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Some thoughts on the reports of Ghalibaf talks with the US:
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has vehemently denied that there are any talks between Iran and the United States. But Ghalibaf may simply be lying. The current speaker of the Iranian parliament has been a chameleon-like insider. Over the years, different groups have accused him of corruption, nepotism, violence, and opportunism. Most of these accusations are true. Yet he has also maintained close ties to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who trusted him with various sensitive responsibilities.
In June 2025, IranWire reported that Ghalibaf’s advisors were marketing him in different capitals as the only viable option in post-Khamenei Iran. That claim rested on a simple reality: Ghalibaf is not trusted by any faction within the regime—yet almost all of them have worked with him when it suited their interests. That talent could work in his favour if reports of backchannel negotiations with the United States prove to be true.
Ghalibaf has managed to remain one of the few high-ranking IRGC commanders to sustain working relationships across rival factions, often by taking contradictory positions. For more than three decades, this ability to shift and adapt has been his defining political skill. Even when he lacked deep trust, he remained useful.
Ghalibaf’s pattern of reinvention dates to 1999, when he began portraying himself as “the Islamic Reza Shah”—a nationalist strongman capable of restoring order and fighting corruption. That same year, he was among the IRGC commanders who wrote to reformist president Mohammad Khatami, expressing alarm over student protests during which Ayatollah Khamenei was insulted. “The other night our Leader was insulted,” Ghalibaf wrote. “Our children looked at us and wondered why we didn’t do anything. Why do we have no dignity?”
By 2005, he had reinvented himself again—this time as a moderniser. He ran for president, wearing a white sports jacket and Ray-Bans. He adopted a more polished image and spoke about social freedoms for young Iranians. But voters rejected him and instead chose the ideological zealot Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Later that year, Ghalibaf became mayor of Tehran, a position he held for twelve years. The role expanded both his influence and his network. His tenure began with visible efforts to improve the city, but over time, his reign became associated with patronage and opaque financial practices. He began to face opposition from hardline supporters of the regime, who pointed to close associates receiving lucrative contracts and to reports that entities linked to his family, including his wife’s charity, benefited from municipal resources. The mayoralty also allowed him to build relationships with industrialists and corrupt businessmen who later supported his presidential bids in 2013 and 2017.
In those presidential elections, Ghalibaf shifted his messaging again—no longer a moderniser, but a loyal devotee of the Supreme Leader and a competent manager. His main rival in both campaigns was the more outwardly pragmatic Hasan Rouhani, who advocated for better relations with the rest of the world, especially the United States. Rouhani was also a skilled debater who exposed Ghalibaf’s violent past. During a debate, Rouhani highlighted Ghalibaf’s role in suppressing student protests in 1999, when Ghalibaf served as a security chief. “Don’t you remember that you told us that we need to attack the students from two sides and pressure them like a pair of pliers?” Rouhani asked an obviously embarrassed Ghalibaf. Ghalibaf lost both elections.
In 2020, Ghalibaf entered parliament in an election marked by a historically low turnout and soon became Speaker of the Majles. The position placed him at the centre of power—but also exposed him to constant pressure. Unsurprisingly, some of his most persistent opponents came from members of the ultra-conservative Paydari (Resistance) faction, who have strong backing within parts of the IRGC.
Paydarists present themselves as “pure” revolutionaries and view Ghalibaf’s “flexibility” as weakness—or worse, betrayal. Their members have repeatedly worked to block his presidential ambitions, most recently by backing Saeed Jalili in the 2024 election. Both Jalili and Ghalibaf lost to the more “moderate” Masoud Pezeshkian in that election.
The Paydarists have also weaponised his vulnerabilities. Ghalibaf’s past—both his record in office and allegations surrounding his network—has made him an easy target. So too have controversies involving his family, including widely circulated footage of his daughter, Maryam, shopping for expensive baby goods in Istanbul, and reports about his son, Elias's, business activities. These reports and rumours have reinforced a broader narrative of privilege and hypocrisy around Ghalibaf.
If reports of negotiations between Ghalibaf and the United States are accurate, the Paydarists are likely to become his primary internal adversaries. Even if Mojtaba Khamenei were to instruct his allies to tolerate Ghalibaf, “Khamenei 2.0” may lack the authority and legitimacy to enforce discipline across competing factions.
If Ghalibaf ultimately becomes the “Islamic Reza Shah” and secures the power he has pursued for decades, he will face a stark choice: accommodate his rivals or eliminate them.
History suggests he is capable of decisive—and harsh—action. The question is whether he has sufficient backing within the IRGC to carry it out. He may need to carry out his own version of the “Night of the Long Knives” to destroy his enemies and consolidate his power. In early July 1934, a year after Adolf Hitler came to power, some of his cronies killed up to one thousand Nazi “troublemakers” to cleanse the party of anti-Hitler elements. The purge became known as the Nacht der langen Messer.
If such a consolidation occurs, the Islamic Republic could enter a new phase. In the best-case scenario for Ghalibaf, it would resemble a conventional, if corrupt, Middle Eastern authoritarian state, facing periodic unrest from a dissatisfied population. In the worst case (again for Ghalibaf), internal fractures could deepen, pushing his regime toward instability, fragmentation and collapse in a short time...
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