const / コンスト

473 posts

const / コンスト

const / コンスト

@lambda_xy_x

クリプトエンジニア。アイコンはNFTではなくRobohashです。

Se unió Şubat 2022
7 Siguiendo713 Seguidores
Tweet fijado
const / コンスト
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ブロックチェーン技術がもたらす未来について私が楽観的な理由 (スレッド)
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DeFiは死んだんだ いくらRWAと名乗ってもトラストレスにはならないんだ もう仲介を飛ばして金融を作り直す試みは終わって、オフチェーン依存と向き合う時なんだ
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DEXにおいては初めはLPerが価格を指定しなくていい手軽さからフルレンジ流動性が広まったものの、今では個々のLPerが価格を指定する集中流動性が当たり前になっているように、CDPにおいても個々のborrowerが金利を指定してステーブルコインを発行するのが当たり前になるのかもしれない。
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よさそう。
Liquity@LiquityProtocol

Liquity v2: Why user-set interest rates are a BOLD move forward 🔵 To date there is no protocol that has created an efficient interest-rate market between borrowers and stablecoin holders. This is about to change. ⛓️ In DeFi we have: - Fixed one-time origination fee - e.g. Liquity v1 - Governance based interest rates - e.g. MakerDAO - Algorithmically controlled interest rates - e.g. crvUSD All these systems have different trade-offs: - Fixed rate protocols cannot adjust to high interest rate environments - Governance can be slow and arbitrary - Algorithmic controllers create volatile and unpredictable rates. We’re yet to see a market-driven mechanism….. till now. Why should you care, and how does Liquity v2 solve this? 🤔👇 In contrast to money markets where there is a significant spread between lenders and borrowers, Liquity v2’s unique user-set interest rate mechanism will enable swift, adaptive adjustments that tighten the disparity between the two. Over time, we anticipate that DeFi interest rates will converge towards the Liquity v2 model, establishing a new standard for borrowing and capital efficiency within DeFi. To see how user-set interest rates work and why borrowers would want to pay a higher rate than 0%, we first need to understand what keeps Liquity’s stablecoin stable in the first place A quick lesson in Liquity mechanics👇 In April 2021, Liquity v1 pioneered the first CDP system with a built-in redemption mechanism and introduced a stablecoin with a strong downward peg protection with no dependency on centralized collateral. The redemption feature allows any LUSD holder to exchange their stablecoins for $1 worth of ETH. When LUSD is <$1, users can buy it for e.g. $0.99 off the market and sell to the protocol for $1.00. While this mechanism maintains a hard price floor around $1 (minus fees) through direct arbitrage, it impacts the riskiest borrowers since the redeemed LUSD is used to pay back the loans with the lowest collateral ratio in exchange for an equivalent amount of ETH. The affected borrowers see their collateral and debt go down by the same value, implying no net loss but a reduced exposure to ETH. Why has this been an issue? 👇 Due to rapidly increasing market rates in the last few months, borrowing volumes have outweighed the demand for holding LUSD, resulting in excessive selling pressure, and thus redemptions. As a consequence, many LUSD borrowers have increased their collateral ratios to previously unseen levels, just to avoid redemptions. This has seriously impaired Liquity v1’s ability to offer capital-efficient loans in the current environment of excessively high DeFi interest rates.  Being interest-free in nature and with its fixed-cost and reward system, Liquity v1 has shown to work reliably in low interest environments, and it continues to be a viable option for borrowers in such scenarios. But in high interest rate situations, users tend to seek stablecoins with higher yields.  It has become clear that variable interest rates are better suited to deal with a variety of market scenarios in a sustainable and flexible way. At the same time, we also realize the importance of the redemption mechanism to prevent a stablecoin from losing its peg: many existing stablecoins have suffered from downward peg deviations due to high sell pressure.  Enter the innovation: user-set interest rates 👇 Through user-set interest rates, redemptions can be neatly married with dynamic interest rates: instead of targeting the loans with the lowest collateral ratio, redemptions in Liquity v2 will be performed in an ascending order of individual interest rates. Borrowers with low interest rates thus have the highest risk of being affected by redemptions. Users can freely manage their redemption risk by adjusting their interest rates relative to their peers (or delegate the management to third parties; more on this below). Based on the borrowers’ individual risk tolerance, the market will establish a range of individual interest rates. Borrowers willing to risk redemptions may set below-average rates for capital efficiency, whereas more risk averse or “set-and-forget” borrowers may opt for an above-average rate for peace of mind. As opposed to most existing CDP protocols, the interest revenue in v2 will be used to incentivize stablecoin demand and liquidity autonomously with minimal human governance. For safety and efficiency reasons most of the revenue is funneled to the Stability Pools, incentivizing stablecoin demand as well as protocol solvency. In addition to that, a sizable part of the revenue is sent to LPs on external AMMs to ensure sufficient stablecoin liquidity as PIL (protocol incentivized liquidity) across multiple pairs. As fees are collected in the form of interest, this ensures a continuous and smoothed flow of incentives to SP and LP depositors. And this brings us to BOLD ⚫ 👇 In light of this, we’re excited to announce the new stablecoin at the heart of Liquity v2 will be named BOLD. This name mirrors our resolve to pioneer a paradigm shift in DeFi, enabling a market driven mechanism where interest rates are no longer dictated by the few, but chosen by the many. The interest rates set by users’ also influence how BOLD's peg mechanics work ↓ When BOLD trades above $1, borrowers will tend to reduce their rates due to the lower redemption risk. This makes borrowing and leveraging on ETH (and LSTs) more attractive, while holding BOLD becomes less attractive. Conversely, when BOLD is below $1, borrowers are exposed to a higher redemption risk and are likely to increase their interest rates. Borrowing thus becomes less attractive, while demand for BOLD increases as the interest payments result in higher yield for the stablecoin, pushing its price upward. Instead of driving collateral ratios to unreasonable levels, user-set interest rates should enable a capital efficient equilibrium between borrowers and stablecoin holders in a fully market-driven manner. Borrowers will be able to actually benefit from Liquity v2’s attractive loan to value ratios,  and get as much funds against the chosen collateral as their liquidation risk tolerance permits. What does this mean? 🤔 👇 As a borrower, you will be able to choose any interest rate you like, to pay whatever you want. You can also delegate your interest rate to: 1) A manager - a 3rd party which actively and continuously adjusts the rate for a group of users, with a clear goal / rate percentile.  2) A smart contract - an Ethereum contract address autonomously managing the borrow rate for its users following a preset logic. 3) Any EOA - this can be a hot wallet or a friend doing this for you. In all cases, the only permission this delegate will have is to adjust the interest rate in a predetermined range. Nothing else. 🔷 With this advancement, we expect v2 to offer very competitive borrowing and stablecoin holding rates. What else are you cooking? 👨‍🍳 🍚 User-chosen interest rates will be a big leap forward - but this is by no means the only innovation Liquity v2 will ship with. Stay tuned for our upcoming article which emphasizes the other borrowing enhancements in greater detail, and join our Discord for discussions ✨

