Aragon.eth 🦅

One Year of Katana What started as a conviction that chains need to be opinionated is now evolving into ownership and the conviction that chains need to focus on revenue. More to come. A thread our progress since launch:

1/ Announcing Ethereum Institutional An independent non-profit dedicated to accelerating the institutional adoption of Ethereum, its L2s, applications and overall ecosystem.

Voting Process for Citrea Governance: Due to its Optimistic Governance framework, xCTR holders do not need to vote if they agree with the proposal. Voting options: - Yes to Veto = No (disagree) - No to Veto = Yes (agree) - Abstain = Choosing not to vote

The ladder of control: 1. Immutable 2. Automated 3. Distributed Tradeoffs = situational 1. Risk 2. Speed 3. Cost

Interesting how legitimate this looks from the UI, and good to explain what depositors can check before their USDC gets routed into something like this. At the block I checked, the market had about 7.734m USDC supplied and 7.734m USDC borrowed - One account, `0xe38a...Dc4C`, has effectively all of the borrow against 9.6517m AZND collateral. On the surface, this looks like a stablecoin lending market: - USDC loan asset - AZND collateral - 86% LLTV - current LTV around 80% catch is the oracle: `0x270B...5588b`. showing: BASE_FEED_1 = 0x0 BASE_FEED_2 = 0x0 QUOTE_FEED_1 = 0x0 QUOTE_FEED_2 = 0x0 BASE_VAULT = 0x0 QUOTE_VAULT = 0x0 SCALE_FACTOR = 1e24 price() = 1e24 For 18-decimal AZND against 6-decimal USDC, `1e24` is the Morpho-scaled version of "1 AZND = 1 USDC". So the oracle path has no external price input: no base feed, no quote feed, no vault conversion route. `price()` just returns the scale factor, and the market treats AZND as $1. If AZND is not actually redeemable at par, the borrower does not need a price manipulation attack. They can default and leave lenders with AZND collateral. Alpha USDC Asia V2 vault is more or less exclusive supplier to this market through a Morpho adapter. That adapter's supply shares convert to about 7.713m USDC, or roughly 99.72% of the market supply. Depositors here look legit, so the vault is acting as an abstraction to trap unsuspecting depositors... Vault control is concentrated too: owner = 0xEB4A...4645 curator = 0x6788...9Da5 (Both are allocators - yay) If AZND fails to hold par, the market is left short USDC relative to lender claims, with AZND as the recovery asset.