Dr. Jeffrey Lewis

doesn't securing the hormuz kind of require some kind of central authority in the area? like in a collapse scenario, why couldn't remnants of the IRGC or just heavily armed groups do what the houthis did in a much narrower zone.

President Erdoğan of Turkey argues that the war against Iran is not only about Israel's security: "A network that has seized power, that sees itself as superior to other human beings, is dragging our region step by step into catastrophe"

An unintended consequence of the strikes on Iran’s gas fields? Turkey may be forced to import more LNG 🇹🇷 🚢 Iran sends gas from South Pars to Turkey via a pipeline (making up ~15% of the country’s demand) If that’s shut, Turkey will need more LNG to fill the gap

Operation Epic Fury: March 16th Update

A few remarks regarding the Israeli perspective that may explain the continuation of the policy of decapitating senior Iranian officials. One can agree with it or oppose it, but it is worth at least understanding it, because it will also influence the continuation of the campaign. From Israel’s perspective, there is currently no one among the decision-makers in Iran—neither in the political leadership nor in the military establishment—who can be relied upon to bring about a meaningful change in Iranian strategy after the war. In the view of Israeli decision-makers, the distinction between pragmatic conservatives such as Larijani and hardliners such as Ahmad Vahidi may be relevant to academic Iran watchers, but it has little practical significance. Even the supposedly more pragmatic figures were not prepared before the war—and certainly not after it—to implement a “paradigmatic change,” as some of the more moderate voices outside Iran’s decision-making circles had proposed. In addition, since Israel would oppose any future attempt at any arrangement with the Islamic Republic, the question of whether one Iranian official or another might be more or less willing to agree to such a possible arrangement is irrelevant from Israel’s perspective. Given this assessment, the military campaign proceeds from the assumption that the Iranian leadership will likely continue the same policies pursued by the Islamic Republic under Khamenei—perhaps even in a more extreme form—unless Israel’s preferred (and less likely at this stage) scenario materializes: regime change or regime collapse. Therefore, Israel’s assessment focuses on three components: 1. The intentions of the Iranian leadership: Here, as noted, Israel sees no meaningful difference between the different Iranian officials regarding the issues that concern Israel most—nuclear capabilities, missiles, and regional policy. 2. The skills and abilities of the Iranian officials: From this perspective, Larijani may be considered no less dangerous than someone like Saeed Jalili, because he is perceived as having greater influence, experience, and abilities. 3. The military capabilities that will be available to the Iranian leadership after the war: In this context, one can understand the effort to degrade not only Iran’s strategic military capabilities but also its ability to rebuild them after the war. In sum, since Israel cannot ensure that Iran’s leadership after the war will meet the minimum necessary requirements to its national security, any kind of undermining and weakening of the regime—alongside the degradation of its military capabilities—is considered a valid objective.

Most of the DC arms control community is reflexively anti-military action—under any circumstances. To them, U.S. diplomatic failure under Republicans is always to blame, regardless of facts or Iran’s stances and threatening nuclear advances. This goes back further than the early 2010s when the Ploughshares Fund asked grantees to sign on to talking points about how we can “live with” a nuclear Iran, which I personally witnessed. No serious analyst can rule out military force to stop adversaries from developing nuclear weapons. That’s simply ideology—and a dangerous one.