The Pan-European Journal

All answers as to who or what man actually is point to one fundamental anthropological truth: every answer serves human beings in their quest for self-preservation. The multiplicity of views, outlooks, and conceptions of things hints at something deeper - that human beings are creatures who cannot not compete, cannot not seek to impose their self-conception, cannot not build hierarchies. And yet they are also creatures who genuinely need community, genuinely need rule, and are genuinely capable of elaborating the most sophisticated cultural and moral frameworks. Those frameworks, however, are never simply what they claim to be.

What makes writers like Montaigne, the French moralists - e.g. La Rochefoucauld, Chamfort, Rivarol - Gracián, Lichtenberg, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche so compelling? They are, above all, brilliant psychologists and unflinching anthropologists of the human condition - not merely observers of how people feel, but diagnosticians of how people actually are. They are united in more than outlook and temperament. Many of them witnessed the unravelling of Scholasticism and Christian dogma, and their thought carries the mark of that collapse; others wrote in the wake of Revolution and the upheavals of industrial modernity. They inherited a world stripped of settled answers and wrote with full knowledge of that loss. The aphoristic form, for them, is not merely a stylistic preference - it is a philosophical stance, the only honest response to an age of permanent flux. "Man is indeed an object miraculously vain, various and wavering," Montaigne wrote. "It is difficult to found a judgement on him which is steady and uniform."

Alexis de Tocqueville, like Klemens von Metternich, foresaw the central role the media apparatus would play in the age of mass society. A newspaper - or media more broadly - becomes a substitute for the social ties that aristocracy once provided automatically. It is quite remarkable that Tocqueville identified this underlying mechanism so sharply, well before the arrival of mass media in the centralised, managerial form that Samuel Francis describes in the tweet below. "Newspapers become more necessary in proportion as men become more equal and individualism more to be feared. To suppose that they only serve to protect freedom would be to diminish their importance: they maintain civilization. I shall not deny that in democratic countries newspapers frequently lead the citizens to launch together into very ill-digested schemes; but if there were no newspapers there would be no common activity. The evil which they produce is therefore much less than that which they cure. Newspapers make associations and associations make newspapers. A newspaper can survive only on the condition of publishing sentiments or principles common to a large number of men. A newspaper, therefore, always represents an association that is composed of its habitual readers. This association may be more or less defined, more or less restricted, more or less numerous; but the fact that the newspaper keeps alive is a proof that at least the germ of such an association exists in the minds of its readers. The more equal the conditions of men become and the less strong men individually are, the more easily they give way to the current of the multitude and the more difficult it is for them to adhere by themselves to an opinion which the multitude discard. A newspaper represents an association; it may be said to address each of its readers in the name of all the others and to exert its influence over them in proportion to their individual weakness. The power of the newspaper press must therefore increase as the social condition of men become more equal." - Alexis de Tocqueville, Of the relation between public associations and the newspapers in Democracy in America

JUST IN: Sweden passes a “good behavior” law allowing migrants to be deported over non-criminal conduct such as tax debts or extremist links.

JUST IN: Spain reveals 900,000 undocumented migrants have applied for legal status under its mass naturalization program — nearly double initial expectations.

All answers as to who or what man actually is point to one fundamental anthropological truth: every answer serves human beings in their quest for self-preservation. The multiplicity of views, outlooks, and conceptions of things hints at something deeper - that human beings are creatures who cannot not compete, cannot not seek to impose their self-conception, cannot not build hierarchies. And yet they are also creatures who genuinely need community, genuinely need rule, and are genuinely capable of elaborating the most sophisticated cultural and moral frameworks. Those frameworks, however, are never simply what they claim to be.

NOW: Moscow refineries are on fire again amid Ukrainian drone attacks.

Putin encourages "mixed marriages" between Slavic Russians and non-Slavic Russians as a "security buffer" against civil strife. This is Putin the Eurasianist

I often think of our old kings. Whenever I am tired, I think of them. Whenever things are uncomfortable, I think of them. I must admit that I am ashamed of Sweden as it looks today. But things can change as long as there is a will. It is not over. No surrender!

