Chris Steed

Handle changed to @csteed (was @csteed). All my film, X&Os, and coaching content is still here. Bookmark this for easy access.

@HmphreyBogart You need me to cite a source for middies? 😂 This is why I try not to argue with fans, I’ll take the blame.

No source for these "middies"? Not counting free throws made (18). Your egregious statement is further flawed from the lack of thought into the ancillary production from him driving to the "mid range ". Numbers capture production; they don't always capture impact. Your welcome, dolt.

Basketball is a simple game. Mitch Johnson over complicated it, the entire series, in three ways: 1. Exotic coverages: Brunson can’t beat you from the mid range, much like Shai couldn’t last series. Way too many traps, matchup zones, blitzes, etc. leading to the Knicks attacking long closeouts all series long. 2. Transition to build the lead, and then walk the ball up the floor and play not to lose, with the lead. There was a clock in every single game of the series where you could see the Spurs shift from fast to slow. 3. The Kornet minutes. Mitch chose a guaranteed negative 10 minutes on a game by game basis versus getting creative with his personnel. We’ve never a series more negatively impacted by a coaching staff than this Spurs squad in the NBA Finals. And it was all EXTREMELY predictable and preventable. Mike Brown was INCREDIBLE. No coach more deserving of a title than him.

@HmphreyBogart 38.4% on middies during the finals. 0.76 PPP, league average is 1.15. Not only did Brunson not beat them from the middy, it was a net positive for the Spurs. Agreed on the ignorance part 💯

@csteed I stopped reading after I read "Brunson can't beat you from mid range ". Pure ignorance.

The ODDS of the Spurs losing the NBA Finals 4-1, when taking into account the following sequences: - They held a double digit lead in all 5 games - Held the lead at some point in the last 2 minutes of every game - Blew a 29 point half time lead + 20 point 4th Q lead Are ~1 in 250,000. Virtually impossible odds. *This is using a high P value (early leads in some games), which actually lowered the odds.

Steph Curry has led his teams to 4 of the last 11 championships as a small guard. Brunson makes it 5 of the last 12. Isiah Thomas went back to back as a small guard. Too many fans reading the Athletic and taking it as gospel. Creating narratives that never existed in the first place.

@Know_It_Ball Harrison Barnes no question. If not Harrison, anyone with a pulse and two legs.

@csteed What would you do for #3? He is their only "playable" back-up center. Go ultra-small or try another veteran? Wemby already played more minutes than he should, especially in game 4.

The Brunson mid range game will never beat the Spurs (and hasn’t all series). They are loud, aesthetically pleasing, tough buckets that don’t need any attention outside of tipping your cap. Fun listening to the announcers panic; saying the Spurs need to double. If the Spurs trap Brunson in the second half they will lose the game. Ironically, if the Spurs had played Jalen straight up all series, they would be up 3-1 and looking to close it out.

‼️ EMPTY BELOW THE NAIL ‼️ Slice action is really common from the low sideline. But using a DIAMOND TEMPLATE will ‘empty below the nail’ on a slice action, eliminating the help and assuring advantage. We typically see slice SLOB’s from a 2 guard front, allowing the low man to tag or stunt at the rim. If the defense SWITCHES this action it creates an organic flex stagger with a ton of slip/curl opportunities. Real Madrid Low SLOB Slice | Stagger

REBOUNDING is the most under taught skill in basketball. It is also an important foundation in the possession battle AND the shot quality battle. O Boards lead to some of the highest PPP in the basketball. Great rebounders are often associated with a large rebounding radius - the ground they can cover on a rebound. This is true in college, but in the NBA shrinking the rebounding radius and dominating that space is the key. Shots are much more controlled and predictable and the bodies are much bigger. At the high school level, the teaching point is being able to read shots. 👇🏼 ‘Long shot, long rebound’ is true, but not nearly as much as we assume. 3 point shots are rebounded at 5-8 feet on average. The highest % of rebounds from three come in the short corner. CRITICAL information when teaching rebounding. Order of operations at lower levels is: Anticipate the shot, shrink the defensive or offensive rebounding radius by leveraging the opposition away from the rebound, and finishing the board in a QB stance. Easier said than done, but training FOUR TIERS OF REBOUNDS simplifies and automatics this process. 1. Short and clean 2. Short and dirty 3. Long and clean 4. Long and dirty

Wemby was never guarding the inbounder here. Spurs played it 5 on 4, Wemby was the goalie on first pass (I understand the confusion as we often think goalie protects rim). Fox is guarding the ball with his back and he takes away the KAT iso look, which was first option. After fox takes away KAT his responsibility is OG. It actually brilliant by Mitch to put Wemby on first pass due to Wemby’s contest length. Obviously you’re never going from one double on KAT, to a double on the opposite of the floor, you’re simply tagging the inbounder What most miss here is OG could’ve stopped at the 3 point line for a wide open 3 as well, due to the missed coverage by Fox. Inexcusable stuff .

