Bulama Bukarti, PhD@bulamabukarti
Interesting points. Allow me to offer my views on some of them.
On your first point, it is correct that the National Security Agencies Act establishes the State Security Service (SSS) and does not expressly mention the “Department of State Services (DSS).”
However, this is unlikely to invalidate proceedings. Nigerian courts treat such nomenclature discrepancies as misnomer, provided there is no confusion about the identity of the agency. The SSS has long operated administratively as DSS. Unless prejudice is shown, the defect is curable.
On your second point, the NSA Act does not expressly grant prosecutorial powers to the SSS/DSS. But Section 174 of the Constitution vests prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General of the Federation, who may act personally, through officers of his department or by granting fiat to other agencies or individuals.
In practice, SSS/DSS officers frequently prosecute matters, particularly under the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, either in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of Justice or delegated representatives of the Attorney-General.
Thus, the real legal question is not whether the SSS possesses inherent prosecutorial power, but whether the charge was instituted in the name of the AGF or pursuant to proper constitutional authorisation from him (which is typically standard and not granted on a case-by-case basis).
On your third point, an extrajudicial statement simply means a statement made outside court proceedings. It does not need to be made under caution unless it is made before the police or other investigative agencies and the prosecution seeks to tender it as a confessional statement whose voluntariness is in issue. A televised interview is capable of constituting an admission. The absence of caution does not automatically render it inadmissible.
Furthermore, if you watch the interview again, you will observe that El-Rufai first said, “We listen to their calls,” and subsequently stated, “Someone tapped his phone and told me,” without indicating that his initial remark was a mistake. The prosecution is therefore entitled to frame multiple alternative counts to reflect those two formulations, and that appears to be what was done in Counts 1 and 2. If he contends that the first statement was a slip, the prosecution may fall back on the second count.
On your fourth point, section 36(11) of the Constitution protects against compelled self-incrimination. It does not immunise voluntary public statements. If a person speaks freely on national television, those words are admissible. The constitutional shield applies against compulsion - not against consequences of voluntary speech.
Having said all of the above, I think El-Rufai’s words alone are unlikely to ground a conviction for wiretapping. The prosecution must still prove beyond reasonable doubt:
1.That interception actually occurred;
2.That it was unlawful;
3.That he participated, facilitated or conspired.
Without independent oral, document or expert evidence, a televised utterance alone may be insufficient to ground conviction.