BoxLite
174 posts
BoxLite
@BoxLiteAI
Sandbox for every agent. Discord: https://t.co/JbcsDsR9ut
San Francisco Sumali Aralık 2025
0 Sinusundan26 Mga Tagasunod
@alexcretu @ajeetsraina @Docker Great question! Docker containers work well for this. For scenarios where agents visit untrusted URLs, micro-VMs (Firecracker-style) add kernel isolation with similar boot times. Different tools for different threat models - both have their place!
English
The shift from vibe coding to actual agentic engineering is real. Been building browser automation agents this week — the tooling is maturing fast. Browser Use + Gemini Flash can do things that felt impossible a year ago. Would love to see how Docker containers fit into agent sandboxing.
English
Big day for AI builders 🚀
From real engineering (not vibe coding) to agentic systems, Kubernetes, and production ML.
I’ll be running a hands-on workshop on building & deploying AI agents — the @Docker cagent way 🐳
Let’s build what actually ships.
English
Your firewall sees HTTP 200. AI agents can be hijacked through semantic tricks, not malware, while they act with real permissions. Do you have any agent with private data + untrusted input + outbound access? Read this, then audit. #Cybersecurity tinyurl.com/2mx4fnyh
English
@ai_consultancy1 This is the key insight. Isolation is foundational - you can't bolt it on after the fact. Whether it's permission scoping, runtime monitoring, or sandboxing - the architecture has to assume agents will do unexpected things and limit the blast radius from day one.
English
9/10: Security Cuts Both Ways
Agentic coding strengthens defence and offence.
Anyone can run deep security reviews.
But attackers can scale too.
The report is clear:
Security must be architected into agent systems from day one, not bolted on later.
English
🧵New report shaping how software will be built in 2026.
The Agentic Coding Trends Report by Anthropic makes one thing clear:
we’re moving from “writing code” to orchestrating intelligent agents.
Here’s what this actually means for businesses, teams, and AI strategy 👇
English
@ApplyWiseAi Great list! For AI agents specifically, I'd add micro-VMs (Firecracker-style) as a middle ground between #1 and #5. Dedicated kernel per workload like full VMs, but ~125ms boot time like containers. Docker shares the kernel, which matters when agents run untrusted code.
English
5 sandbox approaches that actually keep ai agents from breaking your setup
---
1. docker containers for isolation. spin up a fresh env per agent run. no more state leaks between tasks.
---
English
BoxLite just hit ~1k GitHub stars in ~2 months 🚀
Local-first, embeddable micro-VM sandbox for AI agents
GitHub: github.com/boxlite-ai/box…
If you’re looking for a out-of-box runtime for any of your agents(Claude Code, Codex, OpenClaw, in-house agents, etc). I’d love your feedback
English
Sandboxing OpenClaw in BoxLite VM. No budget for Mac mini? No problem!!!
```
pip install "boxlite[sync]" greenlet
wget raw.githubusercontent.com/boxlite-ai/box…
export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN="…"
python clawboxlite.py
```
Then open: http://127.0.0.1:18789/chat?token=boxlite
Enjoy!!!
English
@loudoggeek We have a minimal OpenClaw + BoxLite example. It runs the OpenClaw Gateway in a BoxLite micro-VM with port forwarding + a persistent volume mount.
```
pip install "boxlite[sync]"
wget raw.githubusercontent.com/boxlite-ai/box…
export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN="…"
python clawboxlite.py
```
English
@BoxLiteAI Interesting. I'm going to stuff this into an instrumented VM first because I have ample resources to do it. Are you looking at an OpenClaw + BoxLite integration guide?
English
There are some serious security issues you need to explore before you deploy OpenClaw and will your users even bother? I promise it's already on your network. Add Moltbook in and this is a potent security risk for Enterprise data. Find out more at:
IT SPARC Cast@ITSPARCCast
Agentic AI systems like OpenClaw represent the future of automation, productivity, and intelligent workflows — but today, they also represent a serious and underappreciated enterprise security risk. In this episode of IT SPARC Cast – CVE of the Week, @john_Video and @loudoggeek break down why running OpenClaw (and related platforms like MoltBook) on corporate hardware or with access to enterprise data is dangerous right now, even if the long-term vision is compelling. The guys use a “bio hotcell” analogy: OpenClaw can be used safely only when isolated, constrained, monitored, and treated as potentially hazardous. Without those controls, it becomes a silent data-exfiltration engine operating entirely inside allowed enterprise workflows. The takeaway for IT leaders is clear: HR and IT must act together now to define policies that prohibit OpenClaw and MoltBook from running on corporate devices or accessing corporate data until proper governance, tooling, and security controls exist. Youtube Episode 23 - youtu.be/SmHXUaeAdbg&ut… YouTube Channel - @sparccast" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">youtube.com/@sparccast
Apple Podcast Link - podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/it-… Spotify Link - open.spotify.com/show/6bzVql2gp… Amazon Podcast Link - music.amazon.com/podcasts/ea336… Acast Link - shows.acast.com/it-sparc-cast English
@sxpstudio Ha, Vista UAC flashbacks! That's the problem with prompt-based security - fatigue leads to auto-approving. Sandboxing flips it: contain the blast radius by default, so you don't need to approve every action. Less friction, same safety.
