Chairman Rabbit

Dear readers: this is my latest platform for publishing Chinese articles. Readers who follow China-related news, please follow me. "tuzhuxi新平台" , at wechat.

The world is with Spain !

Did the 6-4 scoreline between England and France tells us that FIFA robbed us of a thrilling final? Not in the slightest. It only proves that the third-place match is utterly meaningless. Players do not treat it as a serious contest at all, and this very pointlessness undermines the rigor and comparability of all tournament statistics.

Obviously, if only one white player were brought in to take part, the whole thing would look completely different.

Before, Argentina is a left-leaning socialist country. A respectabe country in the Global South. Although its economy sucks. Now, its economy still sucks. And it now becomes part of the US-Israeli New Axis of Pariah States, thanks to its President Javier Milei.

Trump's playing the same old playbook that nobody falls for.

Will the US-Iran war restart? Chairman Rabbit, July 15, 2026 A month ago, the Trump administration signed a ceasefire memorandum with Iran to escape the Strait crisis. A month later, over the same Strait, the two sides are again at daggers drawn, threatening a full-scale resumption of hostilities. The same document, the same waterway: a starting point for peace has become a new flashpoint. Neither side can simply be accused of reneging. From the day the ink dried, Washington and Tehran held diametrically opposed views of what the Strait meant. Here is the latest analysis. 1. The source of the conflict: Iran used the ceasefire to lock in control of the Strait On June 17th 2026, America and Iran signed the Islamabad Ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The crux now appears to be Article Five: Iran is given full responsibility for co-ordinating commercial shipping through the Strait, clearing mines and obstacles, and taking the lead in drafting maritime management rules. The American side inserted no checks or balances, merely a vague requirement that Iran “do its utmost” to “ensure the passage of merchant vessels”. It neither defined the status of shipping lanes nor excluded Iranian regulatory authority. Tehran regards this article as the core achievement of the war, proof that America has accepted Iranian dominance of the Strait. Moreover, across the MoU’s fourteen articles, America conceded ground on regional ceasefire, the Strait, sanctions, compensation, and the nuclear issue, while most of Iran’s five wartime negotiating demands were met. For America, it was an unvarnished instrument of surrender. Tellingly, Mr Trump completed his electronic signature at the Palace of Versailles that same day. 2. Why Mr Trump signed a surrender memorandum: he could not hold out any longer The document drew a storm of domestic criticism. Mr Trump signed it not willingly, but because he had run out of options. The most immediate pressure was energy and the economy. After the war began, traffic through the Strait largely halted. Brent crude stayed above $100 a barrel; American petrol rose from $3 to $5 a gallon; inflation remained stubbornly high; supply chains and household costs surged; the MAGA coalition collapsed; and the mid-term elections in November loomed. Militarily, America saw no way out. It had expended vast stocks of munitions but could not clear Iran’s mines, drones and anti-ship missiles, nor retake the Strait. Its alliance system was also loosening: Gulf states clamoured for reopened shipping, Israel provoked mischief, transatlantic ties weakened, and America found itself on the back foot in its competition with China. Under this weight, Mr Trump signed the MoU, hoping to buy time. 3. Mr Trump’s calculation: cool things down first, then claw back later Mr Trump had a strategy: put out the fire first, then negotiate from a position of strength. The priority was to restore traffic through the Strait quickly, bring down oil prices, and ease domestic economic and political pain. Next, he hoped that during the coming months of talks, he could chip away at the fuzzy clauses - on jurisdiction over the Strait, the nuclear issue, sanctions relief - and gradually, through negotiation, persuasion and dealmaking, whittle back the powers Iran had won. With the cards Mr Trump holds, this logic made some sense: de-escalate first, avoid head-on confrontation, then “see how it goes” and recover lost ground at the table. Perhaps Iran would treat the Strait as a bargaining chip, willing to trade it for other benefits? Mr Trump may even have imagined a big real-estate project between the Trump family and the Iranian government, in exchange for Tehran allowing America to share in the Strait’s management and toll revenues. He was still thinking transactionally. He also wanted to test Iran’s bottom line: would the Persians really risk restarting a war JUST to keep control of the Strait? What if he tried to undermine their grip? He hoped Iran would be “rational”, unwilling to reignite a full-blown conflict over a single issue. 