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やはり分からないものを学ぶには使ってみるのが一番だな (新興DeFiに想定外のタイミングで資金をロックされた人の顔)
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とあるP2Pレンディングプロトコルの説明をしようとして「債務者の借り逃げを前提としつつ高APYの債権を移転し続ける爆弾ゲーム」というあまりにも酷い表現になってしまった。
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インフラレイヤーはalt L1 → alt DAときたら次はalt VMかなと思ってる。EVMはpermitなりAAにおけるbundlingなりが広まらないとUX面で厳しいのでは。
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いや、「fraud proofが間違っていると思ったら」はおかしいな。「proofなしのstate transitionが間違っていると思ったら」か。
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面白い。賭け金を積んでティア分けされたproofで競うcontestable rollup。例えばfraud proofが間違っていると思ったら、上位ティアに位置するvalidity proofで賭け金を奪うことができる。 taiko.mirror.xyz/Z4I5ZhreGkyfda…
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@crypto2real なるほど〜。Web UIにおけるpriority feeの自動設定は、戸惑いなく使えるようにするという意味で設計思想的には好きですが、高度な設定としてスリッページ同様カスタマイズできてもいいかもなと思いました。 根本的にはSolana自体の手数料体系の改善により予測可能性が高まることに期待しています。
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yugure.sol
yugure.sol@crypto2real·
@lambda_xy_x Orca 活用ありがとうございます!🐳 なるほど、盲点でした・・・🤦‍ スワップが多発していると、スリッページ・エラーは避けられるものの、Whirlpool アカウントの書き込み権限の取得争いには巻き込まれるので、Priority fee の積み増しは必要かもしれないです💧
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最近何やってる?と聞かれたらこの記事と同じことやってました、と言うしかないくらい私の戦略が言語化されていた。Orcaはリバランスコストが低いので色々試しやすく愛用してます。
yugure.sol@crypto2real

