AMNM_eth

Now, scaling. There are two buckets here: short-term and long-term. Short term scaling I've written about elsewhere. Basically: * Block level access lists (coming in Glamsterdam) allow blocks to be verified in parallel. * ePBS (coming in Glamsterdam) has many features, of which one is that it becomes safe to use a large fraction of each slot (instead of just a few hundred milliseconds) to verify a block * Gas repricings ensure that gas costs of operations are aligned with the actual time it takes to execute them (plus other costs they impose). We're also taking early forays into multidimensional gas, which ensures that different resources are capped differently. Both allow us to take larger fractions of a slot to verify blocks, without fear of exceptional cases. There is a multi-stage roadmap for multidimensional gas. First, in Glamsterdam, we separate out "state creation" costs from "execution and calldata" costs. Today, an SSTORE that changes a slot from nonzero -> nonzero costs 5000 gas, an SSTORE that changes zero -> nonzero costs 20000. One of the Glamsterdam repricings greatly increases that extra amount (eg. to 60000); our goal doing this + gas limit increases is to scale execution capacity much more than we scale state size capacity, for reasons I've written before ( ethresear.ch/t/hyper-scalin… ). So in Glamsterdam, that SSTORE will charge 5000 "regular" gas and (eg.) 55000 "state creation gas". State creation gas will NOT count toward the ~16 million tx gas cap, so creating large contracts (larger than today) will be possible. One challenge is: how does this work in the EVM? The EVM opcodes (GAS, CALL...) all assume one dimension. Here is our approach. We maintain two invariants: * If you make a call with X gas, that call will have X gas that's usable for "regular" OR "state creation" OR other future dimensions * If you call the GAS opcode, it tells you you have Y gas, then you make a call with X gas, you still have at least Y-X gas, usable for any function, _after_ the call to do any post-operations What we do is, we create N+1 "dimensions" of gas, where by default N=1 (state creation), and the extra dimension we call "reservoir". EVM execution by default consumes the "specialized" dimensions if it can, and otherwise it consumes from reservoir. So eg. if you have (100000 state creation gas, 100000 reservoir), then if you use SSTORE to create new state three times, your remaining gas goes (100000, 100000) -> (45000, 95000) -> (0, 80000) -> (0, 20000). GAS returns reservoir. CALL passes along the specified gas amount from the reservoir, plus _all_ non-reservoir gas. Later, we switch to multi-dimensional *pricing*, where different dimensions can have different floating gas prices. This gives us long-term economic sustainability and optimality (see vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/0… ). The reservoir mechanism solves the sub-call problem at the end of that article. Now, for long-term scaling, there are two parts: ZK-EVM, and blobs. For blobs, the plan is to continue to iterate on PeerDAS, and get it to an eventual end-state where it can ideally handle ~8 MB/sec of data. Enough for Ethereum's needs, not attempting to be some kind of global data layer. Today, blobs are for L2s. In the future, the plan is for Ethereum block data to directly go into blobs. This is necessary to enable someone to validate a hyperscaled Ethereum chain without personally downloading and re-executing it: ZK-SNARKs remove the need to re-execute, and PeerDAS on blobs lets you verify availability without personally downloading. For ZK-EVM, the goal is to step up our "comfort" relying on it in stages: * Clients that let you participate as an attester with ZK-EVMs will exist in 2026. They will not be safe enough to allow the network to run on them, but eg. 5% of the network relying on them will be ok. (If the ZK-EVM breaks, you *will not* be slashed, you'll just have a risk of building on an invalid block and losing revenue) * In 2027, we'll start recommending for a larger minority of the network to run on ZK-EVMs, and at the same time full focus will be on formally verifying, maximizing their security, etc. Even 20% of the network running ZK-EVMs will let us greatly increase the gaslimit, because it allows gas limits to greatly increase while having a cheap path for solo stakers, who are under 20% anyway. * When ready, we move to 3-of-5 mandatory proving. For a block to be valid, it would need to contain 3 of 5 types of proofs from different proof systems. By this point, we would expect that all nodes (except nodes that need to do indexing) will rely on ZK-EVM proofs. * Keep improving the ZK-EVM, and make it as robust, formally verified, etc as possible. This will also start to involve any VM change efforts (eg. RISC-V) firefly.social/post/lens/1040…

