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Earlier today we identified suspicious cross-chain activity involving rsETH. We have paused rsETH contracts across mainnet and several L2s while we investigate. We are working with @LayerZero_Core, @unichain, our auditors and top security experts on RCA. We will keep you posted as we learn more about this situation. Please follow only the official @KelpDAO handle for the updates.






The rsETH hack is so damaging because of how deeply integrated it is across DeFi. 91% of all lending protocols are seeing outflows simultaneously. Here's the outflows over the past 24 hours: 1. Aave $4,920M –25.4% 2. Morpho V1 $608M –8.5% 3. Maple $1.7B $183M –10.7% 4. Tydro $246M $97M –39.6% 5. Fluid Lending $84M –11.4% 6. Jupiter Lend $72M –7.9% 7. Kamino Lend $71M –4.4% 8. Euler V2 $468M $50M –10.6% 9. JustLend $3.6B $41M –1.1% There is a systemic risk off move happening for DeFi right now.

Another bridge hack another $292 million gone. An attacker forged a cross-chain message on Kelp DAO's LayerZero bridge minted 116500 rsETH out of thin air and used them as collateral to drain real ETH from lending protocols. The emergency multisig paused everything 46 minutes later but the damage was already done. This keeps happening because bridges rely on trusting messages from other chains. When that trust layer gets exploited there is nothing underneath it. Native assets don't have this problem. When you swap on THORChain nothing gets minted nothing gets wrapped and no third party vouches for anything. Real cryptos move between chains validated by the network itself. That is the only model that removes this attack surface entirely. Native or nothing.









Due to the KelpDAO exploit, the attacker deposited $RSETH into #Aave to borrow $ETH, creating bad debt on #Aave. Many whales have already rushed to withdraw their $ETH from #Aave. $ETH Utilization Rate on Aave has now reached 100%.

Good catch on the DVN config. 1/1 required, LayerZero Labs only, zero optional threshold, is a genuine single-point-of-failure setup for a $293M pool. That looks weird @PrimordialAA 😅 but it’s 5am. Still open though. Two paths fit the same config: 1.DVN compromise or bug. No legit send(). Our hypothesis lands here if a source tx never existed. 2.Source peer key compromise. A real send() with a hijacked Kelp peer, DVN validly signs a real-but-malicious message. LZ Scan was showing source tx hash pending last I checked. If no source tx for nonce 308 ever surfaces, you’re right and this is DVN-side. If a real send() exists with the Kelp-labeled peer as sender, it’s OApp-side. Either way, D2 Finance and its users are not affected. Back to sleep 💤