@csteed This doesn't make sense unless you didn't mean to imply that Wemby intentionally left the inbounder? And if he is the goalie, why is he switching? I'm willing to bet they just told everyone to switch everything in the huddle

This makes no sense. For the entire game, Wemby was switching to stay zoned up in the paint. Why doesn't he do that & stay on Bridges??? Instead, he's caught contesting at 27 ft while OG sprints in for the game winning tip. Good chance that doesn't happen with Wemby near the rim

Traditionally, we track gravity assists through double gap creation, playing 4 on 3 (blitz/trap/double spots), and long closeout (> 6 feet) advantage creation. Offensive rebounding rate is outside the box thinking, which is great, but likely involves too many variables. Offensive rebound rate in the NBA is ~ 26%. Offensive rebounding leads to ~ 1.20 PPP. This would mean the league average ‘Kobe Assist %’ is ~ 14% (depending on 3PT rate). Love the idea of this statistic but curious to see who the league leaders are based off of %. When it’s tracked this way it simply mirrors volume shooters. Also curious to see the actions that lead to the highest Kobe assist % and if the data differs from traditional doubles.

Examples of special teams situations: - up/down 20 in the 4th - up/down 10 with 5 min left - up/down 2 possessions with 1 min left - 2 for 1 ATO in EOG - full clock ATO in EOG - under 10 seconds ATO in EOG

The entire 4th quarter for the Spurs falls into the SPECIAL TEAMS category of play. Verbal cue for special teams we use is ‘time and score’. KEEP A GAME CARD. Three critical special teams errors by the Spurs staff in the 4th. 👇🏼 1. Matchup zone in the 4th. A comeback like that was only possible if the Spurs chose not to play M2M. Mike Brown simply overloaded the strong side of zone and rhe 3 point shot brought them back. 2. Doubling with Fox on the Knicks ATO. Wemby guarding Brunson on the perimeter doesn’t require a double, it requires O Board help with the big pulled 23 feet away from the rim. 3. Dylan Harper as the inbounder with 1.2 seconds left. Play call was great; layup was there and KAT made a great play tipping the inbounds. Harrison Barnes should’ve been the inbounder (height/experience). The special teams takeaways for coaches at ALL LEVELS: 1. Aggressive coverages increaae variance, this is allows for comebacks at a higher rate. Focusing on limiting SHOT QUALITY is key. 2. ATO coverages are only as good as your offensive rebounding strategy. 3. Experienced play makers in SLOB/BLOB spots in EOG situations. Tactical adjustments are built into special teams. These adjustments should be practiced, and the details hammered home DAILY.

Shooting is the only skill in basketball where 10% deviation from the median puts you at the best or the worst of your class. 10% means JV or Varsity 10% means starter or bench 10% means Juco or D1 10% means drafted or undrafted 10% means All NBA or 6th man No other skill can be quantified this way. More importantly, a shooters gravity provides creation without the ball and compounds all skill sets associated with on ball creation. PRIORITIZE SHOOTING.

NEED A THREE? Beautiful tag manipulation by Charles Hantoumakos and @CanBball in the u18 Americup Finals. This a Stack Out into a Spread PnR, with a push, and a perfectly timed Exit Screen that freezes the low man. This action is extremely effective with A) a dominant big who commands attention in the paint or B) teams who aggressively hedge/tag.

The causal fans/media are finally starting to understand the power of data. All it took was the big market Knicks to shine a light on it. Buzzwords like dawg, killer, and hooper are relatable, have broad appeal and they used to signal ‘expertise’. Analytics/systems/schemes are threatening and narrow because it shatters the dogmas centered around fandom and forces learning to stay relevant. Mike Brown bringing in a data driven, Princeton (hybrid) based system on offense and analytics based offensive rebounding rules has put the Knicks over the top. It also might be the single biggest leap for ‘analytics’ to date with the mainstream bball community. Look at how many mid range jumpers the Knicks pass on in this ONE CLIP ALONE. PLUS here is the data the Knicks system is based on 👇🏼.