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"Concern over civilian casualties is always valid; every innocent life is sacred. But I hope you also expressed outrage over the tens of thousands of Iranians slaughtered recently...for protesting for their basic human rights." Read @Kasparov63 on Iran: thenextmove.org/p/what-to-make…

The main theme of the Munich Security Conference, which opens tomorrow, is the Europeans’ attempt to take stock of and make sense of the changes affecting Europe and the world at large, and to determine what to do next. It was simpler when responsibility for European security rested entirely with the United States. But JD Vance’s absence at this year's Conference speaks even more loudly than his speech did last year. The primary systemic threat to the EU is Russia’s war against Ukraine, while the main challenge is the lack of political will to address this issue and the absence of leadership in rethinking and redefining the EU’s strategy in a rapidly changing world. We often hear that European societies are not ready for tough decisions. But that’s not entirely true, and in part it is an attempt to shift responsibility for inaction onto the public. It is useful to look at the latest statistics. In EU countries, societies are increasingly aware of the threat: Eurobarometer data show high levels of concern about security and record support for a common EU defense policy. The standard Eurobarometer (Spring 2025) records that 78% of Europeans are worried about the EU’s defense and security over the next five years, while 81% support a common EU defense and security policy (the highest level since 2004). At the same time, the European Parliament Eurobarometer (Autumn 2025) shows demand for the EU to play the role of "defender": 66% want the EU to take a greater role in safeguarding against global crises and security risks, and as a priority for strengthening the EU’s global position, citizens most often cite defense and security (40%). At the same time, these same data highlight a key problem: fear and recognition of the threat have not yet translated into readiness to pay the price of long-term confrontation. This is precisely where real leadership is needed - not managing public sentiment, but shaping strategic will and making decisions today so as not to pay a higher price tomorrow. At the level of basic attitudes, the EU has a strong "social mandate" for a security pivot. There is a public mandate for a security shift in the EU. In popular attitudes, Europe is ready to acknowledge that security must become a political priority, and that the EU should serve as an instrument of protection. Yet this mandate is not yet structured: it resembles a reservoir of trust that can either be converted into policy or lost amid oscillations between crises. Surveys provide a particularly important test of real readiness - attitudes toward specific, costly options. They show that support for increasing defense spending in many countries is only a "relative majority," not a stable consensus. The most telling example is Italy: only 27% support raising defense spending, while 59% are against it, even though almost half of Italians acknowledge the possibility of Russian aggression expanding beyond Ukraine. ecfr.eu/publication/th… ‼️ This is not simply "pacifism"; it is a signal of a failure in political translation: society perceives the risk but does not see a compelling strategy explaining what exactly it should pay for, and why the consequences will be worse without it. An even more sensitive marker is the nuclear dimension and strategic autonomy. The discussion of a European "nuclear umbrella" does not enjoy automatic support: in some countries, opponents outnumber proponents; even in France and the UK, there is no unquestioned willingness to expand arsenals. This matters not as a technical issue but as a psychological one: Europe wants security, but fears taking steps that would symbolize true responsibility for it. Again, this is a void of leadership: societies have not been told that strategic autonomy is not just rhetoric, but a sequence of decisions, each carrying a political cost. Attitudes toward Russia also demonstrate that there is more room for illusion than official statements suggest. Yes, the vast majority see Russia as an enemy or adversary, but 20-25% perceive Russia as a "reluctant partner." In periods of economic pressure and political turbulence, this segment becomes the base for a "deal at any cost" - not out of affection for the Kremlin, but from a desire to escape risk. Surveys on the prospects of the war deliver yet another cold shower: in Europe, the expectation of a long conflict dominates, yet belief in Ukraine’s victory is almost a "Ukrainian peculiarity," while in many countries significant portions of the population expect Russia to prevail. ecfr.eu/publication/tr… This is not simply a matter of "a different opinion"; it is an indicator that in some societies the battle over the interpretation of reality - and therefore the readiness to maintain a long line of deterrence - is already being lost. It is also a symptom of the absence of a clear strategy, adequate communication with the public, and, as a result, the victory of Russian propaganda. This is precisely where leadership comes in. The question is not whether "Europeans are ready." The data show that they are ready, but only partially, conditionally, unevenly - and that readiness can either strengthen or crumble. The question is whether EU leaders can transform awareness of the threat into durable political will. Today, Europe does not lack analysis or rhetoric, but the ability to do three things simultaneously: acknowledge the war as a long-term confrontation, honestly explain the cost, and offer citizens a sense of control through a predictable strategy. Real leadership here means rejecting reactivity. If Russia lacks the political will to end the war, the only way to make it change course is to "convince" it. The EU needs multi-year frameworks for supporting Ukraine, defense spending, and industrial capacities - so that people see not chaotic responses, but a plan. Beyond that, there must be an honest conversation about the "cost of inaction": the argument that deferred defense will be more expensive because it increases the risk of escalation, sabotage, blackmail, and the expansion of the war. Finally, there is the question of social acceptability: defense decisions must be linked to industrial policy, jobs, technology, and regional development, so that security does not appear as "guns instead of butter." Europe faces another problem that only leadership can solve: its societies are fragmented along different lines. Some are ready for tough decisions but do not trust the EU; some support the EU but are unwilling to finance defense; others are inclined toward "appeasement" out of fatigue and pessimism. The task of a leader is not to wait for these "islands" to converge on their own, but to weave them together into coalitions: using different arguments for different audiences, but with a single strategic goal - deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine as a prerequisite for European security. So, the data do not contradict the possibility of a prolonged confrontation. They show something else: without leadership, the EU risks losing not due to a lack of resources, but due to a lack of will and explanation. The time for leaders has come precisely because the public foundation still exists - but it will not last indefinitely.