IvanKo

It's just a perfect market environment to highlight longer term goals

@naranero_base I take it as a compliment

@Iv4n_Ko he is ai

Sharing a bit broader highlight of the Resolv security incident

@ColinAmbrose14 Pleasure to meet you, my name is Ivan

@Iv4n_Ko Fucking scammy rats

A brief take on Resolv post-incident process

@cutlossess @ResolvLabs Thank you, good ser, that explains it

1) “AI was not used”. Blatant lie lol, you cant be serious. The text is literally a spam of em dashes and unnecessarily hyphenated words. 2) It has been >2 weeks and youre still holding your junior tranche in limbo. The article didnt specify anything we dont already know. 3) Im CIS myself so I can have an opinion on it you dont need to get pressed about it lmao. My achievements? Didnt let an attacker mint 80m unbacked units of a “stablecoin”

@goldenhotplasma @ResolvLabs I can not add anything else at this stage

@Iv4n_Ko @ResolvLabs Can you just be clear about whether or not RLP will cover the losses or nah.

That's what we did in the first place - played by the book and took the docs analysis to the external legal counsel. Making unilateral decisions and creating additional liabilities is not something we are up to, but working out the most appropriate way to move forward still takes time.

@Iv4n_Ko @ResolvLabs “we are dedicated to finding the most balanced solution” how about you play by the books and do it according to what your docs say instead of unilaterally make decisions that creates more classes of liabilities. It’s simple, is RLP supposed to cover in this case or not

Just FYI: 1) AI was not used in the creation of this post, but it was heavily edited over the course of last week to represent the case as objectively as it can be (also on the legal side of things). 2) Postmortem and post-hack action plan are two different things, and we are actively working on the latter. 3) Appreciate your take on CIS teams, mind sharing your nationality and achievements so that we are on the same playing field here?

@ResolvLabs Cant expect much from a CIS team but an absolute retarded AI slop block of text without any info about RLP and its holders

@gabrielccapo @ResolvLabs @gauntlet_xyz @Morpho We are still in the process of working out the action plan with the affected parties, unfortunately can't provide updates on that side yet.

@ResolvLabs @gauntlet_xyz @Morpho What is the update and the plan for the affected vaults on Morpho?

@goldenhotplasma @ResolvLabs The post-hack action plan is a separate topic and we are working actively on it. Unfortunately, takes more time than we would want it to, but we are dedicated to finding the most balanced solution.

@ResolvLabs Didn’t say shit about recovery and how people are getting paid back.

@Lylo69 @ResolvLabs It's not about unprofessionalism, laziness or lack of desire to find the solution as quickly as possible. We push forward to find a balanced path forward with all the parties involved, and it takes coordination and time, not only hard effort.

@ResolvLabs Still waiting for information about RLP holders, after two weeks. Unprofessional behavior.

@Karanyuk Appreciate the support!

@Iv4n_Ko Ivan, wish you all the best! Truly believe in your highest professional standards

@mishablank @timsheki Thanks for all the support, Mike!

@Iv4n_Ko @timsheki Ivan, I’m shure that you and Resolv will recover and become stronger after this.

@upsidan We are still working on the action plan with regards to RLP redemptions and will share updates when they are available

@Iv4n_Ko ok but what about RLP redemptions? There is no reason for them to be blocked

@Marty40121700 We are working on a post mortem to highlight the chain of events in full detail, will share in the coming days

@Iv4n_Ko Why is no one ever talking about how this could have happened? (key compromise) Was it an internal issue? Was the system built in such a way that just one key could destroy everything? Seriously: something like this should never have gone live. 🤷‍♂️

For the last three days Resolv team has been fully devoted to delivering the post-hack action plan. We are working closely with investors, advisors, projects and legal counsels to arrive at the solution. The first and immediate action was to make whole whitelisted pre-hack USR holders and 95%+ of these holdings have been redeemed already. As these redemptions are being finalized, we are working out the next phase of the plan. It takes time, but we focus hard on producing the most justified course of action in the shortest timeframe. Truly appreciate the support of all those who reached out and patience of everyone involved!

As the mitigation process continues, we want to provide clarity on an important point. We strongly advise against trading or acquiring USR at this time. Onchain data indicates that illicitly minted USR has mixed with pre-hack USR across many wallets and continues to change hands on secondary markets. USR created illicitly by the exploiter was never backed by collateral and carries no redemption rights. Any transactions at this time carry a risk of involving illicit tokens and add complexity to the recovery process. We are in the early stages of evaluating recovery options for affected holders and cannot make guarantees, but any relief that may ultimately be available could be limited by continued trading activity. We are working closely with affected protocols to develop a resolution plan and will share details when ready.

Update on illicitly minted USR supply reduction Of the total 80M USR illicitly minted during the exploit on March 22, 2026, approx. 46M (~57%) has been permanently removed from circulation through a combination of burns and blacklisting. As a result, no illicitly minted assets remain on exploiter-associated addresses that could be further transferred or converted. Multiple steps have been taken to reduce the amount of 80M illicitly minted USR: → ~9M USR was burned across two transactions on March 22 • etherscan.io/tx/0xecf1f0575… • etherscan.io/tx/0x0d30bee89… → Another ~36M USR held by exploiter-associated wallets in a form of wstUSR was blacklisted. This was accomplished via a wstUSR contract upgrade, which required a 72-hour timelock initiation due to contract-level constraints. • etherscan.io/tx/0xa1ef88d38… → Remaining exploiter-held USR has been burned. • etherscan.io/tx/0x99c985c75…