流動性提供の手数料発生のしくみ Part 3|yugure.sol @crypto2real #note 手数料を生み出さない流動性と改善の方向性、レンジ外を意図的に使うことなどを説明します。 note.com/crypto2real/n/…

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const / コンスト
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DAレイヤーのlivenessに問題が起きた場合のフォールバックは容易だが、コンセンサスレイヤーのlivenessに問題が起きた場合のフォールバックは容易ではない。
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議論を読んで私としてはフォールバックの有無は本質的な違いだと感じた。
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DAがオフチェーンでもl2beatに載っていればL2と呼ぶことにした。他にrollupとvalidiumとoptimiumをまとめて呼ぶ方法がないし。Polygon PoSはzkEVM validiumになるまで頑張って。
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Ethereumのセキュリティが欲しい -> Arbitrum One ガス代をとにかく安くしたい -> Arbitrum Nova 独自トークンでガス代を払えるようにしたい -> Arbitrum Orbit AnyTrust chains
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L3のORは最終的にL1にトランザクションを書き込まないといけないので、コスト圧縮があまり見込めないという課題があった。 Arbitrum AnyTrustを使ったL3なら、trust minimizeされたDACでDAコストを減らせ、ガス代をERC-20で払えるというおまけ付き。分類的にはoptimiumだけど全然アリだと思う。
The Block@TheBlockCo

Arbitrum Orbit's Layer 3 chains can now use select ERC-20 tokens for transaction fees theblock.co/post/270370/ar…

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DeFiにおけるUniswap以来の大発明か?
Greg Di Prisco@g_dip

