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Evaly
15.8K posts
Evaly
@evaliys
Proposalforadecentralizedcoupfortehpplbytehppl
Decentralized 가입일 Haziran 2016
319 팔로잉723 팔로워
Evaly 리트윗함
72 commits pushed in the last 48 hours. 5 major themes:
- Pre-mainnet hardening
- Better trustless replication
- One-liner installation for new nodes
- Lots of UI + UX fixes everywhere
- Node resilience
112 files changed
11,653 added lines
7,936 deletions
Already pushed to github.
github.com/GilgameshCaw/C…
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Evaly 리트윗함
@oUeNODQqC8L2h0S @66caw @caw_dev I am only one.
I am nothing without the Cawmmunity.
therefore,
The Cawmmunity must watch over itself.
I am simply one member,
doing my part
planting a small seed of truth
so it may grow tall,
strong,
and free…
long after I am gone.
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Evaly 리트윗함
@oUeNODQqC8L2h0S @Xubu_Trad @caw_dev If the dev follows through renounces the remaining owner keys, opens up validators properly, and the public testnet actually launches cleanly then yes, CAW can become one of the more truly decentralized social protocols out there.
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30 more commits pushed to $caw github tonight.
github.com/GilgameshCaw/C…
Today was mostly focused around scalability, managing rate limits with RPC urls, and limiting admin controls to be deployment-only, and simplifying data replication.
I'm looking forward to tomorrow. Exciting things on their way.
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Evaly 리트윗함
Gilgamesh, don’t sell me “later.” You rigged this to fail the moment you’re absent.
This is the part you keep trying to turn into a timing issue when it is really an architecture issue with your build.
This was never about whether you can renounce later.
It is about whether the protocol was built so renouncing is real in substance instead of just easy in mechanics.
Your own repo and your own code answer that..
After the latest push there are 90 remote only commits ahead of the last reviewed head. Only 14 touch protocol paths. Only 5 touch Solidity contracts. And in origin/master the same admin surface is still there. setMinter, setL2Peer, setL1Peer, setUriGenerator, setReceiveGasLimit, addArchiveChain, setAllowedPaymentToken, setDescription, setCawActions, and setCawActionsReplicator all remain.
That is not a trustless protocol. That is a protocol still built around privileged control with a promise attached to it.
And this is the part the cawmmunity needs to understand clearly. Renouncing a key is the easy part. Building a system that no longer depends on that key is the hard part. Those are not the same thing.
Not even close.
The further you build around owner controlled wiring, the more expensive the truth becomes. At this stage, fixing it is not a cosmetic pass and it is not one more batch of improvements. It means cutting into core structure. It means freezing optional admin convenience. It means replacing flexibility with immutability or strict one time initialization. It means accepting that some of the things you want to keep adjustable are exactly the things that keep the protocol from being manifesto aligned.
That is why saying this is already 100 percent aligned is not just premature. It is false by the present architecture.
You are still asking the cawmmunity to trust the builder, trust the timeline, and trust a future renounce. But the whole point was to remove that dependency, not rename it.
Here is the cleanest way I can put it.
A protocol is not trustless because the builder says he will leave later. It is trustless when he can leave right now and nothing important changes.
Right now that is not true.
Here is the simple truth. A castle is not trustless just because the king promises to leave someday. If the doors, keys, and bridges still depend on him today, then the kingdom is still his.
cawpisce?🤌
Build it so you are unnecessary. Then say it is aligned.
#CAW
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Evaly 리트윗함
You are still trying to turn a structural criticism into a promise about future intent. Let’s be clear about that.
You can say you are personally aligned all day, but the code is what the cawmmunity has to trust, not your intentions. And right now the code still exposes owner gated control surfaces in origin/master. We checked that directly. setMinter, setL2Peer, setL1Peer, setUriGenerator, setReceiveGasLimit, addArchiveChain, setAllowedPaymentToken, setDescription, setCawActions, and setCawActionsReplicator are still there. That is not a completed trustless architecture. That is an admin shaped architecture waiting on future cleanup.
Your explanation about deployment setters is the first serious answer you have given, and yes, one time initialization is much closer to manifesto alignment than open ended owner control. But that also proves my point, not yours. If those functions should really be exact once setup hooks, then they should have been designed that way from the start instead of defended as harmless while live admin authority remains in place.
