Lbb

Final box office results for calendar year 2026 Q1 are in at +21.6% YoY Given D-BOX $DBO.TO began the quarter with +16.9% more screens YoY (adj. for inactive screen closures) implies +42.2% YoY royalty increase for D-BOX FY26 Q4 before FX and indexing effects

@SharogradskyM But STIF is moving up the value chain: passive → active → detection → distribution Now it’s all about execution If it works: high growth + margin expansion → re-rating If not: lower margins + higher capital intensity → multiple compression

@SharogradskyM The market is concerned about the lack of visible synergies, which still need to be proven. On paper, however, the acquisitions make strong strategic sense and have the potential to strengthen the company’s system, business, and moat.

An interesting case study from one of our holdings this month — $ALSTI (STIF, France) The stock dropped sharply after reporting full H2 results. Here’s why i think the market got it wrong. 👇

@SharogradskyM Mark what is your opinion on the cash cycle? Do you think it will remain structurally high with the shift to a distribution-led sales model?

$SLYG if you want learn more about company, stop read stupid claims at X and learn more what they building and their support groups

@BG_kmeta 2) Under this model, should we expect DSO to remain at current levels, or to normalize in the coming quarters? 3) Should we expect a meaningful cash inflow from receivables in H1 2026?

@BG_kmeta Hello @BG_kmeta Thanks for your 🧵. I have 2 more questions: 1) Is the increase in receivables in Q4 mainly structural due to the shift to a distribution-led model, or mainly temporary due to seasonal factors like Black Friday?

As co-founder and co-CEO of $SLYG, holding 32% of Shelly Group, I want to address investor concerns directly. I don't normally engage on X — building technology is my job, not social media. But some analyses circulating are factually wrong, and that's not good for the company or its shareholders. A thread 🧵

@SharogradskyM @IdentityJohnDoe @jptissot1 remains strong. In that scenario, Shelly effectively becomes the financing layer of its distribution channel. H1 results should be decisive in resolving this

@SharogradskyM @IdentityJohnDoe @jptissot1 higher receivables and (temporary) working capital pressure. The key question is whether this reflects a temporary adjustment phase or a structural change in the business model. If structural, the quality of the business declines and multiples should compress, even if growth

1/ FULL Post-mortem – Why I sold $SLYG After seeing your responses, receiving many questions, and reading some very well-done threads — some challenging my points — I decided to write up my main reason for selling Shelly. I also decided to respond to @ThomasTangMI 's thread. Selling was not hard. What has been extremely difficult is letting the story go, after it being a core position of Arauca for so long. I think the best thing for me is to write in full what I saw in the annual report and public filings and what my rationale was. An important disclaimer: there is only one point in this post-mortem that I did not know when I sold. I decided to add it anyway, as it raises an important set of questions. I learned it through @mavix_leon 's latest thread, and it relates to what was behind the BGN receivables, an aspect I was extremely curious about but did not know before. Mavix also subsequently reached out to me privately to clarify certain points from his thread — I have incorporated both his public thread and his private clarification in Tweet 3, with full attribution and with the appropriate caveats. So, when you see me discussing that specifically, you should know I only learned it a few days ago. I knew about receivables booked in BGN of course — but not what was behind them. Everything else comes from the official reports — so nothing I post should be a surprise. It is all there. What I am sharing is how I read that information, and that is my entirely personal interpretation. As I said previously, I am not responding to the company's FAQ. I have moved on. I do however raise many questions in this post-mortem — but those are exclusively my honest questions. I have shared all of these points privately with some of you and have seen a range of interpretations, which has been a wonderful exchange. I decided to share it with everyone. You might ask, given some negative reactions, why I do it. Well — first, I learned how to use the block button. Second, I do it more for myself, to put an end to the story and express clearly, while it is still fresh, my exact thought process. Additionally, nothing that follows should be new to you: I have already sold, everything comes from the financial statements except the BGN receivables detail from Mavix, and I have incorporated some of the most frequent questions I have received — so this also serves as a final reference document. In this post-mortem I cover mostly reason number one: the lack of cash flow generation and the increase in receivables and why that is a problem for me. Almost all points relate to that. That is the bulk of why I exited Shelly. I am not covering every reason — mostly reason number one. One more thing before we start. I received a lot of pushbacks on my comments about the optics of the compensation package. I stand by them entirely, and I have dedicated a full section to explaining exactly why — including how the package actually worked, because I think most of the criticism came from a misunderstanding of its mechanics. I will get to that in Tweet 6. One clarification upfront, because it is the most common misreading of my position. My concern is not that Shelly burns cash — high-growth companies burn cash and I accept that completely. I would have been comfortable with negative free cash flow if the cash were going into R&D, marketing, capex, or inventory. Those are investments you can evaluate. What makes Shelly different is that the cash is not going there. It is sitting in receivables. That distinction is the entire foundation of my decision. One important point: my reasons for selling and my concerns are in many ways easy for the company to fix and demonstrate. Nothing more is needed than meaningful cash flow generation and a reduction in receivables over the course of the year. I am equally sure that this will be a catalyst for improved communication. I have said repeatedly that I am a Shelly fan — of the products and of what the company has built. That cannot be taken away. But I am truly disappointed by the lack of cash flow and the working capital metrics and the facts for the investment definitely changed. Important Disclosure: Neither Arauca Capital nor I, nor any closely related person, nor any firm that does business with me or my firms, has any position — short or long — in Shelly shares, to my knowledge. This post is therefore entirely informational. My intention is to show you how I came to this conclusion. For reference, my position in Shelly was long-only for years. I never trimmed. I sold the full position following the Q4 2025 results, and that is that. Please note that nothing in this thread can be considered investment advice, and this is not an investment recommendation. The thread is long and may contain mistakes — if so, they are mine. Please verify everything independently and do not take anything I say below as fact. I hope to share my process, why I sold, and the questions that continue to dominate my thinking.

@pbcinc Many technologies are involved: AI & autonomy, vision, sensors, communications, cybersecurity, weapons… probably a lot of opportunities here. I may have found one for now - still very early though

@pbcinc that dominance. Inexpensive systems can now destroy assets worth $M. We’re entering a technological arms race: drones vs counter-drone systems->driving massive investment on both sides.

Drone Warfare. ig.ft.com/ukraine-kill-z…

Quelles sont vos recommandations de lecture pour 2026 ? (Bourse/invest/histoire d'entrepreneur) 📕

What interest do they have in keeping shareholders in the dark as much as possible?

2️⃣Management has under-communicated to the market. The allocation of these future >€240M is completely unclear! What will they do with it? Every CEO is at least somewhat sensitive to their company’s share price. If you flip the question :

In theory, there’s nothing left to prevent management from buying shares -> the legal documents for the transfer have been released, and there are still>30 days until the AGM. So… there are 2 possible reasons why management isn’t buying: 1️⃣ Another opportunity is on the table