A thread: *ALL ABOUT AJNA* @ajnafi Next week Ajna redeploys to the Ethereum mainnet and to multiple L2s. I think it's as good a time as any to share the story of how the project came to be, and why it was so insanely hard to build. The story begins in July of 2021 with the winddown of the @MakerDAO Foundation. The entire original founding team of Ajna (9 of us) had all recently left the Maker Foundation as part of its winddown process. It was the peak of the "free money era" bull market and optimism regarding the future of DeFi was everywhere. But not for us. We had seen how the sausage was made. We knew that the mechanisms and risk trade-offs behind the scenes were never going to hold water. But even more importantly, we realized that the fundamental architecture of most protocols inhibited us from doing what we actually wanted to do, which was to use the majority of the crypto assets in our portfolio across DeFi. The team came from a combination of backgrounds in software development and prop/high-frequency trading, and many of us had the shared experience of helping to build MakerDAO. We knew it would be a challenge to solve this problem, but we thought we were uniquely suited to do it. Until now, most protocols (pretty sure Uniswap is the sole notable exception) have used a model that socializes risk across all users and manages this risk through governance. They also employ centralized price feeds via oracles like Chainlink that introduce fundamentally unscalable trust assumptions into the business logic of the protocol. Why unscalable? Just look at how the major DeFi protocols work today and it should be obvious. They can only support "blue chip" assets with huge secondary market liquidity and a reliable price oracle. The moment they stray from this they get rekt. It's not a matter of tweaking governance parameters, it is a fundamental design flaw. In order to be supported by these protocols, a new asset creator needs to spend months building secondary market liquidity, working with exchanges and market makers, integrating with oracle providers, and (worst of all IMO) negotiating with the "governance" abominations we call DAOs. The result is that only extremely well funded teams with an army of lawyers to defend their decentralization theatrics can actually launch assets and get them supported across the ecosystem. This is completely against the promise and the ethos of crypto. But why is it so hard to get a reliable price oracle? Price oracles rely on a sufficient amount of secondary market liquidity in order to be used as a price feed for other DeFi activities like lending/borrowing. If the amount of liquidity in a lending protocol is greater than the amount of liquidity in the secondary market, the secondary market can be manipulated to (generally) profitably manipulate the lending market. We've seen this happen more times than I can count now. For a new or smaller asset it's very difficult (if not impossible) to get to a sufficient level of secondary market liquidity, and even harder to get a DAO to pay attention/justify putting in the resources required for onboarding. There is also a "chicken and the egg" problem at work. In order for a secondary market to develop, market makers need inventory, and this inventory is generally provided to them as a loan. If they can't get a loan, they will have to tie up their own capital and take on the price risk themselves, which they won't do isn't scalable anyway. In order to secure a loan on a new or small asset, market makers will need to work directly with the team that created the asset. This pattern is optimizing for centralization and hurting the regulatory status of the entire industry. Ajna offers a new path. The reason it took 2.5 years to implement and reach a final deployment of the Ajna Protocol is that we completely removed oracles from the equation. It was incredibly difficult to do this. Frankly, any protocol that does not remove the need for oracles is just not trying to solve the same problem as Ajna and cannot possibly serve the same breadth of assets that Ajna does. Ultimately the Ajna Protocol not only removed price oracles, but also any form of governance. Our contracts are completely immutable, credibly neutral, and permissionless. So how does it work? First, Ajna introduces a novel mechanism for liquidity management inside the lending pool. Most other lending markets are one-dimensional, in the sense that the entire pool will lend and collateralize loans at the same price (the one provided by the oracle). Ajna is multi-dimensional. It uses a type of order book to accept deposits and automatically distributes loans across these prices. To do this we had to implement a novel mechanism called a Scaled Fenwick Tree. This was created by our team member @anthropicprince and the concept was published in the IEEE journal: ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10196… By having lenders provide the price at which they are willing to lend at to the protocol, rather than using an external and trusted price source, Ajna removes the need for oracles altogether. The implication of this is that an Ajna market is completely self contained and therefore resistant to price manipulation on secondary markets. You can use Ajna to borrow/lend against any asset in your portfolio - be it a super illiquid ERC20, or even an individual NFT. This has never been possible before now in a peer-to-pool setting. Now, the pool must determine what level of over-collateralization is required for a given asset. Through the research of our economic consultants/advisors, we reached the conclusion that a good approximation for the annualized volatility of an asset is the square root of the annualized interest rate in an efficient lending market (denominated in the lending asset). We therefore take the square root of the annualized interest rate and apply some extra calculations to determine the overcollateralization required of a loan at any given time. The overcollateralization of a specific loan is fixed upon origination, giving the borrower a known liquidation price, and therefore provides a UX similar to other lending protocols. The next component of the lending pool is managing the interest rate, which Ajna does without governance. Each Ajna pool has an internal concept of balance, which tries to match two numbers: "target utilization" and "meaningful actual utilization." This balance metric accounts for all meaningful deposits (i.e. deposits above a certain price) and checks what % of them are being utilized. It then looks at the average collateralization of the loans in the pool and inverts this number to create a target level of utilization. The logic behind this target level is that users collateralize their loans in line with the volatility of the asset (partially because they don't want to get liquidated and partially because they are forced to), which in turn informs the pool how difficult it will be to replenish liquidity and therefore what % of the deposits it should ideally keep reserved. Every 12 hours the pool checks how far these two numbers are from each other and adjusts the rate up or down by 10%. It does this until the utilization rates are in equilibrium. The combination of these mechanisms creates a virtuous cycle where lenders can make an informed decision based on the current rate of the pool, and where the accumulation of these informed decisions further influences the rate mechanics. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all lending markets need an efficient liquidation mechanism. The problem with a liquidation mechanism that does not use oracles is that it relies on game theory and can be manipulated if the incentives are not carefully calibrated. To solve this problem, Ajna pioneered the concept of “liquidation bonds.” A liquidation bond is effectively a bet that the kicker of a liquidation will need to make on the outcome of that liquidation. For example, if I see a loan in an Ajna pool that is below the minimum collateralization relative to the actual market price (which the pool does not know), I can kick that loan into liquidation. However, in order to do so, I will need to put down a cash deposit that guarantees the settlement of the liquidation auction below a certain price. If the auction settles above this price range, I will lose my bond. If it settles below, I will make money on my bond. The result of this mechanism is a decentralized marketplace for liquidations where liquidators need to put skin in the game in order to kick a loan into auction, and one in which they have no direct incentive to cheat, removing the need for oracles or governance in the liquidation mechanics. On a personal level, my experience working with my co-founders at Ajna, and all of the other amazing people who I've met along the way, has been one of the most meaningful learning experiences of my life. It is bittersweet to see it come to an end. When the protocol is relaunched next week, we will be simultaneously winding down Ajna Labs LLC and disbanding our team. We are doing this because we need to eat our own dogfood. We truly believe in the promise of decentralization. Once the team is gone and the protocol is once again live, the first grants cycle will begin and decentralized ecosystem development can take root. Ping @Davidutro to learn more about that. I’m excited to see how you all will use Ajna and I’m hopeful for the positive impact it can have on DeFi. See you all on the other side 🫡

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