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@Andrew_Zammit Hope this latest updated chart helps (these charts/data are based on IS's own claims, but collected and analysed by BBC Monitoring)
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Mina Al-Lami
4.8K posts
Mina Al-Lami
@Minalami
Chief jihadist media specialist at @BBC/ BBC Monitoring (https://t.co/YOO1pNdHh2)
London Katılım Haziran 2009
923 Takip Edilen21.3K Takipçiler
3/ It's worth pointing out, however, that during a similar bout of tensions last year between the Sharaa government and a group of "independent" foreign fighters - a term used for those who did not join either the government ranks or any opposing faction - IS also called on foreign fighters to join its ranks and was disappointed when they failed to do so. As a result, during the latest bout of tensions involving the Uzbek fighters, IS supporters largely gloated over their fate. In its latest editorial, IS said it could similarly gloat over the fighters' situation but preferred instead to invite them to join its ranks, adding that its doors remain open.
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2/ Although the message may not constitute an immediate threat, and despite the fact that most of these former fighters oppose IS's ultra-extremist ideology, a combination of government pressure on "independent" foreign fighters and the exploitation of these tensions by IS - as well as by hardline Islamist clerics, as seen recently - could risk driving at least some fighters into IS's arms. The circulation of unconfirmed or even false narratives during such episodes of tension also plays a key role in exacerbating and inflaming them, opportunities that IS is unlikely to miss exploiting.
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1/ ISIS has called on former foreign fighters in Syria who settled in the country to join its ranks, seeking to capitalise on recent tensions between a group of Uzbek former fighters and the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa. IS warned foreign fighters that the Sharaa government would sooner or later move against them and eliminate them, either all at once or gradually, at the behest of external powers. It instead urged them to join forces with IS, which it claimed represented the only pure and uncompromised Muslim banner and project.
The appeal came in the editorial of IS's weekly newspaper, al-Naba, released on 14 May.
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My latest for BBC Monitoring: Does unrest in Mali confirm a shift in jihadist dynamics?
monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0005u…
It looks at JNIM’s messaging during its recent offensive, which suggests a deliberate strategy of pragmatism and restraint, aimed at winning local support while avoiding provoking regional and international actors.
This echoes trajectories seen with HTS in Syria and the Taliban in Afghanistan, but its roots lie within al-Qaeda itself. Notably, in July 2012, AQIM's then leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, issued guidance to jihadist commanders in Mali urging them to “blend in”, lower their profile, and avoid signalling regional or global ambitions, advice that may now be shaping JNIM’s approach.
But this flexibility and restraint may be temporary and tactical, reflecting a phase before jihadists reach “tamkin” (full power and authority).
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Does the Mali conflict confirm a shift in jihadist dynamics? My brief take on this
tinyurl.com/4x3am66u (BBCM website)
tinyurl.com/mt2pc8rx (LinkedIn)
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Shadowy group Ashab al-Yamin has claimed responsibility for the 29 April stabbings in Golders Green, north London, which seriously injured two Jewish men, according to a statement in the group’s name shared on Telegram. UK police have declared this a terrorist incident.
This marks a shift in Ashab al-Yamin's activity, as its previous attacks have been relatively minor and have mostly involved arson targeting Jewish buildings or vehicles, without causing harm to individuals.
In a further escalation in its messaging, the group also incited deadly attacks against Jewish people.
This brings the total number of attacks claimed in the group’s name to at least 17, including seven in London.
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Al-Qaeda has issued a rare statement urging Pakistanis - including members of the military and security services - to overthrow their government. It framed this as support for the Afghan Taliban amid recent Pakistani airstrikes, and as a protest against what it described as the Pakistani government's subservience to the US and Israel.
This is the first time since the Taliban's return to power in 2021 that al-Qaeda has explicitly called for action and "jihad" in their support. In its latest statement, al-Qaeda said it would work to support the Afghan Taliban against the Pakistani government in any way it can, while urging Pakistanis to take part in that effort.
The Taliban has not so far commented on the statement, and it's unlikely to openly welcome such support.
While al-Qaeda welcomed the Afghan Taliban's return to power in 2021, it has largely refrained from expressing open support or calling for action on its behalf. This restraint likely reflects an effort to avoid placing the Taliban in a difficult position amid suspicions of ongoing ties between the two, which the Taliban routinely denies.
