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@Andrew_Zammit Hope this latest updated chart helps (these charts/data are based on IS's own claims, but collected and analysed by BBC Monitoring)
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Mina Al-Lami
4.8K posts
Mina Al-Lami
@Minalami
Chief jihadist media specialist at @BBC/ BBC Monitoring (https://t.co/YOO1pNdHh2)
London Katılım Haziran 2009
924 Takip Edilen21.5K Takipçiler
IS has published the latest issue of its weekly newspaper, al-Naba, without any mention of the #BerlinPrideAttack attack. Its supporters online have also become far less vocal about the incident.
If IS intends to associate itself with the attack or the attacker, including by claiming to have inspired the act through its messaging, such a statement would not necessarily come immediately. In 2024 and 2025, the group said it would no longer rush to claim every attack and, in some cases, would not claim involvement even where it had played a role.
This approach was reflected in the New Orleans and Bondi Beach attacks last year. In both cases, IS commented on the incidents in the editorials of al-Naba, rather than issuing a separate statement or formal claim. It did not claim direct responsibility, instead presenting the attacks as having been inspired by its propaganda.
Following the New Orleans attack on 1 Jan 2025, IS commented on the incident in al-Naba on 9 Jan - eight days later - in the second issue published after the attack, rather than the first.
Following the Bondi Beach attack on 14 Dec 2025, IS addressed the incident in al-Naba on 18 Dec, four days later, in the first issue published after the attack.
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On questions about whether IS will claim the Berlin attack, and why it has not claimed other attacks it was widely expected to claim, see IS's commentary in al-Naba on the New Orleans attack in Jan 2025. My write-up at the time:
Through its weekly newspaper al-Naba, issued on 9 January, IS indicated that it had specific criteria, which it did not disclose, for claiming association with attacks. This indirectly suggested the Jabbar's attack - or more likely his profile - did not meet those criteria.
The group indicated that its "inbox" is "always brimming with messages linked to attacks from around the world" - presumably meaning from attackers pledging allegiance or dedicating their actions to the group. While it expressed a willingness to praise and commend such actions, it emphasised that it would not necessarily claim affiliation unless the attack met certain conditions.
"The Islamic State is not desperate to claim any attack around the world, as some may think, even if such attacks stem from its ideology or were the fruit of its incitement, or even more!" it said.
The profile of Jabbar, the man behind the New Orleans attack, may have not met specific IS criteria, and maybe the group had become more selective, compared to earlier years.
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
I don't know for sure, but we've written analyses on both cases. In the New Orleans case, IS's unexpected decision not to claim responsibility for the attack, despite the perpetrator's professed/reported support for the group, may suggest he was considered too unstable for IS to claim direct association (we explain in detail why). In its al-Naba editorial on the subject, where it took credit for inspiring the attack but not directing it, IS said that specific conditions must be met - without specifying these - for the group to claim affiliation with an attack or its perpetrator. My analysis at the time, if you're subscribed: monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b00034… In the case of Bondi Beach, IS rarely claims attacks in cases where the perpetrator is caught/in custody, and one of the two accused attackers, Naveed Akram, is in custody. Overall, in the past two years, IS has repeatedly argued that it no longer needs to rush to claim every attack, asserting that IS-inspired attacks "speak for themselves" and that authorities now recognise "whether or not an attack has the hallmarks" of the group. It has also claimed that it sometimes deliberately withholds information about its involvement in certain attacks. Together, these claims may be intended to create the impression that IS's influence extends beyond the attacks it formally claims and that its threat is everywhere
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@treesey @abdsayedd No, thanks for sharing. wasn't aware. very interesting!
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@Minalami @abdsayedd Did you see this as well re family link to Bakri?
teresa smith@treesey
Oh my goodness - Yassin with quite a scoop from Germany in @zeitonline
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If this is confirmed, we may see an ISIS claim, even if opportunistic:
“Police find video on phone of suspect pledging allegiance to ISIS on day of July 25 ramming attack in Berlin, Germany: Local News Outlet via Bild.”
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
High-profile ISIS/IS supporters online have celebrated the #BerlinPrideAttack, esp after the suspect, Abdul Ballout, was killed, calling him a “martyr” and a “lion”. They clearly believe he was inspired by IS ideology and messaging, particularly following mainstream reporting about his background. Worth noting that IS itself has not claimed any affiliation with the attack or the attacker. Many IS supporters posted the phrase “one of us”, referencing IS’s Al-Naba editorial from July 2024, where the group claimed responsibility for inspiring a series of attacks in the West, under that title, “One of us”. That editorial stated that even if IS doesn’t claim responsibility for an attack, and even if the perpetrators aren’t operationally linked to the group, “they are [nevertheless] one of us, and we are them”. IS’s argument at the time seemed designed to lower the threshold for affiliation, suggesting that ideological alignment alone connects these individuals to the group. This approach also allows IS to claim credit for even more attacks, even if only by inspiring them. IS made a similar argument in the case of the New Orleans attack (Jan 2025) writing “We were there”, taking credit for inspiring the attack but not directly orchestrating it. Same for Bondi Beach attack. In essence, in their reactions to the latest 25 July Berlin Pride attack, IS supporters seem to be saying that regardless of whether IS claims responsibility or not, the attacker is still considered “one of us [IS]”.
