landscape
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@herobridge 日米安保条約（軍事同盟）を知らないならもう政治の話するの止めた方がいいよ君。レベルが低過ぎる。
The simple, and thus tragic truth is that Europe will be hollowed out by China through death by thousand cuts.
卓球世界選手権 孫選手がトロフィー拒否 中国卓球女子代表の孫選手は、日本の張本選手の試合中に中国の慣習が大ブーイングを浴びせた行為に激怒 優勝メダルとトロフィーをその場に置き、政治を協議に待ち込む国民性に異議を表明
中国が日本を攻撃するわけない 軍事力はいくら日本が軍拡しても追いつかないほど差があるし、そんなことしなくても中国が日本へのさまざまな輸出を全て止めたらそれだけで日本は干上がります そもそも中国がわざわざ大事な軍事力を日本に使うメリット何もありません 日本にそんな価値はない
然而，讨厌中国人的日本人显然要比讨厌日本人的中国人要多得多。 友善的中国人要比友善的日本人也要多得多。 随便看一下 X 就知道了。 关于中国的负面新闻，哪怕是极小的一件事，也会在 X 上面获得日本人数万的点赞，以及数百万的浏览量。 我随便举例即可。 中国人在日本偷电。 中国人在日本奈良踢鹿。 中国人在日本的富士山前便利店跳舞。 中国在日本繁华的马路中间拍照。 中国再度开放日本旅游，日本网民纷纷乞求，不要开放。 以上内容都是这一两年来发生的事，而且都是极小的事情。 然而他们在 X 上获得了日本人数百万甚至千万级别的浏览量。 尤其是中国开放日本旅游这一条，非常可笑。就在当天，独卖新闻报道，美国要求日本承担 42 亿日元重建中的 24 亿。 这一条新闻只有可怜的 40 万不到的浏览量。 远远低于每日新闻报道的中国旅游公司再度开放赴日旅游。 可笑吧？明明是关于日本切身利益的新闻，却远不如仇恨中国的新闻热度来得高。 但是在中国，你是否有见过中国人针对日本的细小事件的仇恨？ 中国人确实会讨厌日本人，但那都是阶段性且由官方主导的。 即官方发布一项针对日本的政策、针对日本的大新闻，这个时候人们才会关注日本，才会表达对日本的仇恨。 你可以随便去抖音或者微博这些中国的主流社交平台上面搜一搜，看一下，在这些中国的主流平台上面是否有数百万的浏览量，是针对日本人的仇恨的。 我可以说，除非是官方主导的，例如说，前不久针对日本的军民两用名单禁运。 只有在这种大事上，中国人才会关注到日本。 在平时，我们的眼中是没有日本的。 我们的新闻是出现的外国最多的是美国，而不是日本。我们根本不关注日本的细小事，更不必说因此而产生仇恨了。 但是日本是不一样的。日本，我甚至可以说，60% 甚至 80% 以上的日本人，包括平民是仇恨中国人的。 但中国人不是这样的。中国人绝大多数压根不关心日本。 我是用数据来说话的，这个数据你可以在 X 上面搜一搜。而且针对日本人仇恨中国人的 X 发帖。每一个我都有保存。我都有截图。 我是有证据的。 我之所以截图保存这些日本人仇恨中国人的发言，就是为了避免有些人说，啊，仇恨中国的是少数人，啊，他们不过是网右。 说实话，能够高票选出高市早苗的日本人，可以说绝大多数人都是极右翼。 所谓的理智的日本人，不过是极少数。
Global Times on a new "Plaza Accord": "China will not accept using exchange rates as a pretext for oppression, nor will it return to the old era of great powers coordinating the fate of a few countries." This is a rather bizarre argument to make, although it is one you often hear in the Chinese press. It assumes that the RMB exchange rate belongs to China, and that for the EU or anyone else to intervene in the RMB exchange rate is an act of colonial oppression. But this simply isn't true. An exchange rate "belongs" to both countries involved. If China has intervened to devalue the RMB by 20-30% against the currency of its trade partners, this is exactly the same as if it had engineered a "stealth" Plaza Accord in which it forced its trade partners to revalue their currencies by 25-43%. There is no difference between the two, and so if one way isn't an act of colonial oppression, the other way isn't either. The Global Times also argues that China's trade surplus and its manufacturing competitiveness have nothing to do with an undervalued RMB. If the PBoC actually believed this, it is pretty obvious what it should do – it should revalue the RMB as quickly as it can. There would be no cost to doing so as, presumably, Chinese manufacturers would be as globally competitive as ever, and it would immediately benefit Chinese households by raising the real value of their domestic income. Of course the reason the PBoC isn't doing this is because it knows (as most analysts know, including, I suspect, the editors of the Global Times) that this just isn't true. The claim that currency values don't affect trade imbalances is just silly. But to the extent that these kind of editorials reflect actual positions among policymakers, we should expect a difficult and probably painful outcome. Joan Robinson warned in the 1930s that mercantilist regimes that ran large, persistent trade surpluses would inevitably drive their trade partners to retaliate with their own forms of trade intervention once the costs of beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses were perceived as too high. We are clearly in Joan Robinson's world, and denying the problem is an extremely ineffective way of resolving it. We know this from the rather lengthy history. There have been many large trade imbalances – especially ones associated with large increases in debt – in the past 100 years, and they have usually ended very badly. The interesting question in retrospect has been why, and under what conditions, the brunt of the adjustment costs were ultimately borne by either the surplus countries or the deficit countries. I worry that because there is clearly no appetite among surplus and deficit economies to reduce the imbalances in the least painful way possible for both sides, and because the imbalances may have already gone too far for any compromise, we may be moving inexorably towards an adjustment process in which the costs are magnified, as each side tries to force the other to bear the brunt. globaltimes.cn/page/202606/13…
Bloomberg: "Pimco views China’s role as a global source of disinflation as a structural trend. It expects Beijing to continue prioritizing manufacturing and technology, allowing it to keep expanding production capacity faster than domestic demand and exerting downward pressure on prices abroad. Between what China produces and what it consumes, “that gap is not closing,” said Stephen Chang, PIMCO managing director and portfolio manager." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
실시간 목격 ¯ࡇ¯ 50대 남성 두 분이 비즈니스 미팅은 30분 넘게 하더니 사용한 컵과 쓰레기는 1초 만에 버리고 가심 정확히는 테이블에…🤬 미친건가?? (결론은 내가 치웠음)