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Key updates from BBCM's Africa watchlist:
- Mali declares national mourning to honour defence minister Sadio Camara who was killed, along with some family members, in the 25 Apr JNIM suicide car bomb attack on his residence at the Kati military camp south of the capital Bamako.
- Mali president Goita has not addressed the nation since the attacks. His whereabouts have not been disclosed. He sent condolences on the killing of Camara.
- Army Chief said the situation in the country was under control following what he described as "coordinated, simultaneous and complex" assaults across at least seven localities. Said the army "neutralised" over 200 attackers
- Russian Africa Corps force (via its Telegram accounts) said its "brave" and "heroic" fighters repelled the coordinated attacks across Mali and prevented a “Syrian scenario”
- Meanwhile, the FLA (Tuareg separatists who coordinated the 25 April attacks with JNIM) said it had reached a deal for the withdrawal of Africa Corps troops who it said were encircled by the group and JNIM militants in Kidal town. FLA later said it was escorting Africa Corps troops out of a former UN peacekeeping camp in Kidal.
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In addition to the below, IS supporters have also sought to explain away JNIM’s 25 April advances by pointing to its recent partnership with Tuareg separatists from the FLA, whom they describe as “apostates”, “nationalists” and “secularists”.
They also attempt to justify IS’s own setbacks by arguing that it's the only group that has not compromised on strict Islamic and Sharia principles, unlike its rivals. IS has repeatedly advanced this argument, esp in response to the political gains of rivals in Afghanistan and Syria, claiming that its refusal to compromise has led it to be singled out and targeted by local, regional and international forces.
Some IS supporters further suggest that Somalia could be next, arguing that al-Qaeda’s affiliate al-Shabab may be “co-opted”, "defanged" or “tamed” by the West to serve what they describe as an “anti-jihad” agenda in the region.
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
#ISIS supporters online are trying to rationalise the advance of al-Qaeda’s JNIM, a key rival of ISIS. They draw parallels with the Taliban in Afghanistan and HTS in Syria, arguing that JNIM’s gains are backed by external powers, particularly the US, to serve alleged Western interests against “the true mujahidin” (ISIS). In this narrative, JNIM’s rise is not the result of its own efforts, but of outside support. They present this as part of a broader agenda to pit jihadists against each other and ultimately weaken the wider jihadist project. This mirrors the narrative ISIS has repeatedly used against HTS and the Taliban, and which it uses to justify its own “jihad” against them. In reality, ISIS appears angered and jealous by the successes of its rivals. Their political gains highlight the shortcomings of ISIS’s approach and risk undermining its image and recruitment among its support base. If JNIM manages to consolidate or expand its gains, it would represent another blow to ISIS’s rigid model of global jihad without local partnerships, a strategy that has often left the group isolated and weakened across multiple arenas.
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For at least a year now, JNIM has been somewhat distancing itself from al-Qaeda's global jihadist agenda & rhetoric. They've stopped issuing joint statements with parent group AQIM (Al-Qaeda in North Africa), and their messaging has been focused on local Sahelian issues and grievances rather than broader Muslim concerns. This change seems aimed at appealing to local communities and placating external actors (by suggesting that JNIM has no ambitions beyond Sahel).
This doesn’t necessarily indicate a division or falling out with al-Qaeda; rather, it may reflect a mutual tactical adjustment aimed at maximising gains.
Since events/ regime changes in Afghanistan in 2021 and Syria in 2024, radical Islamist groups have been looking to capitalise on similar opportunities
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ISIS is active in Mali in a limited capacity, dwarfed by its rival JNIM and largely confined to a small area in the east near the tri-border region with Niger and Burkina Faso. The two groups clash occasionally and are not known to cooperate
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
#ISIS supporters online are trying to rationalise the advance of al-Qaeda’s JNIM, a key rival of ISIS. They draw parallels with the Taliban in Afghanistan and HTS in Syria, arguing that JNIM’s gains are backed by external powers, particularly the US, to serve alleged Western interests against “the true mujahidin” (ISIS). In this narrative, JNIM’s rise is not the result of its own efforts, but of outside support. They present this as part of a broader agenda to pit jihadists against each other and ultimately weaken the wider jihadist project. This mirrors the narrative ISIS has repeatedly used against HTS and the Taliban, and which it uses to justify its own “jihad” against them. In reality, ISIS appears angered and jealous by the successes of its rivals. Their political gains highlight the shortcomings of ISIS’s approach and risk undermining its image and recruitment among its support base. If JNIM manages to consolidate or expand its gains, it would represent another blow to ISIS’s rigid model of global jihad without local partnerships, a strategy that has often left the group isolated and weakened across multiple arenas.
