Adwa Defense, Intelligence & Strategic Studies

Happy Ethiopian Patriotic Day!

Reports indicate Egyptian military aircraft struck artisanal gold mining sites in Jabal Al Uqayat within the Halaib Triangle, killing at least seven miners and injuring dozens. The incident comes amid a broader expansion of Egypt’s role in the Sudan conflict. Since late 2025, Cairo has moved beyond political and logistical support for the SAF toward a more direct security posture, including reported air operations, drone activity, and military personnel involvement. The shift accelerated as RSF advances increasingly threatened the SAF’s strategic position. While Egypt rejects claims of direct intervention, the trajectory points to deeper engagement in Sudan’s war.

Former Sudanese PM Abdalla Hamdok has reportedly rejected a Saudi-backed proposal to form a civilian government aligned with SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Hamdok argues that any settlement must end the war, restore genuine civilian rule, and avoid military-dominated power-sharing arrangements that merely repackage the conflict. The proposal is notable given Saudi Arabia’s political and diplomatic support for the SAF throughout the conflict. The episode underscores Sudan’s central dilemma: civilian actors seek an independent political center, while regional and domestic power brokers continue to pursue solutions anchored in military-led frameworks.

On the sidelines of the G7 meeting in France, Trump told Egypt’s Sisi: “We are helping Sisi with his dam project. I think Egypt was treated very unfairly by Ethiopia. The Nile is getting a little emptier than it should be.” He also remarked: “He was in a hotel and I met him. We fell in love, deeply in love … we didn’t know each other before that. We had great chemistry, and I stayed twice as long as I was supposed to.” The United States provides Egypt with approximately $1.3–1.5 billion in annual foreign aid, the overwhelming majority of which is military assistance, including about $1.375 billion in Foreign Military Financing for FY2026. This longstanding support, which has exceeded $90 billion since 1946 and expanded significantly after 1979, is rooted in the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty brokered by Washington. In return for Egypt maintaining peace with Israel, the first Arab state to do so the aid serves as a strategic investment in renewed Arab-Israeli conflict. Beyond the peace treaty, Egypt’s importance to Washington rests on its control of the Suez Canal and regional mediation efforts, including Gaza. The assistance also helps preserve U.S. influence in the Middle East amid competition from Russia, China, and other powers, while ensuring that Egypt’s military remains equipped with American systems and interoperable with U.S. forces.

Chaired by Hemedti in Nyala, the first Security and Defence Council meeting of Sudan’s Government of Peace and Unity, a parallel administration established by the RSF in 2025 issued directives on security enforcement, protection of the agricultural season, humanitarian convoy security, and combating smuggling, crime, and Islamic Movement-linked destabilization. RSF’s continued to institutionalize governance across territories under its control in Darfur and western Sudan.

AU’s endorsement of the Port Sudan initiative while upholding a zero-tolerance policy on unconstitutional changes of government exposes a contradiction within its own architecture. The practice risks sidelining civilian voices while balancing its normative principles against conflict-management realities. adiss-strategies.org/publications/a…

Sudan’s deeper crisis is the absence of a functional civilian political center capable of unifying competing constituencies and restoring national legitimacy. Consultations in Nairobi, Berlin, and Addis Ababa sought to rebuild a civilian political track, but they also exposed the depth of fragmentation within Sudan’s civilian opposition. adiss-strategies.org/publications/s…

Despite continuing differences over Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland and parts of the Horn of Africa, the June 15 Cairo summit between Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed reaffirmed the durability of one of the region’s most important strategic partnerships. Notably, this was MBZ’s first foreign trip since the Iran war began on February 28, lasting only a few hours but accompanied by a large senior delegation. The visit followed earlier high-level Egyptian visits to the UAE during the conflict, underscoring the intensity of bilateral coordination. The leaders emphasized economic integration, investment, regional security, and coordination following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while Sisi reiterated that Gulf security is inseparable from Egypt’s national security. The summit demonstrated that tactical divergences have not altered the strategic foundations of the Egypt-UAE axis.