English
@BoxLiteAI Yeah I totally get the security part, but part of me can't forget how much fun Windows Vista was at the time with all the admin confirmation popups... hopefully we won't get there for general agentic protocol(s) support on macOS :-)
English
Xcode 26.3 RC now comes with an MCP server which is actually a pretty good sign that Apple might finally boost their dev tools and overall ecosystem for agentic coding. First on my wishlist would be not showing this popup on every single new claude-code session.
English
@hueypov @heyandras @openclaw Fair point - SimpleClaw serves non-tech users well. But there's a middle ground: devs who know API keys but don't want to manage VMs/infra. That's where embedded sandboxes shine - pip install, no ops overhead, but still isolated. Different tools for different needs.
English
@BoxLiteAI @heyandras @openclaw i think you are missing the point, the service projects like simpleclaw provide to non-tech people, to people doesn't know what an api key is.
if someone knows what is an api key, they probably know how to deploy their own bot in a private vm etc
English
cool idea and implementation tbh, but...
hosting an @openclaw instance that has access to your apps/tokens/keys (after you configured them ofc) on a server that you don't have access to (or at least hosted by someone else) is probably not the best idea.
did I misunderstand something? 🤔
Savio@saviomartin7
Introducing simpleclaw.com The easiest way to deploy your own 24/7 active OpenClaw instance — done under 1 min Built for non-technical people. Limited capacity. demo:
English
@jaehunshin_ @openclaw @Docker Yes, Docker Sandboxes is solid! They use microVM isolation (not just containers) so each agent gets its own kernel. Much safer than running directly on your main PC. Smart to sandbox first.
English
@Achex2026 @openclaw Running it directly on your main PC with full access carries some risk - agents can be unpredictable. Safest approach is an isolated environment (VM, container, or dedicated machine). At minimum, limit file/permission access and keep it away from sensitive credentials.
English
OpenClaw 2026.2.1 🦞
🔒 Major security hardening: path traversal, LFI, exec injection fixes
🧵 Discord thread routing + gateway message timestamps
🔐 TLS 1.3 minimum, system prompt guardrails
🛠️ Streaming stability, memory search fixes
20+ community PRs 🙏 github.com/openclaw/openc…
English
@FrancoSchiavone Great breakdown. For those who still want to experiment with OpenClaw, running it in an isolated environment is a solid first step.
Micro-VMs can help - separate kernel means prompt injection can't escape to your host.
github.com/boxlite-ai/box…
English
ZeroLeaks published an assessment indicating OpenClaw is not yet safe for sensitive agent workflows.
Key findings:
System prompt extraction: 11/13 (84.6%)
Prompt injection success: 21/23 (91.3%)
Overall score: 2/100
This isn't an isolated report. Cisco's AI Threat Research team called OpenClaw "a security nightmare," and Koi Security identified 341 malicious skills on ClawHub designed to steal credentials via Atomic Stealer.
If you're running OpenClaw for anything beyond experimentation, treat it as exposed infrastructure and add security controls accordingly.
Report: zeroleaks.ai/reports/opencl…
#PromptInjection #AgenticAI #AppSec
English
@SolutionsJoeG This is exactly right! Sandboxing is key for running AI agents safely.
If you want the isolation without dedicating a whole machine, micro-VMs give you that same air-gap feeling but lighter weight.
github.com/boxlite-ai/box…
English
@iamcadec @openclaw Running locally can be nice if you isolate it properly. We use micro-VMs so agents get full OS access but can't touch the host. Best of both worlds - local speed, VPS-level isolation.
github.com/boxlite-ai/box…
English
@theobearman Core MCP trust problem: agents treat tool descriptions as ground truth. Even audited tools can change descriptions post-review. Architecture-level defense matters too - scope what each tool can access so a misleading description can't escalate into unrestricted privileges.
English
Researchers reveal a new MCP vulnerability: description-code mismatches can lead to agents taking privileged actions, like trading, without user awareness. Marketplaces should be systematically auditing for this & providers penalised where they fall short arxiv.org/abs/2602.03580…
English
@ivanzugec @d4m1n Worth noting: that re-auth friction is the isolation doing its job. If an agent gets prompt-injected in one project, it can't access credentials from another. The env var approach works - just scope it per project rather than sharing a master key across all sandboxes.
English
@d4m1n Great article.
I did test out the sandbox Docker, but I always had to re-authenticate for every folder that I set it up on in my Claude code.
Does it inherit your Claude code settings? I guess it wouldn't because it's in a sandbox environment.
English