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@VitalikButerin Progressive slot & finality compression down to seconds, erasure-coded p2p, random attesters, and quantum prep bundled in this is the high-performance Ethereum we've been waiting for. Strawmap delivering 🔥

A very important document. Let's walk through this one "goal" at a time. We'll start with fast slots and fast finality. I expect that we'll reduce slot time in an incremental fashion, eg. I like the "sqrt(2) at a time" formula (12 -> 8 -> 6 -> 4 -> 3 -> 2, though the last two steps are more speculative and depend on heavy research). It is possible to go faster or slower here; but the high level is that we'll view the slot time as a parameter that we adjust down when we're confident it's safe to, similar to the blob target. Fast slots are off in their own lane at the top of the roadmap, and do not really seem to connect to anything. This is because the rest of the roadmap is pretty independent of the slot time: we would need to do roughly the same things whether the slot time is 2 seconds or 32 seconds There are a few intersection areas though. One is p2p improvements. @raulvk has recently been working on an optimized p2p layer for Ethereum, which uses erasure coding to greatly improve on the bandwidth/latency tradeoff frontier. Roughly speaking: in today's design, each node receives a full block body from several peers, and is able to accept and rebroadcast it as soon as it receives the first one. If the "width" (number of peers sending you the block) is low, then one bad peer can greatly delay when you receive the block. If width is high, there is a lot of unneeded data overhead. With erasure coding, you can choose a k-of-n setup, eg: split each block into 8 pieces so that with any 4 of them you can reconstruct the full block. This gives you much of the redundancy benefits of high width, without the overhead. We have stats that show that this architecture can greatly reduce 95th percentile block propagation time, making shorter slots viable with no security tradeoffs (except increased protocol complexity, though here the performance-gain-to-lines-of-code ratio is quite favorable) Another intersection area is the more complex slot structure that comes with ePBS, FOCIL, and the fast confirmation rule. These have important benefits, but they decrease the safe latency maximum from slot/3 to slot/5. There's ongoing research to try to pipeline things better to minimize losses (also note: the slot time is lower-bounded not just by slot latency, but also by the fixed-cost part of ZK prover latency), but there are some tradeoffs here. One way we are exploring to compensate for this is to change to an architecture where only ~256-1024 randomly selected attesters sign on each slot. For a fork choice (non-finalizing) function, this is totally sufficient. The smaller number of signatures lets us remove the aggregation phase, shortening the slots. Fast finality is more complex (the ultimate protocol is IMO simpler than status quo Gasper, but the change path is complex). Today, finality takes 16 minutes (12s slots * 32 slot epochs * 2.5 epochs) on average. The goal is to decouple slots and finality, so allow us to reason about both separately, and we are aiming to use a one-round-finality BFT algorithm (a Minimmit variant) to finalize. So endgame finality time might be eg. 6-16 sec. Because this is a very invasive set of changes, the plan is to bundle the largest step in each change with a switch of the cryptography, notably to post-quantum hash-based signatures, and to a maximally STARK-friendly hash (there are three possible responses to the recent Poseidon2 attacks: (i) increase round count or introduce other countermeasures such as a Monolith layer, (ii) go back to Poseidon1, which is even more lindy than Poseidon2 and has not seen flaws, (iii) use BLAKE3 or other maximally-cheap "conventional" hash. All are being researched). Additionally, there is a plan to introduce many of these changes piece-by-piece, eg. "1-epoch finality" means we adjust the current consensus to change from FFG-style finalization to Minimmit-style finalization. One possible finality time trajectory is: 16 min (today) -> 10m40s (8s slots) -> 6m24s (one-epoch finality) -> 1m12s (8-slot epochs, 6s slots) -> 48s (4s slots) -> 16s (minimmit) -> 8s (minimmit with more aggressive parameters) One interesting consequence of the incremental approach is that there is a pathway to making the slots quantum-resistant much sooner than making the finality quantum-resistant, so we may well quite quickly get to a regime where, if quantum computers suddenly appear, we lose the finality guarantee, but the chain keeps chugging along. Summary: expect to see progressive decreases of both slot time and finality time, and expect to see these changes to be intertwined with a "ship of Theseus" style component-by-component replacement of Ethereum's slot structure and consensus with a cleaner, simpler, quantum-resistant, prover-friendly, end-to-end formally-verified alternative.