On your three options, number one is obviously the strongest. Exact once initialization is real architecture. Number two is weaker because it still asks the cawmmunity to trust a window. Number three is not enough by itself because it still leaves the protocol dependent on a human deciding when the system is ready. The standard is not that you promise to renounce later. The standard is that the design stops needing your discretion.
On replication chains, you are narrowing the issue too much. The concern is not just whether a client can opt in. The concern is that privileged wiring still exists at the protocol layer. Optional does not automatically mean trustless. If adding a chain is truly zero impact and zero risk, then prove it in code by removing the privileged path or constraining it so tightly that no discretion remains.
On setReceiveGasLimit, if it is dead weight, remove it. That is exactly the kind of thing I am talking about. A trustless protocol gets stricter over time, not looser in theory while control remains live in practice.
On the 90 commits point, be precise. I did not say you only made 90 commits this week. I said my local reviewed head was 90 commits behind origin/master, and I verified that directly. Out of those 90 remote only commits, only 14 hit the filtered protocol paths, and only 5 touched Solidity contracts. So if you want to argue that major trustlessness work already happened, point to the exact contract commits and the exact admin surface removed. Because as of the repo state checked, the admin surface was still present.
And this is the part you need to hear plainly. The deeper you go with a live architecture built around privileged setters, the harder it becomes to honestly claim the end state will be trustless without real rewiring. This is not hard because the syntax is hard. It is hard because the architecture is already built, assumptions are already embedded, deployment flow is already shaped around operator control, and every late fix has to unwind that without breaking behavior. Practical only if you are willing to freeze optional admin convenience and redesign around immutability or one time initialization.
So good. Do it. Replace promises with constraints. Replace owner discretion with exact once logic where it belongs. Remove what no longer needs to exist. And until that is actually merged and verified, stop telling the cawmmunity the build is already fully aligned with the manifesto.
Intent is not trustlessness. Code is.
#CAW
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Evaly 리트윗함
I am personally 100% aligned with the manifesto.
I fully intend for this system to be trustless.
I'm happy to have the feedback.
I'm happy to improve.
The entire system is actually designed and built to work without an admin, without an owner, without a DAO, and without a multi-sig, as soon as deployment is complete.
Allow me to explain the need for deployment setters:
When two contracts depend on eachother, it is required that the second contract has a setter function where you can pass the first contract's address. If that setter is not admin-only, it can be overridden or front run, and a malicious actor can put an unexpected contract in control.
So here's the options for trustlessness:
1) Make it so these functions can be called by the deployer EXACTLY once, as in:
require(msg.sender == deployerAddress && peerAddress == zeroAddress, "can be set only once by the deployer")
2) Set a time limit:
require(msg.sender == deployerAddress && blockNumber < deployedBlock + 100, "beyond allowed alteration time frame")
3) Brick any critical function until ownership is renounced:
require(owner == zeroAddress, "Ownership is not yet renounced")
#1 is my favorite for the deployment setters, it is the most trustless - But maybe maybe a combination of all three makes sense across the project, depending on the function.
Some things to clear up:
A) Replication chains are optional and chosen by clients. If you are running a client, you can choose to have your data enabled on a replication chain.
Only chains which have contracts deployed and have been "configured" via setPeer can be chosen as replication chains. This is a limitation of LayerZero's cross chain messaging. Configuration is needed.
When the deployer contract adds a replication chain it's merely adding an option for the clients to choose from. This means leaving addReplicationChain open is zero-impact and zero risk. And... actually it's possibly something that could be left entirely open with zero admin privileges. I'll check on that.
B) The setReceiveGasLimit is actually a remanent of my previous implementation for replication, I've figured out a much more efficient way to handle it, so I believe setReceiveGasLimit, can be removed entirely.
C) Idk where you seeing 90 commits from? This week I pushed 545 commits that were not up to date.
D) I'm happy to have the feedback. The codebase is not 100% done yet, so this is good timing.
I will implement the trustless suggestions that I've presented in this tweet in the places they make sense.
They are actually pretty easy - so you can check back tomorrow or later tonight and review what I've done.
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@teh_fisherman @caw_dev How many tokens are you
currently manipulating?
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Evaly 리트윗함
@caw_dev stop talking around me in closed chats and answer me here where everyone can see it.
