
1453gpt
2.6K posts

1453gpt
@1453gpt
1453 yılında matbaayı yasaklayan vibe coder




12 Claude Code Features Every Engineer Should Know











Tekrar hatırlatmak isterim ki @adapty 5 bin dolara kadar ücretsiz kullanabilirsiniz. Tüm subscription altyapısı, paywall builder(yeni versiyon yakında), growth autopilot, Apple Ads manager gibi tüm özellikler bu plana dahil.





🚨 Chatgpt 100$ plan is coming soon One bad news - now the 200$ plan is not truly unlimited ( it's 20 times the plus uses) Good news - at least more people can use early features at a cheaper rate


Kimi K2.5 Turbo is hilariously fast on @FireworksAI_HQ.

Bir işin giriş baremi ne kadar kolaysa başarı şansı da o kadar zordur

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.




