AppStateNick

This is Mowgli. He’s very shy. Enjoys being carried so he doesn’t have to decide where to go. 14/10 would believe in him always

David Pagnotta: Re Red Wings: Depending who you talk to, they're real about Robert Thomas, they're sort of...they're kind of in it; it sounds like center is a priority, but I don't think it's the be all end all - The Sheet (3/4)

Netanyahu's Strategic Errors May Force the US into a Risky Precipitous Action In June, Israeli intelligence managed to execute a successful operation against Iranian air defenses, targeting key military leaders and assassinating scientists. But the success was confined to intelligence efforts, as the military action fell short in strategic planning. Netanyahu envisioned an operation spanning several weeks, yet Israel only had fuel and armaments for less than two. American cargo ships, tanker aircraft, and even a German A400 were rushed in to salvage Israeli logistics. The projections for interceptor missiles were even more dismal, forcing the American fleet to be summoned urgently to shield Israeli defense systems, which depleted in just over 10 days of fighting. Netanyahu and his advisors plotted a war of weeks, but failed to anticipate offensive and defensive munitions stocks that could sustain even two. Today, industry hasn't replenished even 30% of the expended volume and would require at least two years to near pre-war levels. The American force, with two CSGs, boasts around 900-1,300 VLS cells, 50-70% of which are defensive missiles, realistically yielding 500-800 interceptors. Half could be swiftly exhausted defending the fleet in the Sea of Oman, sufficient for roughly 200-300 Iranian anti-ship missiles. Following this analysis, the Haifa fleet might hold 250-400 defensive missiles, plus David Sling (15-25 monthly production) and Arrow (2-4 monthly) outputs from the past eight months, alongside regional Patriots and THAAD. That totals about 1,100-1,600 missiles. This would suffice for 700-1,200 Iranian missiles, based on proportions from the 12-day war. That equates to munitions for 15-20 days of protecting Israel. Yet there's a critical detail: the 4-5 AN/TPY-2 radars in Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel. Losing those in Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia would severely degrade tracking precision for Iranian missiles, hampering interceptions. Such radar losses mark a pivotal shift from the 12-day war. The US and Israel will stake everything on suppressing Iranian air defenses, but if it falters, chaos ensues. Even with 250 cargo ships tapping munitions from the two CSGs and bases, the war might stretch to 20 days at best. Netanyahu appears unwilling to forgo attacks, viewing this as a prime chance to topple the Iranian regime, but his June calculations were a debacle and could drag the US into an unprepared conflict. On the Iranian side, the question is whether they can sustain a high missile launch tempo while enduring intense air defense suppression.