James Equity

@taobanker The question is why it doesn’t actually show up in the ROEs …

Imagine raising money at 4% then issuing credit at 25%. even with a 10% annual charge-off rate you're still making 11%. no seriously. think about that for a second. this is an unbelievably good business. $cof

@Muhatcapital Are the returns better if you just invest when it crosses 30 vs. waiting for a full month to confirm?

Cue the “Average SP500 Returns After $VIX > 30” charts. Here’s ours: muhat.com/blog/volatilit…

@hollertotide AI slop post

CoStar Group, NASDAQ: $CSGP Everyone is focused on what Homes.com is costing CoStar right now. Nobody is talking about what CoStar actually owns. $850M invested in Homes.com has compressed margins to a 2024 trough of ~9%. That's real. That's known. That's also temporary. What isn't temporary is what sits underneath it. The CoStar data moat: 12 million+ commercial properties tracked. 50 billion+ verified data points. 3 million+ tenant records with active lease expirations and space requirements. 1,600 field researchers collecting verified transaction data every day. And 37 years of historical foundation covering every cycle, crash, and recovery since 1987. You cannot build this. You can only buy it. No competitor wakes up tomorrow and replicates 37 years of verified lease comps. No private equity roll-up outbids CoStar for data that took decades to collect. The commercial real estate information market has one standard. It has one phone number. It has been CoStar since before most of its competitors existed. The commercial core already runs at 43% EBITDA margins. The market is pricing the Homes.com investment cycle as if it permanently damaged the underlying business. It didn't. The 54 consecutive quarters of double-digit revenue growth — through the financial crisis, COVID, rate hikes, and a real estate freeze — didn't come from Homes.com. They came from the moat. Here's what I think the market is missing: Andy Florance bought $2.5M of $CSGP in the open market. Not options. Not a scheduled plan. Open market. That's a CEO who knows exactly what the commercial core is worth and believes the market has mispriced the recovery. I've added shares at $48.50, $45, and $43 for the same reason. Management has guided 20% EBITDA margins for 2026 and 35% by 2030. The Homes.com investment cycle peaks. FCF normalizes. The data moat doesn't go anywhere. At $43, you're paying trough-cycle multiples for a business with a 37-year irreplaceable asset base and a clear path to margin recovery. I'm publishing my full institutional grade $CSGP deep dive in late April on Holler to Tide Investment Guide. Between now and then I'll be sharing ongoing analysis If you want to follow the thesis as it builds, follow me here and subscribe to the Substack. Link in profile. The deep dive will cover: full DCF model · probability-weighted IRR · reverse DCF entry analysis · bear case triggers · Andy Florance insider activity · Homes.com ROI framework.

@BarnieTaintpipe Yeah I mean my views are relative to the valuation

@truthfromthone I'm sorry but I do not agree. Guidance was also miserable

I guess $KLAR always could have gone lower Disappointing but I guess this is the answer to why wouldn’t you just buy higher quality $AFRM which is what some smarter people have asked me 🤦

what was bad about these $Klar results? Looked pretty amazing to me

I think the stats might be inflated by the growing number of orthodox women....orthodox people in israel are not the ones driving that society forward from an economic perspective, but rather holding it back (many don't work, don't fight in the military, and are a leach off the state)

THIS. IS. ISRAEL. WATCH as Jiang Xuequin, a researcher at the Global Education Innovation Initiative of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, says that game theory reveals that Israel will “dominate” the next 50 years… I will add a factor, God, to cement his prediction…

@CloisterRes My point is that bad results on the drug will cause switching or stopping. So if we both agree that people aren’t following instructions we should probably both agree strong near term prescription data points might be a longer term illusion

@truthfromthone yeah. not disagreeing they told people to do that. Do you think a bunch of obese patients took their morning wegovy, then grabbed a stop watch to wait until at minimum 30 mins before going on with their day? No.

Why isn't $NVO mooning? Seems like maybe estimates are waaaaay low on Wegovy oral adoption. Vol not too expensive for leaps? Why?