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I don't know for sure, but we've written analyses on both cases. In the New Orleans case, IS's unexpected decision not to claim responsibility for the attack, despite the perpetrator's professed/reported support for the group, may suggest he was considered too unstable for IS to claim direct association (we explain in detail why). In its al-Naba editorial on the subject, where it took credit for inspiring the attack but not directing it, IS said that specific conditions must be met - without specifying these - for the group to claim affiliation with an attack or its perpetrator. My analysis at the time, if you're subscribed: monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b00034…
In the case of Bondi Beach, IS rarely claims attacks in cases where the perpetrator is caught/in custody, and one of the two accused attackers, Naveed Akram, is in custody.
Overall, in the past two years, IS has repeatedly argued that it no longer needs to rush to claim every attack, asserting that IS-inspired attacks "speak for themselves" and that authorities now recognise "whether or not an attack has the hallmarks" of the group. It has also claimed that it sometimes deliberately withholds information about its involvement in certain attacks. Together, these claims may be intended to create the impression that IS's influence extends beyond the attacks it formally claims and that its threat is everywhere
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@Minalami Any idea why they never claimed New Orleans and Bondi Beach?
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@Geopolog No, but Al-Qaeda, including its AQIM & AQAP branches praised it. Meanwhile, IS claimed to have inspired the attack, but not directly orchestrated it
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High-profile ISIS/IS supporters online have celebrated the #BerlinPrideAttack, esp after the suspect, Abdul Ballout, was killed, calling him a “martyr” and a “lion”. They clearly believe he was inspired by IS ideology and messaging, particularly following mainstream reporting about his background. Worth noting that IS itself has not claimed any affiliation with the attack or the attacker.
Many IS supporters posted the phrase “one of us”, referencing IS’s Al-Naba editorial from July 2024, where the group claimed responsibility for inspiring a series of attacks in the West, under that title, “One of us”.
That editorial stated that even if IS doesn’t claim responsibility for an attack, and even if the perpetrators aren’t operationally linked to the group, “they are [nevertheless] one of us, and we are them”. IS’s argument at the time seemed designed to lower the threshold for affiliation, suggesting that ideological alignment alone connects these individuals to the group. This approach also allows IS to claim credit for even more attacks, even if only by inspiring them.
IS made a similar argument in the case of the New Orleans attack (Jan 2025) writing “We were there”, taking credit for inspiring the attack but not directly orchestrating it. Same for Bondi Beach attack.
In essence, in their reactions to the latest 25 July Berlin Pride attack, IS supporters seem to be saying that regardless of whether IS claims responsibility or not, the attacker is still considered “one of us [IS]”.
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5/ ISKP, once seen as IS's potential Western-facing threat, now appears a shadow of its former self, with its decline mirrored in the reduced output of its affiliated al-Azaim media group. By contrast, IS activity in Pakistan rose modestly, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with attacks targeting alleged spies and political opponents and Shia Muslims.
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4/ Operationally, IS claimed 30 attacks in Syria during the first half of the year, making it the group's busiest theatre outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
Even so, activity in Syria remained uneven, characterised by short-lived spikes (esp after leadership msg in Feb) rather than sustained momentum.
IS supporters continued to flag up unclaimed attacks, particularly targeted killings of religious minorities and alleged "remnants" of the Assad regime. Such unclaimed attacks appear designed to stoke sectarian and communal tensions and reinforce the climate of insecurity that the group seeks to exploit.
Iraq and Afghanistan continued their longer-term decline, with just two claimed attacks in each country.
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Our team at BBC Monitoring has published a data-driven analysis of IS/ISIS activity and messaging in the first half of 2026, marking 12 years since the group's "caliphate" declaration. While the full report is behind a subscription wall, here are some key findings 🧵
monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b00065…
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The final-page religious article in the new al-Bayan publication is by Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, the AQAP religious figure who was killed in a US airstrike in Yemen in 2015.
Although it doesn't mention any country, gov, or individual by name, its inclusion appears intended as an implicit critique of the current Syrian gov of Ahmed al-Sharaa. The original text was likely written in the context of the Arab uprisings.
