Javier Blas

This week, The World for Sale comes out in paperback It explains how oil and commodity markets work, how they influence geopolitics, and the extraordinary power of a few traders you've probably never heard of Please take a look smarturl.it/TheWorldForSal…

The lowest paid seafarer gets about $1,500 per month, so the bonus comes at ~$9,000 per crossing and back for the lowest paid crew. A captain may take home $15,000 a month, so the bonus comes at ~$90,000.

The Wages of Fear (six-month salary bonus to cross the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf — and back) bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

The EU is facing a collapse in support for new economic sanctions targeting Russia as national capitals refuse to back measures that could damage their corporate champions, diplomats have warned. @henryjfoy @alicemhancock and @xtophercook report: ft.com/content/eb0cd7…

Mexico hedges a significant chunk of its oil exports every year, typically in the Jul-Aug-Sept period in a massive program known as the "Hacienda" hedge. I claim no knowledge of what sovereign hedgers are doing, but clearly current oil prices are quite inviting. Just saying.

"... And though the dangers of escalation are growing, analysts say, neither side can really afford it, either economically or politically at home..." -- @ErikaSolomon nytimes.com/2026/07/20/wor…

BREAKING: Houthis of Yemen announce a a "maritime embargo" against Saudi Arabia, "effective immediately." Saudi Arabia has until now exported ~4.5m b/d from Yanbu in the Red Sea, most of it heading South throughout the Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen and Djibouti-Eritrea

CHART OF THE DAY: Morgan Stanley reckons that more than half of Russian oil refinery capacity is down due to Ukrainian attacks. Typically, Russia is the world's second-largest diesel exporter - normally around 11% of global seaborne trade.

Iran has received “some proposals” from unspecified mediators regarding the war with the US, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei says in press conference, without elaborating.

Another ugly night in the Strait of Hormuz, with at least one tanker hit and on fire (according to @UK_MTO warning). The Greek shipowners (plus a few others) are still crossing the strait, at great risk for crews and ships.

For the third day in a row, Kuwait says that Iran attacked one of its water desalination and power plants. Kuwait says a “large number” of units were impacted.

Now that the American enemy is seeking to escalate the conflict thereby incurring even heavier costs and further humiliation, it should know that the noble nation of Iran and the Resistance Front have unforgettable lessons in store for it.

As Kuwait’s water desalination plants are attacked for the second day in a row, re-publishing this @Opinion column originally posted in March during the early days of the U.S.-Iran war. Sadly, it’s still relevant. bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…

BREAKING: Kuwait state-owned company says “one of the vital sites in the oil sector” was attacked by Iran, resulting in “significant material losses.”

My take on the regional diplomatic landscape. - One of the most striking features of the current phase of the Iran-US confrontation is not only the daily exchange of strikes, but also the relative absence of the regional diplomacy that proved so important only a few weeks ago. - During the previous crisis, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt-the so-called Islamabad Quartet (STEP)-worked through different channels, with Qatar and Oman also playing important roles, creating the conditions that eventually led to the ceasefire and the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Today, that diplomatic momentum appears much weaker. - Pakistan, which had emerged as perhaps the most effective intermediary between Washington and Tehran, now finds itself operating in a much narrower diplomatic space. Islamabad has developed pragmatic and constructive relations with Iran over the years, shaped by geography, shared security concerns and the presence of a large Shiite community representing around one-fifth of Pakistan's population. At the same time, Pakistan remains deeply connected to the Persian Gulf monarchies through decades of political, economic and military cooperation. Its security partnership with Saudi Arabia-including a long-standing mutual defence framework-remains one of the pillars of its regional policy, while reports have recently suggested discussions on a similar arrangement with Kuwait. - As long as Tehran and the Persian Gulf monarchies manage their differences, Pakistan can effectively and successfully balance these relationships. But the more direct the confrontation becomes, the narrower Islamabad's diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The renewed Houthi-Saudi escalation, combined with growing tensions around Bab al-Mandab, makes that balancing act increasingly delicate. Pakistan is not stepping away from diplomacy; it is being forced to navigate between two strategic relationships that have both become more difficult to manage simultaneously. - Saudi Arabia itself is once again focused on its own security concerns, while Qatar also finds itself in a much more difficult position. Doha was previously one of the few actors able to speak credibly with both Washington and Tehran. Today, however, it has become directly exposed because of the Iranian strikes. A mediator inevitably loses room for manoeuvre once it becomes part of the battlefield. - At the same time, Iranian security-linked media have become increasingly critical of Erdogan and Turkey’s regional posture, openly portraying Ankara as a strategic rival. This does not necessarily signal a rupture, but it does suggest that the political cohesion which characterised the Islamabad Quartet during the previous round of diplomacy has weakened. - Egypt, which was the first country to promote the regional diplomatic initiative that later evolved into the Islamabad Quartet, bringing Saudi Arabia into the process with Washington’s encouragement, now appears increasingly isolated. Cairo remains committed to diplomacy, but it no longer seems to enjoy the same regional alignment that made the previous initiative possible. - This, perhaps, is the main difference from the previous crisis. Regional diplomacy has not disappeared, but each of its key actors is now constrained by a different strategic dilemma. Pakistan is trying to preserve its balancing role between Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia is preoccupied with Yemen. Qatar is directly exposed. Relations between Iran and Turkey have become more strained. The result is a fragmented diplomatic landscape precisely when a coordinated regional effort is needed the most. - The key question is therefore not only whether Washington and Tehran can eventually return to negotiations, but whether the regional diplomatic architecture that made the last de-escalation possible can be rebuilt. Without that convergence, another ceasefire will be considerably harder to achieve. #Iran

Kuwait says Iran has attacked another power and water desalination plant, causing a fire — it’s the second consecutive day that Tehran targets them.

The United States welcomes the signing of a historic MOU between the Governments of Iraq and Syria on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Iraq-Syria crude oil pipeline. This priority infrastructure project will advance security and stability through regional interconnectivity and prosperity. U.S. companies will play a key role in advancing construction. state.gov/releases/offic…

Scoop: The Trump administration notified Israel it is sending dozens more refueling planes to the country ahead of a potential expansion of military operations against Iran, three U.S. and Israeli officials said. My story on @axios axios.com/2026/07/17/tru…

“The world has changed considerably, with key European industries facing an unlevel playing field, heavy state subsidies, dumping, dubious labor conditions abroad,” EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said. (No, the world has not changed: Brussels has woken up to reality)

CLIMATE CHANGE: The European Commissions has proposed a **weaker CO2 reduction plan**, with an annual reduction on its carbon market’s emissions cap of 3.7% per year from 2031-2035, and 1.7% from 2036 (under current plans, the annual reduction was ~4.4%). bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

MUST READ: As Michal Meidan, head of China energy research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, puts it, when (and by how much) China would return to the global oil market is the "million-dollar question." reuters.com/business/energ…