Yeah I’m sure people are not following the instructions but the pill also won’t work for them and then they’ll switch. I’ve been following the data and it’s good but the same moderately overweight people taking this (because they don’t want to just workout and eat right) are the same people who aren’t following directions and won’t get an effect from the drug

In phase I studies, food and drink were found to impact the absorption of oral semaglutide, with limited or no measurable absorption reported in fed participants [57]. Oral semaglutide absorption increased with longer post-dose fasting periods and was comparable when administered with either 50 or 120 mL of water [57]. Complete tablet erosion was observed regardless of water volume but occurred at a slower rate with 50 mL versus 240 mL, resulting in higher semaglutide plasma exposure with lower water volumes (Fig. 3) [58]. SNAC absorption was generally rapid and eliminated with no measurable exposure at ~ 4 to 6 h post-dose, while the terminal half-life of semaglutide (t1/2,semaglutide,day 10) was ~ 1 week, showing that, unlike initial absorption, the metabolism and elimination of semaglutide are not affected by food ingestion or water volume [57]. These findings informed the phase II and III study recommendations to administer oral semaglutide in the fasting state with up to 120 mL water and wait for 30 min post-dose before eating or ingesting other oral medications [39, 57, 59–62]

@BlueDuckCap I don't have it as cheap as you do but it is interesting...just think there's actually better stuff to own (i have it at like 20x fcf)

Nobody got it. The answer is $ABNB

@ragingbullcap @decodefinance @KennyAck5 Yep looks like you're thinking about it right re: sizing / downside

@truthfromthone @decodefinance @KennyAck5 Might be right. This is not something I would ever be overly cavalier in my sizing of. On the other hand, uncertainly isn't risk and at this valuation I struggle to see how you get permanently impaired given the strategic/acquisition value.

$SNAP now entering territory where sentiment has become entirely disconnected from reality. Almost 1x sales on a >60% gross margin social media business with 1B MAU and a new high-margin subscription monetization model running at $1B and growing 60%. Perplexity deal seems to actually be rolling out, despite question marks raised on the call. All time low despite the PnL never being in better shape. Beneficiary of AI. This will be a multi-bagger from here. Bookmark it.

@ragingbullcap @decodefinance @KennyAck5 Maybe it is, but I also think this is hero ball you're trying to predict a lot of things without a lot of certainty

@truthfromthone @decodefinance @KennyAck5 What I'm saying is that it's taken a crazy amount of capital to get into a position to make money and I think they've finally arrived at that place, just as the stock is hitting its all time low

@JRiz13 @btcbabey @NestBetter Can you share? Honestly would be interested in seeing

@truthfromthone @btcbabey @NestBetter It’s verified. He runs a fund and has audited returns plus posted his pre fund portfolio.

How does $ORR have 0 vol and only go up? Very impressive and I don't understand.

@btcbabey @NestBetter I've never seen that performance actually verified. If the cycle changes and he changes into the right things again I'll give him his props

@truthfromthone @NestBetter "Its just a few factor bets that have worked" Hes been putting up these numbers for 5 years+

@BlueDuckCap $pypl?

Name the company: -Accelerating revenue to low dd% -HSD% unlevered FCF yield -Stock in a 5 year base -Buying back over $1B / quarter gross of SBC -It's a household name -Market sees some AI risk, but I'm not so sure how credible that is at this valuation.

@ragingbullcap @decodefinance @KennyAck5 Isn’t everything you just noted exactly why it’s not that good of a biz though and has the chance of perpetually underwhelming regardless of how many users it has?

Bit of a long winded answer because this is something I've thought about a lot. The first thing to consider is whether Evan is actually an untrustworthy and value destructive manager. If one were to judge that by simply looking at the stock chart, the answer is conclusive that he is terrible. But one needs to put that into the context of the business he's been building. SNAP has had to compete with Meta for eye balls and ad-dollars.- an earlier mover, better capitalized, with an outlier winner as its CEO - and endless other platforms. So the deck has been stacked against him from the start. What do you do? You need to scale to draw in dollars - ie acquire MAUs. You get those MAUs by investing in a desirable user experience, which takes immense and expensive iteration and innovation, which is constant given the endless competition. So for years a lot of margin has been getting sucked into solving for this problem. We can argue with whether capital has been allocated prudently to get there, but growing to 1B MAU is no small feat. We've largely arrived at scale. But that's not enough. You then need to figure how to to turn those eye balls into attractive ROAS for advertisers. META again has a huge advantage here due to signal density and better attribution, and because Snapchat isn't inherently a fit for direct response. So to monetize its MAU's through ads has been a huge uphill battle, again requiring huge amounts of expenditure. Then you have the unit economics problem. SNAP rents cloud compute and those videos are expensive. So not only have they had to invest their margins in improving the business, but they've had less margin available to do so. As they've scaled, infra spend has grown with it. Only now have they finally started to get leverage off of this spend. Finally, there's simply terminal value risk with social media generally. You need to make sure there's insurance in place for when, inevitably, the appeal of your platform to subscribers wanes. Same issue with Meta, who have invested in all kinds of unrelated ventures to cushion this (e.g. Metaverse). Snap - rightly or wrongly - has plowed capital into AR. Time will tell on whether that works, but I understand the motivation. You need to play offense because social media, in its current form, is not durable. That's not to say I think Evan's been a good capital allocator, or that he hasn't blown a lot of money, but it's not as simple as him just being some dishonest crook using shareholders to fund him and his employees. I'm not sure there was any world in which this could have prioritized profitability and survived this long. Simply, it's not been a very good business and there wasn't much choice. I do, however, think the business quality has started to turn a corner - e.g. the subscription model is far higher quality earnings and its starting to be a meaningful piece of the mix. It's also worth thinking through incentives. While the other executives get paid way too much (in stock), Evan does not and takes no salary or bonuses (he does get a lot of perks). Evan owns a lot of stock and his net worth is rapidly tanking. He also has a big ego, no doubt, and its on the line right now. So yeah he's not Zuck, but I do think he's mispriced and misunderstood, and the business itself is certainly the most mispriced its ever been. A lot of this rhymes with the experience at $SPOT and with Dan Ek. They were competing with Mag 7's for largely commoditized distribution and they spent years prioritizing scale and product quality over profits. Ek also made some expensive gambits, which at the time, the market was extremely critical of (e.g. podcasts), because the ROIs were invisible at the outset and Wall Street always want profits now. He was also criticized for running a bloated labor force and generous comp. Fast forward to today, and he's now consider one of the greats.