The driving force behind Joseph de Maistre's thought is his anthropology, which is sound and historically grounded. This is because the Christian notion of original sin is far more realistic than any tabula rasa conception of man. Maistre's thought emerges from the age of mass politics and totality unleashed by the Revolution. In many respects, this marks a transition in "right-wing thought": the worship of the ancien régime and an absolutist conception of sovereignty as a countermeasure against Revolution. The old defence of estates, rights, and societas civilis became untenable once its "metaphysical" and sociological foundations were destroyed. We see this reaction directly in Maistre, and in Donoso Cortés it morphs into total despair as it takes the form of arbitrary dictatorship - something Schmitt himself criticises him for. Among devout Christian reactionaries especially, a form of eschatology still influences their thinking, which gives rise to a kind of kathetonic thinking that I would argue is psychologically damaging because it produces what in contemporary zoomer parlance might be called "doomerism." When the forces of fate - and the movement they produce through time - are seen as a dissolving force that "cannot be stopped" but only "restrained," the result is a rabid authoritarianism that amounts to little more than a band-aid, meant to let a half-dead corpse draw a few more breaths in an otherwise miserable world conquered by "paganism." This is one reason why devout reactionaries and conservatives, when true to their beliefs, often end up neurotic. To take Maistre seriously beyond his anthropology - and thus beyond his view of power - is less a serious political stance than a form of romanticism. It is also worth noting that people often cite Maistre's essay On Sovereignty as a key work of right-wing thought, when the "real" Maistre is better found in the Saint Petersburg Dialogues. The former is an early, post-revolutionary work, containing a curious mix of different strains of thought. At times it reads like it is written by a moderate constitutionalist, almost as if a Montesquieu was speaking. There is even sections arguing for a type of utilitarianism; and at times it feels like he has recently read Bentham seriously. Moreover, Maistre's notion of sovereignty there is nearly indistinguishable from Rousseau's: sovereignty for him is a centralised will that reigns, not necessarily one that rules. This makes for a rather interesting and frankly confused mix of thought. I think it's safe to say that anyone seriously invoking Joseph de Maistre does so because he represents the "complete opposite" of the current order of things - which said person, of course, opposes. Moreover, such citations often seem to serve merely as a signal that "one is in on the bit," that "I am part of the gang." It is frankly a sort of larp, and there are authors far more worth reading: Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck, Panajotis Kondylis, Gianfranco Poggi, Charles Tilly, etc. These authors give you a far more comprehensive grasp of the overall transformation we have undergone in modernity, and allow you to contemplate solutions to actual problems more coherently, rather than simply lamenting that "things suck and here is why." Just a final note: You should still definitely read Joseph de Maistre.

Some AfD politicians and supporters are currently celebrating the fact that black members of the German national football team prayed with players from Curaçao after yesterday’s match. Remigration suddenly seems irrelevant to them as soon as the black people involved are Christian. Instead, they celebrate this as a victory over the left-wing “woke” agenda. Interesting how that works.

How the French Right's Position on Europe is Changing: Observations from a Pan-European Inside National Rally (RN) This piece was written by a friend of the Pan European Journal. Said person is a long-time member of Jordan Bardella's Rassemblement National (National Rally in English). Jordan Bardella will never fully satisfy the historical sovereigntist wing of his political camp, even if he presents himself as part of that tradition. His current positioning reflects a significant evolution away from classical French sovereigntism and toward a more pragmatic conception of European power. His definition of Europe as a form of “co-ownership” is intellectually sound. Likewise, he is right to challenge the growing influence of the European Commission while simultaneously projecting himself as a future member of the European Council, where national leaders ultimately exercise political authority. This combination of institutional criticism and strategic engagement is coherent. More broadly, Bardella articulates an interesting vision that, in several respects, falls within the continuity of Emmanuel Macron’s doctrine of European strategic autonomy. One of his strongest ideas is that France should provide security guarantees to Eastern European nations—particularly Poland and the Baltic states. This reflects a significant shift in French strategic thinking. Historically, France’s European strategy was largely structured around reassuring Germany and Northern European countries regarding fiscal discipline and budgetary credibility. The emergence of the military and security dimension has altered this equation. Bardella appears to understand that France can now build stronger partnerships with Eastern Europe, exchanging leadership on defense and security for political support on more conservative and sovereign matters, rather than remaining trapped between Northern demands for fiscal orthodoxy and Western European humanitarian politics. This constitutes one of the main differences with Macron: while sharing similar objectives regarding European power and strategic autonomy, Bardella adopts a more confrontational approach toward the Commission and places greater emphasis on the balance of power between member states and Brussels. His position toward Poland is particularly strong. He projects himself effectively as a future European Council leader and understands the strategic importance of Franco-Polish cooperation. His willingness to work closely with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group is also a positive development. On the European Union itself, his implicit doctrine could be summarized as “change everything without destroying anything.” Rather than advocating withdrawal or institutional rupture, he seeks to redirect the Union toward different priorities while preserving its framework. Regarding NATO and Russia, Bardella’s position is notably stronger than Marine Le Pen’s. He correctly identifies the consequences of a potential American disengagement from Europe and the resulting need for France to assume greater responsibility in supporting European rearmament. His refusal to advocate withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command while the war against Russia continues demonstrates strategic realism. More generally, he shows greater lucidity regarding the Russian threat than previous generations of the French nationalist right. His support for extending the French nuclear umbrella to European partners is particularly significant. This is one of the most important developments in contemporary French strategic thinking and represents a credible response to growing security concerns in Eastern Europe. He is also right to advocate a strong European preference in defense procurement. European rearmament should strengthen Europe’s industrial base and strategic independence rather than deepen external dependencies. His position on Russia is generally sound: support for a ceasefire accompanied by meaningful security guarantees, combined with the maintenance of France’s commitments in Eastern Europe. He appears to understand the central role that Eastern Europe now plays in France’s geopolitical projection. This reflects a doctrine that values the Baltic states and Poland not merely as peripheral actors but as essential partners in the construction of a European balance of power. He is equally correct in highlighting the Commission’s weaknesses in trade negotiations and commercial agreements. On the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), he will likely be able to secure meaningful concessions against the Commission by leveraging intergovernmental coalitions. The key concepts underpinning Bardella’s vision are strategic autonomy, rearmament, power, prosperity, independence, and the emergence of a new French leadership within Europe. His political message is increasingly that of a “French sovereigntist” seeking to build a “Europe of power” rather than dismantle the European project itself. Overall, this represents a clear improvement over Marine Le Pen’s traditional positions. While it may be difficult for historical sovereigntists to fully embrace this evolution, it should nevertheless be regarded as a positive and intellectually coherent development.