Port3 Guardian

Port3 Token Update │ Migration Plan We are initiating a token migration to ensure ecosystem stability and protect user assets. The migration plan is as follows: 1. Migration Ratio Snapshot was taken at 20:56 UTC (right after the attack). All tokens will be migrated at a 1:1 ratio, with no loss to users. Migration will be done on CEXs also. So your tokens are SAFU. 2. Token Distribution We will distribute tokens by multi-send, we will send tokens in 200-500 per tx on-chain, to every user who were affected by this hack before 20:56 UTC. We are still confirming how distribution will happen on CEXs, once we will confirm we will update in announcement channel. 3. New Token will Launch Exclusively on BNB Chain Prior to this incident, we had already announced in April that: All $PORT3 liquidity on Ethereum would be migrated to BNB Chain. The new token contract will therefore be deployed only on BNB Chain for enhanced security and consistency. 4. Team Tokens Will Be Burned to Offset the Unauthorized Mint The excess supply created by the exploit will be fully neutralized through the burning of team tokens, which will be in total 162,750,000 $PORT3 to ensuring the total supply remains unchanged. We filled out the hole and hacker won’t be getting any new tokens and won’t be able to mint any new tokens from the new CA. We are communicating with exchanges to review the new token contract, and timelines for reopening deposits, withdrawals, and trading will be announced once confirmed. We have been building this project for years. The Team is here to stay and continue building. We took the hit but we will come out stronger and better. Meanwhile stay with us and just sit tight. YOUR FUNDS ARE SAFU. We will continue providing updates as the migration progresses. Thank you for your patience and support.

Incident Report: $PORT3 Hacker Attack PORT3 aimed to support the development of multiple chains, and therefore adopted @nexa_network’s cross-chain token solution, CATERC20. However, CATERC20 contained a boundary-condition validation vulnerability. After the token’s ownership was renounced, the function returned a value of 0, which happened to match the owner-verification condition. As a result, the ownership check failed and unauthorized access became possible. This issue was not identified in the CATERC20 audit report. Since the Port3 Token had previously renounced ownership for greater decentralization, it was in exactly this vulnerable state. 🧶 (1/3)

The entire incident is now clear, and the follow-up plan is already being formulated. We will announce the next steps soon