Army and parts of the 🇷🇺8th Combined Arms Army have been exerting intense pressure since the summer of 2025. A breakthrough in this area would outflank the "Donetsk fortress cities" (Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk) - potentially a very favourable outcome for the Russians. While this might be one of the goals of their spring offensive, the 🇷🇺51st CAA units are rumored to be significantly attrited after the autumn-winter fighting. The 🇺🇦"Azov" Corps, leading some of the most capable NGU units, is likely to make any Russian advance extremely costly in the coming months.

Lastly, the 55th Naval Infantry Division also redeployed to southern Zaporizhzhia but, as far as we can tell, has yet to engage in combat. In this case, volunteers even posted aid deliveries with location information on social media. t.me/romanov_92/512…

Additionally, following the dismissal of Maj. Gen. Akhmedov from his command of the naval infantry grouping on the Dobropillia axis, several Russian marine units were pulled back. The 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (MUN10103) has now reappeared in the south. vk.com/wall-192849126…

🇷🇺 ORBAT – Hulyaipole Following Ukrainian reinforcements in the area, Russian forces redeployed units from Pokrovsk to Hulyaipole, likely in an attempt to maintain offensive tempo in southern Zaporizhzhia. x.com/WarUnitObserve…

Sources: 21st: vk.com/wall-2499828_2… 22nd: t.me/rodnaya98vdd/3… 23rd: t.me/razyashchie/65 25th: vk.com/wall-121828295… 24th: Subordination based on numbering, position and process of elimination: all VDV divisions have a 2xth Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion, numbering of all others is known, therefor this one has to be under 7th Air Assault Division. Additionally, the unit location aligns with 7th Air Assault Division, see: x.com/RedHibana/stat…

We have identified all Russian 🇷🇺 Separate Unmanned Systems Battalions that are subordinated to VDV divisions. As we had evidence of UAV Battalions in multiple VDV Divisions before the formation of these Battalions, we assume that they were used as basis.

Closing remarks: while the extent of 🇺🇦Ukrainian success since the beginning of this recent operation is still unclear, it seems the attacking units have managed to halt 🇷🇺Russian momentum and clear several villages previously considered in the "gray zone" or under light Russian control. Given the last time 🇺🇦Ukraine held the initiative in this area was during the 2023 counteroffensive's push south of Velyka Novosilka, this is an important result. It also demonstrates 🇺🇦Ukrainian forces retain the ability to conduct localized offensive operations, as was the case in Dobropillya (August-September 2025) and Kupyansk (September-November 2025). We will provide more detailed information on these ongoing events as it becomes available.

🇷🇺Russian forces thus continued advancing from Uspenivka and Poltavka, reaching the Hulyaipole-Pokrovske highway at the end of November. Various villages in the open fields between these two larger towns were infiltrated and taken by invading forces. Hulyaipole was, at this point, in a semi-encirclement with Russians on three sides. The 🇺🇦225th Assault Regiment in its entire strength was thus redeployed from Sumy in late November. It took control of the entire Hulyaipole sector, approximately from Dorozhnyanka to Dobropillya, and re-organized the (mainly TDF) forces now under it. While the city still fell to the Russians, the 🇺🇦225th’s intervention managed to slow down their momentum and consolidate the line on the Hulyaipole-Pokrovske highway by January. While enemy infiltrations continued, they were not allowed to consolidate after moving kilometers deep behind the Ukrainian lines, as had happened during the autumn. Despite this, Ukrainian higher command also deployed most of the 🇺🇦1st Assault Regiment north of the 225th, along with various elements of the 🇺🇦33rd, 24th and 210th Regiments. In hindsight, this decision could have been a hint for 🇷🇺Russian command that the 🇺🇦Ukrainian objective was not simply slowing their advances, but retaking the initiative in the area.

🇺🇦Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front - the wider perspective Between the end of January and the beginning of February, Ukrainian forces began a series of counterattacks aimed at the south-eastern corner of the frontline - split between the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro oblasts. This area recorded the deepest 🇷🇺Russian advances in late 2025, but the low force density generated by the infiltration tactics used seems to be an exploitable weakness. The Russian 🇷🇺“Vostok” Grouping faces several 🇺🇦Ukrainian assault regiments along with the 🇺🇦82nd and 95th Air Assault brigades, redeployed from Pokrovsk in late January for the occasion. Given most of this information has been published by various other sources, we set out to provide a longer perspective on the often neglected and forgotten south-eastern corner of the frontline. [1/9]

Additional Notes - Given how frequently Ukrainian reserves are discussed online, it is worth highlighting that both the 🇺🇦72nd Mechanized and 127th Heavy Mechanized brigades appear to still be in Kharkiv oblast, but generally not taking part in active combat based on the lack of recent drone footage and other indicators. A possible explanation is that the units are undergoing a period of rest and refit, while being kept in reserve should a Russian breakthrough occur north of the regional capital. It is also worth mentioning that, especially in the 127th Brigade's case, these units' manning levels are unknown and likely below average. - The 🇺🇦225th Assault Regiment's 1st Assault Battalion, mentioned in post #2, left Vovchans'k in late December to join the rest of its parent regiment on the critical Hulyaipole front. - The 🇺🇦113th TDF Brigade's 1st Battalion is to be reorganized into one of the brigade's two unmanned systems battalions. - The 🇷🇺71st Motor Rifle Division mentioned in the previous post is the expanded 200th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade. Quite famously, one of the very first photos of destroyed Russian tanks on 24/02/2022 was a de-turreted T-80BVM "736" belonging to the 200th Brigade (Image #2 - source: @WarSpotting). It was destroyed around 50km south-west of where the division's subunits are deployed now.

With the intensification of small scale assault actions in December, 🇷🇺Russian forces succeeded in pushing 🇺🇦Ukrainian units south of the city itself, even reaching the village of Vil'cha. It remains unclear whether they managed to consolidate these gains. On the western flank of the salient, near Hrafs'ke, the 🇺🇦48th Reconnaissance Battalion (formerly part of the 72nd Brigade) is deployed as part of the 16th Army Corps. Other elements include the 🇺🇦5th Battalion of the 120th TDF Brigade, along with the aforementioned battalion of the 58th Brigade. Command and control above the battalion level in this sector is unclear at the moment, though it is possible that these units are all operating under the 🇺🇦57th Motorized Brigade. 🇷🇺Russian pressure here seems to be exclusively focused on the village of Lyman. The eastern flank of the city has elements of the 🇺🇦113th TDF Brigade and 🇺🇦159th Mechanized Brigade (though some of its battalions are detached elsewhere in Kharkiv oblast). The 🇷🇺127th and (possibly) 126th Motor Rifle Regiments, belonging to the 71st Division, transferred to this area from Chasiv Yar at the end of 2025 - an intensification of assaults in this direction come spring would not be surprising.

The Battle of Vovchans'k - how the destroyed town fell after almost 2 Years. The renewed 🇷🇺Russian offensive in northern Kharkiv oblast began in May 2024. Only at the end of 2025 did the heavily shelled border town of Vovchans'k become entirely occupied. Most units in this area have been facing each other for a long time, with the 🇺🇦57th Motorized Brigade being in charge of the city's defense in opposition to the 🇷🇺69th Motor Rifle Division, 128th Motor Rifle Brigade, and various attached regiments. Operational command falls under the Ukrainian 🇺🇦16th Army Corps and the Russian 🇷🇺6th Combined Arms Army.