#Mogadishu and #Hargeisa exchanged heavily worded statements over Somaliland and Israel engagements. In a sharp diplomatic spat, Somalia issued a strong condemnation of ongoing Israel–Somaliland ties including high-level visits, embassy openings in Jerusalem, and expanded cooperation, branding them illegal violations of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somaliland fired back with its own sharp rebuttal, rejecting Mogadishu’s claims outright, reaffirming its independence, and vigorously defending its sovereign right to conduct independent foreign policy.

On June 12, 2026, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard declassified intel confirming U.S. funding for 120+ biolabs across 30+ countries including Ethiopia. The release supports Trump’s EO ending risky gain-of-function research abroad and counters what Gabbard called prior cover-ups on lab scope and COVID-19 origins. Per ODNI, the declassification aligns with 2025 Executive Order: maps labs, pathogens & risks for better biosecurity , Corrects the record: previous officials (incl. Fauci) denied/downplayed them and Addresses real threats: hazardous pathogens (anthrax, plague, Ebola) with weak oversight especially in Ukraine.

In historic state visit, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro announces his arrival in Israel as the first Somaliland leader. On his visit Irro highlighted a warm welcome from Israeli President Isaac Herzog and milestone after 35 years of Somaliland’s independence and democratic state-building.

Sudan’s crisis is often reduced to a war between SAF and RSF, the rivalry between their two generals and their foreign backers. The deeper challenge is Sudan’s missing center: a functional civilian political structure. Sudan’s future will depend on whether a credible civilian center can emerge and reduce the dominance of military institutions and political Islamist networks over the state. adiss-strategies.org/publications/s…

African Union’s False Dichotomy Trap in Sudan-AU is trapped in its own contradiction in Sudan. Since the 2021 coup, it has kept Sudan suspended under its anti-coup policy while increasingly treating SAF-controlled institutions in Port Sudan as the country’s authority. In effect, the AU condemns the coup while adapting to its outcome, sidelining civilian actors in the process. adiss-strategies.org/publications/a…

TPLF has decided to launch an offensive against Ethiopia in the coming days, And Asmara is behind it.-Getachew Reda Minister and Redwan Hussein in an opinion piece published on Aljazeera.

In a major U.S. shift on Sudan, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee has advanced the U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act. The bill would direct the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to challenge Sudan’s current representation at the United Nations. Specifically, Section 203 calls for triggering Rule 29 through the UN General Assembly’s Credentials Committee to delegitimize Sudan’s current representatives until the country transitions to a civilian-led or democratically elected government. docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA…

In a first meeting since Debretsion Gebremichael’s faction staged a coup against the Tigray Interim Administration (TIRA), AU envoy Olusegun Obasanjo arrived in Mekelle today (June 11, 2026) for his ninth visit. Amid a new TPLF draft law proposing forced conscription + up to 25 years prison for critics of mass mobilization, talks focus on Pretoria implementation and averting renewed war.

Field Marshal Berhanu Jula, ENDF Chief of Staff, at officer graduation ceremony issued a stern warning against the "Tsimdo" (ጽምዶ) alliance between insurgent elements inside Ethiopia and Eritrea. Addressing new officers, he described it as a renewed plot to deny Ethiopia sea access. "Ethiopia’s growing population will not be blocked from a legitimate outlet to the sea. By building a modern military worthy of this great people and nation, we are fulfilling our historic responsibility to reliably safeguard the country's national interests." "Tsimdo" widely viewed as a tactical/military alignment a buffer for Eritrea, arms/smuggling routes and protection for TPLF hardliners, and a joint front against Federal government (including links to insurgents in Amhara region). Ethiopian officials (PM Abiy, Field Marshal Berhanu Jula) call it a dangerous plot to isolate Ethiopia from the sea and destabilize the country.

President Sisi and Tshisekedi discussed cooperation among Nile Basin countries and stressed the importance of respecting international law governing transboundary rivers, according to the Egyptian presidency. Tshisekedi praised Egypt’s consensus-oriented approach and coordination with Egypt. Congo is a full member of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) but has not signed or ratified the CFA along Egypt and Sudan. The signatories are: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Burundi. presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%B…