Mina Al-Lami

@Andrew_Zammit Hope this latest updated chart helps (these charts/data are based on IS's own claims, but collected and analysed by BBC Monitoring)

8. The Thorny question of al-Qaeda "in Iran" IS supporters unsurprisingly did not miss the opportunity to take aim at al-Qaeda and the reported presence of elements of its leadership in Iran, including al-Qaeda chief Sayf al-Adl. It was only last week, in the al-Naba editorial, that IS accused al-Qaeda of acting as a mouthpiece for Tehran and aligning itself with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. The accusation referred to al-Qaeda’s 4 Feb call for Muslims to mobilise against the then US military build-up in the Middle East, which IS and its supporters interpreted as indirect support for Iran. Some IS supporters jokingly said that al-Qaeda might issue a statement to mourn Khamenei.

7. A minority pushes back Not all Islamist commentators agree with the “don’t take sides” argument, and these differing views have sparked debate and rifts within Islamist circles. The dispute is not new and persisted throughout the Gaza war. A much smaller group of Islamists says Sunnis should support Iran against Israel because Iran is still a Muslim country. These voices argue that when two sides are fighting and one is Muslim, fellow believers have a duty to support that side. They cite religious texts to justify this position. At the same time, they stress this doesn't mean full support for Iran, and they acknowledge Tehran's past “crimes” against Sunnis but say wartime circumstances may justify temporary alignment. In its comment today, IS has once again poured scorn at such "misleading" Islamist voices. At the heart of the debate is a deeper question (in the view of hardliners): Can Iran be considered a Muslim country in a way that warrants Sunni solidarity at all? This has long divided jihadist and Islamist circles.

🧵Key takeaways from my 2 Mar BBC Monitoring explainer on how jihadists and Islamists are reacting to the US-Israel attack on Iran 👇 monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0005i…

#ISIS #AlQaeda #Iran After focusing on Syria in its 21 Feb leadership message, urging rival Islamists to join IS due to the Sharaa government's alleged “subservience” to US, IS has shifted its attention to Al-Qaeda. In the latest issue of its weekly paper Al-Naba on 26 Feb, IS claims Al-Qaeda is “subservient” to Iran, encouraging Al-Qaeda followers/sympathisers to “wake up”, and presumably switch to IS instead. IS points to Al-Qaeda’s 4 Feb message, which called for attacks against US military bases in the Middle East, as evidence of this alleged loyalty to Iran. Many anti-Al-Qaeda jihadist as well as analysts at the time interpreted this call as a sign of Al-Qaeda’s indirect “alignment” with Iran, particularly since Al-Qaeda leadership is believed to be based there. By trying to discredit both Al-Qaeda and the Sharaa government in Syria - the rival global jihadist project and the pragmatic Islamist project, respectively - IS aims to position itself as the only true Muslim group that remains committed to Sharia and that has not allegedly compromised for political gains. IS wants to paint itself as the righteous choice for those seeking a genuine Muslim cause

6/ There is currently an ideological tug of war. In its leadership msg, IS has sought to exploit dissatisfaction among Islamist hardliners in Syria, as well as jihadist "remnants" in the country (as the leadership msg put it) who are unhappy with Sharaa’s perceived "liberal" trajectory and what they see as his government’s cozying up to the US. IS on 21 Feb directly called on them to join forces with it to topple the Sharaa "apostate", "secular regime". Meanwhile, influential Islamist writers and commentators, both supportive of and critical of the Sharaa government, are clearly sensing the growing danger posed by IS and its messaging. They are pushing back against it and warning young people not to be "fooled" by its grandstanding. One cleric has been systematically sharing "evidence" - documents & videos - of IS's "crimes" and "deviant ultra-extremist ideology"

5/ In recent official messaging (namely through its weekly paper al-Naba and the 21 Feb leadership speech), IS itself appeared angered by such allegations, which it sees as a slight on its honour and image: that its rivals, the Syrian government (or HTS as it sees it), rather than its own militants, were the ones who ultimately "freed" IS affiliated families. Such a scenario is a further humiliation for IS and underscores its failure to act on its longstanding, often grandiose promises to "liberate" the women

🧵on #Syria #ISIS #AlHol 1/ In its latest claim of responsibility for the 23 Feb attack on government forces in Raqqa, which killed four security personnel and followed a string of attacks on government forces in eastern and north eastern Syria, IS said it was responding to the 21 Feb leadership message in which the group effectively declared war on the Syrian government of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his forces, stating that fighting to topple "the secular regime" was now a top priority. Up until Dec 2025, the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had been the main target of IS operations in Syria. The Raqqa attack is the fourth since IS's 21 Feb mobilisation call. It remains to be seen whether IS can sustain such operations, especially amid a government clampdown on IS cells.

@Minalami I’d argue that this speech is less impactful than the previous one, which gloated about the Iran and Russia attacks. It is also evident that IS just doesn’t have a good narrative solution to the lingering issues surrounding detention facilities and the supporters infighting.

9/ One part of the message appeared to address the ongoing infighting among IS supporters and media groups online, urging them to remain focused and united. This suggests that IS is concerned about the impact of these divisions on the group’s image. Such rifts have resurfaced in recent weeks, particularly over the issue of donations for al-Hol camp. IS last year referred to these divisions on a number of occasions, implicitly and explicitly

8/ The spokesman concluded by paying tribute to IS members and officials - without naming any - killed over the past two years by the US-led coalition and its local partners through airstrikes, raids and clashes. He insisted that such losses would not weaken the group.

🧵Key topics from IS's first leadership message in two years.. 1/ ISIS/IS on 21 Feb released its first leadership message since Mar 2024, covering a wide range of mostly predictable themes. These included calls for jihad against the Syrian government and army, appeals for followers in the West to intensify attacks against "Christians and Jews", calls for sympathisers worldwide to migrate to IS branches, vague and non-committal remarks on IS-linked prisoners in Syria, and now customary tributes to IS's Africa branches, which it said had received foreign fighters.