The Russia Program

📍 How Returning Veterans Are Driving a Surge in Violent Crime in Russia ➡️ russiapost.info/society/war_co… A new CEDAR study for The Russia Program finds that nearly 8,000 veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine have been convicted of civilian crimes since 2022 — a growing share of them for violence. 🔹 Scale: ~8,000 convictions linked to war participants since 2022; about 7,000 were veterans who had already returned home. 🔹 Rising yearly totals: roughly 350 cases identified in 2022, 2,500 in 2023, and 4,700+ in 2024 (2025 figures are incomplete so far). 🔹 Violence & domestic abuse: 900+ veterans prosecuted for violent crimes; 423+ victims killed (including fatal traffic cases). The dataset includes 52 domestic-violence cases targeting partners, children, and other relatives. 🔹 Disproportionate severity: veterans are prosecuted for murder/attempted murder 2.5× more often than men overall, and 2× more often for assaults causing grievous bodily harm. 🔹 Repeat offenders & pardons: at least 2,139 convicted veterans had prior convictions; 656 were pardoned by presidential decree after being recruited from jail to fight. 🔹 Leniency in courts: about one-third of veterans receive more lenient sentences than comparable civilians, often getting fines or labor penalties instead of prison. The report also stresses these are minimum estimates: not all cases reach court, not all verdicts are published, and data from occupied territories is largely unavailable. Read full analysis: russiapost.info/society/war_co…

📍 New research. How does the Kremlin decide which cultural initiatives deserve support — and which values that support should promote? ➡️ therussiaprogram.org/presidential-f…

Why does a failed revolt from 1825 still trouble the Kremlin? Igor Torbakov traces how the Decembrists became a lasting symbol of moral resistance to autocracy—and why Putin’s regime now works to suppress that legacy while rehabilitating Nicholas I. therussiaprogram.org/the-specter-of…

📢 Join our digital methods training school! The next series of online trainings starts next week. We provide hands-on training to turn digital traces into reliable empirical evidence—without requiring specialized technical skills. therussiaprogram.org/school/

Russian oil exports have fallen — but not dramatically. In the observable data, exports dropped from ~7.15 mb/d in June to ~5.54 mb/d in December, then rebounded to ~5.95 mb/d by February. The swing is real, but it’s hard to explain by production alone, and seasonal fuel-oil use doesn’t come close to accounting for the full gap. Source: Sergey Vakulenko / Telegram

📍 Russians’ attitudes toward China, the US, the EU, and Ukraine (January 2026) Since late last year, Russians’ views of China, the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine have remained largely unchanged. China continues to enjoy consistently positive perceptions throughout the entire period of observation. 🇺🇸 Attitudes toward the US are more mixed: just under half of respondents view it negatively, while about a third say they view it positively. The US image improved last year amid attempts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 By contrast, perceptions of the EU and Ukraine have remained predominantly negative over the past four years. 🇨🇳 In January 2026, a majority of respondents said they had a generally positive view of China (83%). One in three (33%) reported a positive view of the US, one in five (21%) of the EU, and one in six (16%) of Ukraine.

📍 New research. Trump’s Peacemaking Rhetoric: Hope, Polarization, and Disillusionment ➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak… New research from The Russia Program shows that Donald Trump’s peacemaking rhetoric initially raised expectations of a swift end to the Russia–Ukraine war, but ultimately deepened polarization rather than advancing peace. ▪️ Early optimism was high: Before Trump took office, large majorities in both Russia and Ukraine believed peace depended on his intervention. ▪️ Expectations collapsed quickly when bold promises failed to produce tangible results. ▪️ Polarization increased: Russian public opinion shifted toward greater support for continuing the war, while Ukrainians became more committed to full territorial liberation and less open to compromise. ▪️ Trust in Trump as a mediator remained low, with many viewing him as biased or driven by U.S. interests. ▪️ Media framing mattered: Russian state media promoted selective visions of “peace,” reinforcing skepticism toward direct negotiations with Ukraine. ➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak…

🚨 New research. Outsourcing Social Policy, Controlling Civil Society: Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund ➡️ therussiaprogram.org/russias_presid… Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund has become the main source of NGO financing since 2017. It fills real social-service gaps and provides rapid crisis support, but it also centralizes state control over civil society. Most funding goes to a small group of established NGOs, while new or independent groups rarely break through. As foreign funding has been restricted, PGF now shapes which projects — and which narratives — are allowed to thrive, often aligning with government priorities. The result: a civil society that exists, but largely on the state’s terms.

Heading to the 2025 ASEEES Convention in DC? Join GW’s IERES for an evening reception celebrating our community of scholars & professionals! Cosponsored by ASEEES—come reconnect, meet new colleagues, and chat with IERES faculty, staff, and visiting scholars. Snacks, desserts & drinks (cash bar) provided.

