Game Theory Papers

Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions Shuang Cui, He Huang, Yu-e Sun, Chen Xue arxiv.org/abs/2605.00411 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃] 💬Accepted at ICML 2026

Fast Rates in α-Potential Games via Regularized Mirror Descent Claire Chen, Yuheng Zhang arxiv.org/abs/2605.00268 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Compatible k-Relaxations of Fairness and Non-Wastefulness Under Hereditary Constraints Tenma Wakasugi, Zhaohong Sun, Kei Kimura, Makoto Yokoo arxiv.org/abs/2605.00134 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Computing Equilibrium beyond Unilateral Deviation Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar arxiv.org/abs/2604.28186 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙰𝙸 𝚌𝚜.𝙲𝙲 𝚌𝚜.𝙻𝙶 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗.𝚃𝙷]

Can We Volunteer Out of the Peer Review Crisis? Theo Tang, Toby Handfield, Julian Garcia arxiv.org/abs/2604.27900 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙼𝙰]

Maximally Diverse Stable Matchings: Optimizing Arbitrary Institutional Objectives Gergely Csáji, Zhaohong Sun arxiv.org/abs/2604.27823 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Fisher Markets with Approximately Optimal Bundles and the Need for a PCP Theorem for PPAD Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender, Themistoklis Melissourgos arxiv.org/abs/2604.27276 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙲𝙲]

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige, Noam Manaker Morag arxiv.org/abs/2604.27211 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

What Suppresses Nash Equilibrium Play in Large Language Models? Mechanistic Evidence and Causal Control Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos arxiv.org/abs/2604.27167 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙰𝙸 𝚌𝚜.𝙻𝙶]

MISES: Minimal Information Sufficiency for Effective Service Joss Armstrong arxiv.org/abs/2604.26808 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙸𝚃]

Fast Core Identification Irene Aldridge arxiv.org/abs/2604.25954 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗.𝚃𝙷 𝚚-𝚏𝚒𝚗.𝚃𝚁]

Credit Limits beyond Full Collateralization in Decentralized Micropayments: Incentive Conditions Chien-Chih Chen, Wojciech Golab arxiv.org/abs/2604.25913 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙲𝚁]

Job-Scheduling Games with Time-Dependent Processing Times Ido Borenstein, Tami Tamir arxiv.org/abs/2604.25301 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Optimally Auditing Adversarial Agents Sanmay Das, Fang-Yi Yu, Yuang Zhang arxiv.org/abs/2604.25085 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙰𝙸 𝚌𝚜.𝙲𝚈]

Asymmetric-Information Resource Allocation Games: An LP Approach to Purposeful Deception Longxu Pan, Yue Guan, Daigo Shishika, Panagiotis Tsiotras arxiv.org/abs/2604.25070 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙼𝙰 𝚎𝚎𝚜𝚜.𝚂𝚈]

Hierarchies of No-regret Algorithms R. Xu, E. Yachbes, J. Zhang arxiv.org/abs/2604.25045 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Arctic Auctions Jugal Garg, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V Vazirani arxiv.org/abs/2604.24756 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃 𝚌𝚜.𝙳𝚂]

Distributional Robustness of Linear Contracts Shiliang Zuo arxiv.org/abs/2604.24732 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Verification of Correlated Equilibria in Concurrent Reachability Games Senthil Rajasekaran, Jean-François Raskin, Moshe Y. Vardi arxiv.org/abs/2604.24655 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]

Private Private Information in Second-Price Auction Boyu Liu, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang arxiv.org/abs/2604.24530 [𝚌𝚜.𝙶𝚃]