BQM

The Modal Trilemma Argument for the Necessary Existence of God ⸻ Definition By God I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect personal being. Necessary existence is not included in this definition. The argument does not begin by defining God as necessary. Instead, it begins with the familiar attributes traditionally associated with maximal greatness and examines what follows from them. The goal of the argument is to determine the modal status of such a being—whether such a being would be impossible, contingent, or necessary. ⸻ Clarifying A Priori Reasoning Before presenting the argument itself, it is important to clarify how a priori reasoning from properties works. Critics sometimes claim that statements such as “God is good” are trivial because goodness is supposedly built into the definition of God. But this confuses a tautology with a genuine a priori inference. Consider a simple geometric example. Geometric version 1.If a shape has eight equal sides and eight equal angles, then it is an octagon. 2.This shape has eight equal sides and eight equal angles. Therefore: This shape is an octagon. The conclusion follows necessarily, but it is not a meaningless restatement. Instead, we identified a set of properties that entail octagonhood. Now consider a parallel structure in the moral case. Moral version 1.A being with perfect knowledge of all value-relevant facts and perfect power to act on that knowledge cannot fail to do what is objectively best. 2.A maximally great being possesses perfect knowledge and perfect power. Therefore: The maximally great being is morally perfect. If a being is morally perfect in every possible situation, it is good. Thus the statement “God is good” is not definitional but the conclusion of a chain of reasoning. Just as eight equal sides + eight equal angles → octagon we get perfect knowledge + perfect power → moral perfection → goodness. Understanding this structure matters because the modal reasoning below proceeds in the same way: it does not define God into existence but explores what follows from the attributes of maximal greatness. ⸻ The Argument Premise 1 God is defined as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect personal being. These attributes describe a being that would possess maximal power, maximal knowledge, and perfect goodness. ⸻ Premise 2 Every candidate being must fall into one of three modal categories: impossible, contingent, or necessary. A being is impossible if it cannot exist in any possible reality. A being is contingent if it exists in some possible realities but not others. A being is necessary if it exists in every possible reality. These three possibilities exhaust the modal options. ⸻ Premise 3 If God exists, God would be the ultimate foundation of reality. A being with unlimited knowledge, power, and moral perfection would not merely be another object within reality but the deepest explanatory ground of it. ⸻ Premise 4 The ultimate foundation of reality cannot be contingent. If the ultimate ground of reality existed in some possible realities but not others, we would need an explanation for why it exists here but not there. Either something external explains the difference, the being’s own nature explains it, or the distribution is brute. External explanation undermines ultimacy. Internal explanation yields necessity. Brute distribution would make the ultimate foundation of reality arbitrary. ⸻ Premise 5 Therefore a maximally great being must be metaphysically independent. A maximally great being cannot depend on external causes or unexplained modal distribution. Its existence cannot flicker on and off across possible realities. ⸻ Premise 6 If God exists at all, God must exist necessarily rather than contingently. Once contingency is ruled out for a maximally great being, the remaining modal options are necessity or impossibility. ⸻ … continued in comment below

@Accounted44 @sylevus It doesn’t matter if they’re epistemically equal. What matters is whether or not God is actually possible or impossible.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus “Equal” *epistemologically* that is, to our best current knowledge. (Not actually/metaphysically) As I already noted your reasons equally apply to the case where there is no God necessarily by virtue of the fact it becomes the only possible explanation.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus Proof of my already noting such a world without God couldn’t be contingent:

@sylevus @Accounted44 You are contingent. What you (or I, or anyone else) can imagine has no bearing on the metaphysical reality of the candidate being we’ve been talking about. There are possible worlds where humans, including us, never exist. The argument is still valid in those worlds.

@PrayPuffPlay @Accounted44 It does, because if I imagine one god, I can make all the same necessary and contingent arguments for that god, even though "I" know it's imaginary. Imagine the difficulty when you are thousands of years removed from the person who can admit to imagining the god.

@sylevus @Accounted44 It has nothing to do with what we can or can’t imagine.

@PrayPuffPlay @Accounted44 Possible does not exclude imaginary, does it?

@Accounted44 @sylevus I’m saying a Godless world is impossible, you’ve been implying it’s contingent. I’m trying to help you see why that’s absurd. That world would also have to be either necessary or impossible if it depends on God’s existence.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus You've admitted the Godless world can't be contingent. So once possibility is granted, necessity follows. The burden is explaining what makes the Godless world impossible, not merely asserting there's actually a world with him without further reasoning. 3/3

1. Every candidate being is either necessary, contingent, or impossible. 2. A unicorn can exist in some possible worlds and fail to exist in others without contradiction or loss of its essential nature. 3. The concept of a unicorn is not impossible because it contains no contradiction. C. Therefore, a unicorn is contingent rather than necessary.

A Godless world is one possible state of affairs among many. The MGB is a candidate being whose modal status is evaluated across all possible worlds. If the MGB is possible, it exists in every possible world. That’s what necessity means. But if a Godless world is possible, that tells us only that one world lacks God. It doesn’t tell us why that world obtains, why others don’t, or why the MGB is impossible. You’ve admitted the MGB can’t be contingent. So once possibility is granted, necessity follows. The burden is explaining what makes the MGB impossible, not merely asserting there’s actually a world without him without further reasoning.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus You see the issue? I can throw back the same argument, just replacing God/MGB with the world without it, and in doing so create this symmetry. You didn’t demonstrate a single contradiction nor have I, we have merely made proposals both of which are internally logically coherent.

What makes the world impossible is God’s possibility. The MGB is a serious candidate for explaining the existence of logic, modality, consciousness, rationality, objective morality, intentionality, and the intelligibility of reality itself, to name just a few. What makes God impossible?