Join us for Echoes of Tomorrow: Russia’s War, Society, and Ideas of Change on Nov 18 at George Washington University (1957 E St NW, Washington DC) — a deep dive into how war, society and vision converge in Russia today. With round-table and panel sessions exploring ideas of the future, conservatism, war demography, economic shifts & anti-war petitions. Free and open to all. Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/echoes-o… @IERES_GWU

Attending the 2025 Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) Annual Convention in Washington, DC? Join the @IERES_GWU for an evening reception celebrating our vibrant community of scholars and professionals. Cosponsored by ASEEES, this event is a wonderful opportunity to reconnect with colleagues, make new connections, and engage with IERES faculty, staff, visiting scholars, alumni, and colleagues worldwide. And don’t forget to stop by the IERES booth (#213) in the Exhibition Hall! Meet our faculty and staff, explore our latest research, publications, and events, and learn about opportunities for scholars and students to study and collaborate with us at IERES. Register here: shorturl.at/IGwt9

Satinsky Archive reminds us: Western business built much of 1990s Russia’s modern economy — even as politics pulled apart. Peter Gerwe, Henrik Winther, Fred Berliner, Joel Schatz, Paul Heth & Derk Sauer all helped shape media, finance, food, and culture. russiapost.info/economy/the_sa…

Don’t miss RIMA Fest 2025 — a global gathering on digital memory, truth & resistance. 📅 Nov 8-9 | 🌍 Hybrid: Berlin · NYC · Online Details 👉 fest.rima.media

📢 Join us at the next CORUSCANT seminar in Paris! 🗓️ Wed 19 Nov, 4–6PM (Condorcet Campus + online) Dr Annamaria Kiss (Queen Mary University of London) will discuss how Russia framed and used foreign fighters in its discourse and policy on Syria. Discussant: Dr Anne Le Huérou. Register here to attend online: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAI… More details here: coruscant.therussiaprogram.org/tpost/ou8rkp1o…

Estimating the Real Size of Russia’s Mobilization Reserve Based on publicly available data, the size of Russia’s mobilization reserve appears to be far smaller than some official estimates suggest. According to Kommersant [1], the government allocates around 14 billion rubles annually to fund the mobilization reserve. Meanwhile, News .ru [2] reports that reservists receive between 4,000 and 10,000 rubles per month. If we divide the total annual funding by these monthly payments, the number of reservists ranges from roughly 116,000 to 291,000 people. This calculation does not account for training costs, bonuses, or other additional payments, which would further reduce the figure. Even allowing for these variables, the data indicates that the mobilization reserve is nowhere near the 2 million people mentioned by some lawmakers [2]. [1] — kommersant.ru/doc/7196955 [2] — news.ru/society/pro-za…

In “Illiberalism, Putin & the Politics of Religion,” Marlene Laruelle unpacks how the Kremlin fuses nationalism, Eurasianism & Orthodox identity to undergird its illiberal project—and what that means for Russia’s future & the war in Ukraine. Listen here ralphbuncheinstitute.org/illiberalism-p…

📢 Event: From Russia with Love — Corruption & Sanctions Bypass in the Ukraine War Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fueled new corruption and sanctions-evasion networks. Join experts to explore how regime elites move money, bypass restrictions, and how civil society pushes back. ✅ Register here: lp.constantcontactpages.com/ev/reg/n8aex9e…

What do Russians actually read for news—and where can independent outlets break through? ➡️ therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news Alesya Sokolova’s latest policy study (Sept. 3, 2025) uncovers a striking divide: 44% of Telegram users follow pro-government channels, while just 14% follow oppositional ones. But here’s the silver lining: “neutral” channels—those not fully aligned with either camp—are gaining traction and could offer independent media a vital path to moderate audiences. The takeaway? To expand reach in today’s constrained media landscape, independent outlets should lean into Telegram—with content tailored to the middle ground—and build trust through credibility, transparency, and strategic partnerships. Read the analysis: therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news

📢 New Research. From Wages to Loyalty: How Economics Fuels Political Allegiance in Russia therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_… Ever wondered how economic policy subtly shapes public loyalty? A recent analysis reveals a striking trend: from 2021 to 2024, Russia’s personal income tax (PIT) revenues jumped by 71%, with the sharpest single-year growth—27%—in 2023. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) also surged in 2023 before slightly dipping in 2024. Yet, interestingly, tax rates themselves remained untouched during this span—so what's driving this surge? The study suggests robust economic activity, particularly in some regional sectors, is a key factor in bolstering tax revenues and reinforcing local budgets. Here's the fascinating part: this economic momentum appears to translate into political support. People may not always feel fully optimistic, but as incomes rise or stabilize, the link between wages and political loyalty becomes more tangible—pragmatism over ideology. What does this mean for understanding support systems in authoritarian regimes? It's not always about coercion or propaganda—sometimes it's about tangible material benefits that keep the system stable, even amid uncertainty. therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_…

📢 New Research Paper. Russia & Iran: Tactical Allies, Strategic Rivals in Syria? 👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli… Since 2015, Russia and Iran have propped up Assad’s regime side-by-side. But beneath their battlefield cooperation lies a growing rift. 🔹 Russia wants a stable, centralized Syria to secure military bases, reconstruction deals, and global leverage. 🔹 Iran aims to entrench its influence through militias, ideology, and a “resistance axis” stretching to Lebanon. Despite appearances, their alliance was never built to last—it’s a marriage of convenience, not shared vision. From diverging strategies to tensions over Israel and economic competition, the cracks are widening. 📊 Our new report from breaks it down: “Diverging Allies in Syria: Russia’s and Iran’s Grand Strategies” 👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli… Why it matters: These fractures could reshape Syria’s post-war future—and shift the balance of power across the region.