The article warns against squandering "the fruit of revolution" by failing to establish Sharia after achieving power. Otherwise, al-Rubaysh argues, the result is merely "replacing one oppressor with another, and one agent [of the West] with another." He stresses that implementing Sharia is a religious obligation rather than a political choice or a matter of popular consent.
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami
The high-profile pro-al-Qaeda media group al-Yaqin has shared the first issue of a new weekly newspaper, al-Bayan, which closely mimics IS’s weekly newspaper al-Naba in its design, layout, length and content. Even its name, al-Bayan, echoes that of IS’s now-defunct flagship radio station. The nine-page publication was released on 3 July by al-Yaqin's online outlets. It was presented as “a weekly newspaper issued every Friday by [al-Qaeda] supporters from the Arabian Peninsula”, which often refers to al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch (AQAP). Like al-Naba, al-Bayan offers a roundup of key militant attacks and propaganda from al-Qaeda’s global affiliates, although the first issue focuses primarily on the activities of al-Qaeda’s most active branches: JNIM in the Sahel and al-Shabab in Somalia. Interestingly, the publication refers to these groups not by their commonly known names - Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Shabab - but as al-Qaeda in West Africa and al-Qaeda in East Africa, respectively. Almost identical to al-Naba’s layout, the publication opens with a front page highlighting key stories. The second page features an infographic summarising attack statistics from the previous week, while the third page carries an editorial. The editorial in the first issue, which focuses on the conflict in Gaza, appeared somewhat dated and generic.
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The high-profile pro-al-Qaeda media group al-Yaqin has shared the first issue of a new weekly newspaper, al-Bayan, which closely mimics IS’s weekly newspaper al-Naba in its design, layout, length and content. Even its name, al-Bayan, echoes that of IS’s now-defunct flagship radio station.
The nine-page publication was released on 3 July by al-Yaqin's online outlets. It was presented as “a weekly newspaper issued every Friday by [al-Qaeda] supporters from the Arabian Peninsula”, which often refers to al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch (AQAP).
Like al-Naba, al-Bayan offers a roundup of key militant attacks and propaganda from al-Qaeda’s global affiliates, although the first issue focuses primarily on the activities of al-Qaeda’s most active branches: JNIM in the Sahel and al-Shabab in Somalia.
Interestingly, the publication refers to these groups not by their commonly known names - Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Shabab - but as al-Qaeda in West Africa and al-Qaeda in East Africa, respectively.
Almost identical to al-Naba’s layout, the publication opens with a front page highlighting key stories. The second page features an infographic summarising attack statistics from the previous week, while the third page carries an editorial. The editorial in the first issue, which focuses on the conflict in Gaza, appeared somewhat dated and generic.
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ISIS has issued an explicit call for attacks on World Cup venues and crowds in the US, telling sympathisers they have a "golden opportunity" to strike.
The group suggested a range of attack methods, including arson attacks inside stadiums during matches, with the aim of causing mass panic and crowd stampedes.
It also urged online supporters to hijack popular World Cup hashtags to spread ISIS incitement and propaganda. Many supporters pledged to comply, identifying key hashtags and preparing coordinated hashtag "raids" to amplify the group's messaging.
Worth noting that in recent years, most ISIS calls for attacks around major events or religious holidays have not led to an immediate uptick in attacks, including the campaign of incitement by supportive media groups during the World Cup in 2024. Still, worth being aware of this incitement and the accompanying propaganda campaign
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5/ While IS attacks in Syria - at least those publicly claimed - remain relatively infrequent and generally low-level, with a few notable exceptions, the group clearly continues to prioritise the country and is seeking to exploit security gaps, as well as tensions between the government, hardline Islamists and foreign fighters.
In its 21 Feb leadership message, IS urged its fighters in Syria to make government forces and personnel their "utmost priority". Although the directive was followed by a brief uptick in attacks, activity soon tailed off and returned to its usual pattern of sporadic, mostly small-scale ops.
However, IS may also be behind some unclaimed targeted killings, esp of religious minorities and individuals accused of being "remnants" of the former regime, potentially as part of an effort to inflame sectarian tensions and undermine stability
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4/ This appears to be the first time since IS began attacking the forces of Ahmed al-Sharaa's government that it has identified attackers, even if only by their noms de guerre. The move may have been intended to highlight the continued presence of both foreign and local fighters in the group's ranks in Syria
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1/ ISIS has claimed responsibility for the 15 Jun attack on a Syrian Interior Ministry command centre in Raqqa province, describing it as a "brazen" assault on a "heavily fortified" security site carried out "in broad daylight"
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