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#ISIS supporters online are trying to rationalise the advance of al-Qaeda’s JNIM, a key rival of ISIS.
They draw parallels with the Taliban in Afghanistan and HTS in Syria, arguing that JNIM’s gains are backed by external powers, particularly the US, to serve alleged Western interests against “the true mujahidin” (ISIS).
In this narrative, JNIM’s rise is not the result of its own efforts, but of outside support. They present this as part of a broader agenda to pit jihadists against each other and ultimately weaken the wider jihadist project.
This mirrors the narrative ISIS has repeatedly used against HTS and the Taliban, and which it uses to justify its own “jihad” against them.
In reality, ISIS appears angered and jealous by the successes of its rivals. Their political gains highlight the shortcomings of ISIS’s approach and risk undermining its image and recruitment among its support base.
If JNIM manages to consolidate or expand its gains, it would represent another blow to ISIS’s rigid model of global jihad without local partnerships, a strategy that has often left the group isolated and weakened across multiple arenas.
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Following the HTS (Syria) playbook, and very different from ISIS’s more rigid approach, JNIM is addressing Russian forces (Africa Corps) in Mali, who are backing the government. It's urging them to stay out of the fighting in return for not being targeted, and offering “coordination for a balanced and effective relationship” in the future.
This approach is reminiscent of HTS as it advanced on Damascus in late 2024. It is a calculated move that could prove effective.
If the Russians assess that the Bamako government cannot hold, or cannot be saved through their intervention, similar to the Assad government in November 2024, this messaging may encourage them to step aside.
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
Al-Qaeda's Sahel branch, JNIM, has issued a sweeping “victory statement” claiming it has taken “full control” of Mopti, Kidal, and seized most army and Russian bases in Sevare and Gao. It also claimed responsibility for targeting the residence of Mali’s president Assimi Goita, the defence minister, and Bamako’s international airport. The group said the coordinated attacks were carried out with “our partners”, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), praising and thanking them. Separately, in notable messaging, JNIM addressed the Russian Africa Corps forces (who replaced Wagner last year), telling them it wants them to remain neutral in the conflict, “in return for not being targeted [by JNIM] and for coordination in order to build an effective and balanced relationship in future.” This messaging to Russian forces is reminiscent of HTS’s approach as it advanced on Damascus in late 2024, combining military escalation with efforts to reassure/placate other actors. #JNIM #ALQAEDA #MALI #BAMAKO
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Al-Qaeda's Sahel branch, JNIM, has issued a sweeping “victory statement” claiming it has taken “full control” of Mopti, Kidal, and seized most army and Russian bases in Sevare and Gao. It also claimed responsibility for targeting the residence of Mali’s president Assimi Goita, the defence minister, and Bamako’s international airport.
The group said the coordinated attacks were carried out with “our partners”, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), praising and thanking them.
Separately, in notable messaging, JNIM addressed the Russian Africa Corps forces (who replaced Wagner last year), telling them it wants them to remain neutral in the conflict, “in return for not being targeted [by JNIM] and for coordination in order to build an effective and balanced relationship in future.”
This messaging to Russian forces is reminiscent of HTS’s approach as it advanced on Damascus in late 2024, combining military escalation with efforts to reassure/placate other actors. #JNIM #ALQAEDA #MALI #BAMAKO
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Islamist and pro-Al-Qaeda accounts on Telegram are actively sharing and celebrating reports and footage that suggest JNIM (Al-Qaeda’s branch in Mali) is making significant advances in the country. These posts are filled with fervent prayers and expressions of hope, with many users anticipating that JNIM will capture Bamako and large areas across Mali
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Are we seeing a repeat of the 2012 events in Mali, when a Tuareg separatist rebellion was hijacked by jihadists/Islamists who went on to seize the north following a military coup in Bamako? Serious developments in Mali
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