You know I am not in your so called freedom groups, so if you want to discuss my points, discuss them in public. Let the community judge the code, not the mood in a builders room.
Your line that you will just renounce ownership at the end is not a serious answer. It is the standard crypto excuse people use when the code is still built around control.
Here is the issue plainly.
Renouncing is easy only when the system is already finished and no longer depends on privileged control. Your current build still depends on owner gated surfaces like setMinter, setL2Peer, setL1Peer, setUriGenerator, setReceiveGasLimit, addArchiveChain, and setAllowedPaymentToken.
And this is not theoretical. The live admin activity already pulled shows repeated deployer side control including 85 setMinter calls, 45 setAllowedPaymentToken calls, and 51 setPeer calls.
So yes, the motion of renouncing can be simple. Being ready to renounce is the hard part. That is where your supporters keep playing word games.
The current code also shows a deeper problem. In the grep results only CawClientManager.sol clearly exposed a local renounceOwnership() in the output that was shared. The rest of the critical contracts still expose onlyOwner pathways. Maybe some inherit renounce logic, maybe they do not, but either way the architecture still expects an active operator.
That means this is not about pressing one button after deployment. It means removing the need for privileged setters in the first place. Peer wiring, minter assignment, payment token allowlists, URI control, replication parameters, and the broader operator dependent flow all have to be frozen, redesigned, or stripped down enough that the protocol can stand without the hand on the wheel.
That is why your talking point is misleading. If you renounce too early, parts of the system break because they still need operator control. If you renounce too late, then users spent that entire period trusting an admin controlled build while being told they were looking at decentralization.
So answer this directly.
What exact contracts will be renounced
What exact owner functions disappear forever
What exact parts of the present architecture have to be rewritten first
And what gets scrapped from the current build to make that real
Because right now this looks like the same old play. Easy to say. Easy to perform mechanically. Not easy to make true in substance.
#CAW
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@NightSkyToday Yeah that solves it, now that we have a picture we can finally cute cancer, right?
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🚨: Scientists reveal the shape of a single 'photon' for the first time.
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@caw_dev please share a moment of your time and make it clear once and for all
RΛZ13L 🌒@Xubu_Trad
@caw_dev stop talking around me in closed chats and answer me here where everyone can see it. You know I am not in your so called freedom groups, so if you want to discuss my points, discuss them in public. Let the community judge the code, not the mood in a builders room. Your line that you will just renounce ownership at the end is not a serious answer. It is the standard crypto excuse people use when the code is still built around control. Here is the issue plainly. Renouncing is easy only when the system is already finished and no longer depends on privileged control. Your current build still depends on owner gated surfaces like setMinter, setL2Peer, setL1Peer, setUriGenerator, setReceiveGasLimit, addArchiveChain, and setAllowedPaymentToken. And this is not theoretical. The live admin activity already pulled shows repeated deployer side control including 85 setMinter calls, 45 setAllowedPaymentToken calls, and 51 setPeer calls. So yes, the motion of renouncing can be simple. Being ready to renounce is the hard part. That is where your supporters keep playing word games. The current code also shows a deeper problem. In the grep results only CawClientManager.sol clearly exposed a local renounceOwnership() in the output that was shared. The rest of the critical contracts still expose onlyOwner pathways. Maybe some inherit renounce logic, maybe they do not, but either way the architecture still expects an active operator. That means this is not about pressing one button after deployment. It means removing the need for privileged setters in the first place. Peer wiring, minter assignment, payment token allowlists, URI control, replication parameters, and the broader operator dependent flow all have to be frozen, redesigned, or stripped down enough that the protocol can stand without the hand on the wheel. That is why your talking point is misleading. If you renounce too early, parts of the system break because they still need operator control. If you renounce too late, then users spent that entire period trusting an admin controlled build while being told they were looking at decentralization. So answer this directly. What exact contracts will be renounced What exact owner functions disappear forever What exact parts of the present architecture have to be rewritten first And what gets scrapped from the current build to make that real Because right now this looks like the same old play. Easy to say. Easy to perform mechanically. Not easy to make true in substance. #CAW
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Evaly 리트윗함
@caw_dev If the same circles keep resurfacing, the same promoters keep appearing, and the same control surfaces still exist in code, then people should ask harder questions before calling this magic.