@DimitryNakhla It's interesting that he names two physical companies, but would argue there are plenty of data / network effect companies that have similar moats....and those have recently sold off and are the opportunity

Dan Sundheim, Founder & CIO of D1 Capital Partners, on what stock he’d buy if there was a 10-year lockup: “There’s very few tech companies I feel comfortable saying because I think tech just changes too quickly so it wouldn’t be a tech company. It would have to be a company with a moat that’s incredibly difficult to penetrate, with a growth rate well above GDP for a long time. I like 𝐒𝐢𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐬 𝐄𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐠𝐲 quite a bit… a company called 𝐂𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧 𝐇𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐨𝐫𝐬 which I like a lot… they own the majority of the incinerators in the United States. You can’t really build more incinerators because of NIMBY.” ___ 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧: Investing ultimately comes back to analyzing a company’s moat. Not just whether a business has competitive advantages — but: how easily can those advantages be replicated? How many layers of barriers to entry protect the business? How durable are those advantages over long periods of time? 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘰𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳 𝘺𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘻𝘰𝘯, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘴𝘦 𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦. 𝘈𝘴 𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘩𝘯𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘴, 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘳𝘶𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘬 𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘴. 𝘞𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘭𝘰𝘰𝘬𝘴 𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰𝘥𝘢𝘺 𝘮𝘢𝘺 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘴𝘰 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘭 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 — 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺, 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘺 𝘣𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘦, 𝘴𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘤𝘰𝘴𝘵𝘴, 𝘯𝘦𝘵𝘸𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘦𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘴, 𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘢𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘴, 𝘦𝘵𝘤. ___ 𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩’𝙨 𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙞𝙛𝙪𝙡 𝙖𝙗𝙤𝙪𝙩 𝙎𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙝𝙚𝙞𝙢’𝙨 𝙛𝙧𝙖𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙝𝙖𝙨𝙞𝙨 𝙤𝙣 𝙙𝙪𝙧𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙞𝙩𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩. Particularly what he mentioned about 𝐂𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧 𝐇𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐨𝐫𝐬: “You 𝘤𝘢𝘯’𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘣𝘶𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝙉𝙄𝙈𝘽𝙔 and as you have 𝙢𝙤𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙝𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦’𝘴 𝘨𝘰𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘻𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘸𝘢𝘴𝘵𝘦 and they have both the incinerators and 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝙣𝙚𝙩𝙬𝙤𝙧𝙠 𝘵𝘰 𝘨𝘰 𝘤𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵. And so it’s just a very very good business and the starting multiple is very reasonable.” 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐝𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐛𝐥𝐲 𝐩𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐟𝐮𝐥: 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐁𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐫𝐬 → Hazardous waste facilities face extreme permitting hurdles 𝐍𝐈𝐌𝐁𝐘 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭 t → Even if permitted, communities resist new incinerators 𝐒𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 → Very few licensed hazardous waste incinerators exist 𝐇𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞 → These are not easily replicated digital products 𝐍𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤 𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐫𝐚𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 → Collection, transportation, disposal ecosystem 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐏𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦 → Owning both disposal + logistics compounds the moat This is what a real moat looks like. ___ Interestingly: $SIE.DE: +13% YTD $CLH: +13% YTD 𝐀 𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐠-𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐬𝐧’𝐭 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐟𝐚𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 — 𝐢𝐭’𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐛𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭. ___ Video: Stripe | Dan Sundheim of D1 Capital | (10/22/2025)