Trap Aggressor

📉 Despite the cases described, South Korea’s sanctions regime can be considered relatively effective. Since the tightening of export restrictions, the flow of dual-use goods to Russia has decreased by an order of magnitude. 🔗 Read the full report: trap.org.ua/en/publication…

📍 At the same time, a significant portion of goods reaches Russia not as Korean-made products, but as foreign technologies passing through Korean supply chains. Brands appearing in this segment include AIC, NSK, WAGO, FAG, among others.

An analysis of export structures shows that, even after sanctions were imposed, Russia continues to receive critically important goods from South Korea.

Despite public statements about leaving the Russian market, European high-precision machine tools continue to reach Russia through networks of intermediaries and shell companies. Full investigation: trap.org.ua/en/publication…

🇹🇷 Turkish intermediaries openly offer sanctions-evasion schemes: • purchase of equipment in Europe • re-export through Turkey • concealment of military end use in documents • use of banks and agents for payments

“But please, in no contract, in no letter, do not mention the military or anything like that, okay?” This was said by Bilal, a Turkish trader who has been organizing the supply of European machine tools to Russia since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Thread ↓

This shows a systemic problem. Even equipment not classified as dual use can strengthen enterprises tied to Russia’s military industrial complex. Since 2022 China has increasingly become a key hub for such supply chains. Full investigation: trap.org.ua/en/publication…

No formal direct contract is visible. But links between Iskra, the Chinese supplier and the Mir group suggest Belgian equipment may have been integrated into a production chain serving Russian state defense orders.

In the EU’s industrial heart, Herstal in Belgium, New Lachaussée has produced equipment for detonator primers and ammunition since 1830. After 2014 it claimed to have cut ties with Russia’s defense sector. Evidence suggests otherwise.

Sanctions on zirconium and Rosatom remain fragmented and ineffective. This allows Russia to sustain critical supply chains, continue the war, and use its nuclear triad to blackmail the world. 🔗Full research: trap.org.ua/en/publication…

Despite domestic reserves, Russia remains import-dependent. Key suppliers: Netherlands, India, China, Spain, Indonesia. In 2024–2025, Russia imported over $33M worth of zirconium — while exporting zirconium products abroad.

Russian nuclear power plants. The military-industrial complex. The nuclear triad. All of it runs on one material: zirconium.

📉 While volumes are declining, rising exports to intermediaries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan) still pose re-export risks. 📄 Full study: trap.org.ua/en/publication…

🏭 Russian defense plants use South Korean CNC machines to produce missiles, ammunition, and armored vehicles.

🧭 Despite being in opposing geopolitical camps, both North and South Korea have influenced Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine — in very different ways.