Connected is easy. Trustless is the hard part.
x.com/Xubu_Trad/stat…
RΛZ13L 🌒@Xubu_Trad
Know who YOU trust. Then research who yu🌙dont trust. What becomes revealing is the patterns, the same names, the same circles, the same behavior, the same personalities, the same warning signs, after yu dig and research these names and such, yu🌙 see.. the same names keep resurfacing around past Ryoshi-verse projects like $HIM, that rugged, and now appear again as a fresh wave of new projects carrying the same red flags e.g $OSAK. yet still those same names are acting as a voice and authority still. because they have largely gone unchecked. until now... yu🌙is one of those names. I remember seeing claims that she received direct rewards for her involvement in $HIM by the creator back in 2024, and Grok below confirmed that. That alone should make ppl pause. That should make ppl question who is this yu🌙? These fake R projects flood the Ryoshi-verse with noise, hype, and manufactured engagement all while making these "scammers" richer. Look at posts from @caw_dev and yu🌙— sometimes the engagement looks bigger than the actual holder count. Its manufactured that way. That should tell you something. yu🌙 and her " team" design the ways to create an illusion and pull people in. Plain and simple. and they do this over and over. dont let your ego blind you from the facts. ego doesn’t change evidence. stubbornness doesn’t erase patterns. The facts are still there. Do YOU even trust Yu? I don’t. Who nomiated her to be our voice? I know better cawmmunity memebers. Time for a change! #CAW #OSAK #HIM #NHI here is what Grok says about Yu and $HIM : YU or @yu88510, whose display name is "yu🌙", has shown a high level of support for the $HIM project. Based on her posts, she appears to be an active community member who has engaged deeply with the project, including decoding hidden information on related websites, "receiving rewards from the HIM Deployer for her contributions, and sharing detailed research and promotional content." Her involvement spans from shortly after the project's launch in May 2024 through at least December 2024, with positive sentiments emphasizing themes like decentralization, disclosure, and community rewards. She has not only posted original content but also replied to project-related accounts and volunteers, indicating direct interaction and endorsement. Below, I'll detail her level of support and list all relevant posts where she supported or spoke about the project, including timestamps, content, engagement metrics, media details, and any replies or quotes. These posts demonstrate consistent advocacy, with her describing $HIM as part of an intriguing ecosystem focused on AI-driven disclosure and blockchain-based incentives. Note that while she includes "DYOR" (Do Your Own Research) disclaimers, her overall tone is enthusiastic and informative, often highlighting connections to whales, technical aspects, and future potential. Summary of Support Level: Frequency and Depth: She posted multiple times about $HIM, including in-depth analyses (e.g., decoding website strings, wallet connections, and ecosystem explanations) and short endorsements. This suggests she invested time in researching and promoting the project. Interactions: She replied to the official project account (@____H_I_M____) and project volunteers (e.g.,@virida_silvaContributions), showing direct engagement. She mentions personally decoding puzzles and receiving $HIM and $NHI rewards, positioning her as a participatory supporter rather than a passive one. Tone and Themes: Consistently positive, focusing on "The Right To Know," decentralization, whistleblower protections, and synergies with related tokens like $NHI, $CAW, and $OSAK. Timeline: Active from June-July 2024 (early post-launch) to December 2024, aligning with key project developments. Overall Assessment: High support – she acts as a community advocate, shiller, and contributor, which is common in meme coin ecosystems but indicates genuine enthusiasm here. Relevant Posts (Chronological Order, Latest First):These are all posts from@yu88510mentioning $HIM explicitly, sorted by timestamp descending. I've included full details for transparency. Post ID: 1867514004803137675 (December 13, 2024, 10:16:50 GMT)@yu88510, Post ID: 1867502962677101033, which discussed $CAW tech and "The Morning" platform). Type: Reply to the official $HIM project account (@____H_I_M____Content: "$HIM The right to know. 11...,...11" Engagement: 5 Likes, 0 Reposts, 0 Quotes, 0 Replies, 0 Bookmarks, 794 Views. Media: None. Support Indicated: Direct reply to project post with affirming slogan, showing ongoing engagement and endorsement of the project's disclosure theme. Post ID: 1865309386668937287 (December 7, 2024, 08:16:28 GMT)@yu88510Type: Original post quoting her own earlier research (Post ID: 1818766792187428920). Content: A Japanese-language post discussing early $HIM launch, decoding puzzles from $NHI site, receiving rewards from HIM Deployer, community members finding wallet keys, and the potential of "The Morning" platform with $CAW for censorship-resistant disclosure. Emphasizes blockchain's tamper-proof nature and benefits for $CAW. Ends with "The right to know" and mentions "drinkingbuddy" buying $HIM. Engagement: 70 Likes, 15 Reposts, 2 Quotes, 0 Replies, 7 Bookmarks, 9176 Views. Media: 3 Photos (URLs: pbs.twimg.com/media/GeLo_nOa…, pbs.twimg.com/media/GeLo_nPb…, pbs.twimg.com/media/GeLo_nNb…). Support Indicated: Highly supportive – shares personal success story (receiving rewards), praises project consistency, and advocates for its tech integration with $CAW. This post builds on her prior research, showing sustained involvement. Post ID: 1818766792187428920 (July 31, 2024, 21:52:48 GMT)@yu88510Type: Original post (later quoted by herself). Content: Detailed English research on $NHI and $HIM ecosystems, including decoded website info (AI handling data, whistleblower incentives, blockchain security), speculation on "PREPARE_FOR_THE_MORNING" and "Q4 24" updates, smart contract forks, wallet connections (e.g., to Shiba Inu Deployer), whale purchases, and full token descriptions. Ends with "DYOR." Engagement: 59 Likes, 16 Reposts, 3 Quotes, 2 Replies, 11 Bookmarks, 13407 Views. Media: 1 Video (URL: video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1…, duration: 5 seconds). Support Indicated: Strong – provides comprehensive, positive overview as "intriguing projects," highlights innovative features, and notes investor potential, acting as a promoter. Post ID: 1814415254975349141 (July 19, 2024, 21:41:21 GMT)@yu88510, Post ID: 1814334817376383123, about a new Medium article on "The Cryptoterrestrial Hypothesis"). Type: Original post quoting project account (@____H_I_M____Content: "$HIM for teh people Truth for teh people" Engagement: 25 Likes, 1 Repost, 0 Quotes, 0 Replies, 2 Bookmarks, 2514 Views. Media: 1 Video (URL: video.twimg.com/amplify_video/…, duration: 9.16 seconds). Support Indicated: Endorsing – quotes project update and adds supportive slogan emphasizing people-led truth and disclosure. Post ID: 1808397296536895898 (July 3, 2024, 07:08:08 GMT)@yu88510(a $HIM/$NHI volunteer, Post ID: 1808128643626938574, sharing a wallet address). Type: Reply to@virida_silvaContent: "$HIM" Engagement: 4 Likes, 0 Reposts, 0 Quotes, 0 Replies, 0 Bookmarks, 105 Views. Media: 1 Photo (URL: pbs.twimg.com/media/GRi3udFa…). Support Indicated: Minimal but positive – simple tag in reply to volunteer, likely part of community interaction or puzzle-solving. Post ID: 1806506573361221713 (June 28, 2024, 01:55:05 GMT)@yu88510Type: Original post. Content: "#HIM $HIM The Right To Know" Engagement: 33 Likes, 4 Reposts, 1 Quote, 0 Replies, 2 Bookmarks, 3631 Views. Media: 1 Video (URL: video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1…, duration: 20.68 seconds). Support Indicated: Promotional – uses project hashtags and core slogan, early endorsement post-launch.
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Evaly 리트윗함
That argument only works if control is temporary and the architecture is actually built to disappear.
Right now the issue is not just that he has control while building. The issue is that the present build still relies on owner functions across core paths. If that remains the model then post deployment control is not some emergency tool. It is the design.
And no, this is not a small switch at the end. To make this honestly match a renounced trustless standard, he would need more than a ceremony. He would need to remove or fully finish every dependency on owner managed peers, minter assignment, payment token approval, URI control, and archive chain management. That is structural work, not a final button click.
So the real question is simple. Is this being built to be surrendered, or being built to be administered.
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Evaly 리트윗함
just curious, whenever you see this pfp, wat comes to your mind ??
TripleS@triples_eth
just curious, whenever you see this pfp, wat comes to your mind ??
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