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus Do you now see what ROA does? It establishes a symmetry where *both* (yes including you the theist) have a burden of proof to demonstrate a contradiction in the other’s proposed existence. In the absence of any such contradictions being proven God isn’t proven nor disproven 2/2

1) Every candidate being is either necessary, contingent, or impossible. 2) The Maximally Great Being can’t be contingent. 3) Therefore, if the MGB exists in any possible world, it exists in every possible world. 4) A world without God is a world in which the MGB does not exist. 5) If there is a possible world without the MGB, then the MGB fails to exist in at least one possible world. 6) But anything that fails to exist in even one possible world is not necessary. 7) Therefore, a possible world without God would imply that the MGB is not necessary. 8) Since the MGB cannot be contingent (Premise 2), the only remaining option would be that the MGB is impossible. 9) Therefore, a world without God is possible only if the MGB is impossible. What makes God impossible?

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus Furthermore, the point is that for me to prove God impossible I must demonstrate a contradiction in the concept. However, this applies to *you* when you claim a world without God is impossible. *you* must too demonstrate a contradiction or else it’s assumed possible. 2/2

@Accounted44 @sylevus A human which is strictly a human and not the MGB temporarily taking on human form cannot necessarily exist.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus Clarification for 2: What I mean is something similar to: A human must necessarily exist but *you* end up being the human that exists but it could have been another because the necessity is generic.

A brute contingent fact is one thing. A brute contingent ultimate explanation is another. The moment God’s existence across modal space becomes arbitrary, the arbitrariness is more fundamental than God. The modal distribution becomes the deepest fact, not the being whose job was to explain the deepest facts.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus 1) Such a being could be a brute existence. (Something being brute doesn’t mean it can’t be contingent, IDK where you got that idea from) 2) A being similar to it might be necessary but *it* specifically is a contingent particular being. (Yet, no being higher than it exists)

@sylevus @praiseoflight @majestyofreason That’s simply not true. The God would have to be omnipotent and omniscient, of which there can only be one such God, and we’d just be talking about the same one.

@PrayPuffPlay @praiseoflight @majestyofreason Try learning to read English. 1 made up god can explain everything 1 real god does. How do you tell the difference?

Are you rationally required to bet on God? Here’s a crash course on Pascal’s Wager to help you decide👇 youtu.be/SzeTKiiC59A

You’re conceding contingency is off the table? Then we shouldn’t be talking about about what “seems possible” and instead talking about the actual, specific contradiction that makes God impossible. If the MGB is impossible in one world, S5 makes him impossible in every world. What feature of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection creates a contradiction so thoroughly that the concept can’t exist anywhere?

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus Bruh, this isn’t even a rebuttal to what I’m saying. I am *VERY* clearly *NOT* denying the dilemma but rather playing into it.

@sylevus @praiseoflight @majestyofreason

@PrayPuffPlay @praiseoflight @majestyofreason I make up 1 god, it explains everything. Your argument is equally useful, true or not. So it is not an indicator of truth.

The contradiction isn’t “contingent beings can’t know things.” The contradiction is that a maximally powerful and knowledgeable being would have its own existence conditioned by modal facts beyond its control. If it exists in some worlds but not others, what explains that distribution? If something does, it’s more fundamental. If nothing does, maximality becomes brute and unexplained, making it impossible for such a being to be contingent.

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus …must be possible to fulfill in its entirety necessarily. Nothing stops contingent existences from having knowledge of all contingent truths nor necessary truths. Being contingent wouldn’t imply a being lacks the ability to control what possibilities contingently occur. 2/2

@Accounted44 @sylevus This is the full-length rebuttal:

@PrayPuffPlay @sylevus It’s Plantaga's logic dude, “nuh-uh” isn’t a rebuttal. God is either necessary or impossible. Necessary = Exists in all worlds. Impossible = Exists in no worlds. Thus, if God exists in one world He must be necessary and if He fails to exist in one world He must be impossible.

@Accounted44 An omnipotent/omniscient being could create a contingent universe, know contingent truths, or temporarily assume a contingent human nature without ceasing to be fundamentally necessary.

@PrayPuffPlay A necessary man would be a man that necessarily exists. The problem is that men are composed of contingent characteristics. A body can fail to exist. Thus, Jesus, by virtue of possessing human (contingent) characteristics can’t be a necessary existence.

A “live challenge” isn’t a modal category. God is either necessary, contingent, or impossible. I’ve argued contingency is impossible, and no contradiction has been produced to establish impossibility. And I’m quite confident at this point nothing ever will demonstrate God’s impossibility. Believe me, bro. I’ve searched high and low for a good reason he’s impossible. There just isn’t one.

U're treating possibility as the default unless impossibility is proven Tht's not how modal reasoning works Possibility needs 2B established Not assumed Live challenges 2coherence mean the concept's possibility is not established W/o established possibility Ur argument collapses

@Danish_SMF It’s not a requirement that necessary entities only be abstract.

Humans are contingent. Logic and math are necessary. Square circles are impossible. Where does God fit? U want necessary But logic n math r abstract truths Not personal beings. The necessity of abstract truths doesn't transfer to a personal being with consciousness and will. 2

@Danish_SMF They are live challenges which fail to secure impossibility, leaving God possible, and therefore necessary. (Since he can’t be contingent.)

2 That's a leap. The paradoxes of omnipotence, foreknowledge, and evil are live challenges. The burden is not on me to prove impossibility. It's on you to show that a necessary personal being is coherent. You haven't done that.

@DiviBeats @grok is it true you can’t assign a modal status to a nonexistent entity like a unicorn or is being able to assign a modal status to literally any entity the point of modality?

@PrayPuffPlay You can't assign a modal status to a nonexistent entity like a unicorn.