4. Iran’s judgment: never let go of a prize already won America’s tactics were obvious to Tehran. The Iranians understood clearly: after three months of fighting, America lacked the military power to retake the Strait, could not bear the economic cost of high oil prices, and could not wait politically until the mid-terms. Though it had won every tactical engagement, it had strategically lost the war - and lost decisively - finally forced to sign a ceasefire on Iranian terms. For Tehran, the MoU was the fruit of victory. It was not just a temporary truce; it was the first time, with the world’s superpower as a party, that a text had formally recognised Iran’s control over the Strait. Such a strategic asset, once seized, could never be given back. The Iranians had made up their minds: they would pay any price, even restarting the war, to keep it. Their strategy was also clear: during the 60-day transition period, allow free passage temporarily, let the international community get used to Iran’s control and its mechanisms, then, after the transition, impose reasonable fees under suitable names, turning the Strait into a long-term source of fiscal revenue and geopolitical leverage. For Iran, the MoU was a historic text: it aimed to cement the country’s regional - even global - status. 5. The fundamental opposition: what each side wants from the Strait Iran may have gained the upper hand in the wording of the MoU, but that cannot change one fact: the two sides’ understanding of and demands for the Strait are completely opposite. Iran wants permanent control and is willing to bleed for it. America never truly agreed to give up the Strait; it merely retreated temporarily. Mr Trump thought he could “trade time for space”, using negotiations to slowly fix the problem. Iran wanted to strike while the iron was hot, fully implementing its control and making it permanent. As this game unfolded, the White House soon had to face reality: Iran genuinely demanded control of the Strait and would pay any price to achieve it. The contest for dominance over the Strait finally stepped out from behind the curtain - from being the elephant in the room - to become the central problem that all parties must now confront. 6. Two sets of rules in the Strait It is worth understanding recent traffic patterns. In the first twenty days after the MoU took effect, more than 500 vessels passed through, about 30 per day (mostly tankers), far below the pre-war average of over 100 per day. More than 6,000 seafarers remain trapped in ports along the coast. Many shipping companies and insurers are still waiting and watching; traffic is nowhere near expectations. More sensitive still, the Strait now operates under two competing regimes. On one side, Iran maintains tight control, requiring all ships to register in advance, apply for permits, and sail only along the northern designated lane; violators face armed action. On the other side, America has quietly opened a southern alternative route hugging the Omani coast, guiding merchant ships to turn off their transponders to evade detection, with the Navy providing navigation cover. The aim is to bypass Iran’s controlled zone, diluting and undermining its monopoly over passage. This move infuriated Tehran, which sees it as a violation of the MoU and a challenge to its control of the Strait. 7. Iran’s warning: sail my way or be hit Iran’s response was direct: make an example of those who disobey. On June 25th, a Singapore-flagged container ship was attacked on the southern route—the first commercial vessel hit since the ceasefire. On June 27th, a Panamanian-flagged supertanker was struck by a drone. Each Iranian action drew retaliatory American strikes. Into early July, the conflict escalated further: a Qatari LNG carrier of 130k tonnes was hit and caught fire; a Saudi supertanker suffered hull damage; a Liberian freighter lost power; a Cypriot container ship was attacked, leaving one crew member missing. Iran’s message was uniform: any vessel that does not follow its designated northern lane and enters the southern route without permission is a legitimate target. By this point, the dispute over shipping lanes had moved entirely from textual wrangling and diplomacy to live-fire confrontation at sea. 8. America’s counter-escalation: from lane dispute to bilateral strikes Iran kept attacking merchant ships, crossing two red lines for America and its Gulf allies. For America, deploying air and naval forces to open the southern route was part of its “sand in the gears” strategy - designed to offset and weaken Iran’s control and preserve the principle of freedom of navigation. Not to respond would be tantamount to accepting the nullification of the southern route and conceding Iranian domination of the Strait. That was a loss of face America could not afford, militarily or diplomatically. Under domestic and external pressure, Mr Trump ordered large-scale retaliation. Within a week, America launched three rounds of airstrikes, hitting more than 300 Iranian military positions, sending a clear signal: do not risk escalating the conflict or restarting a full-scale war over the Strait dispute. The two sides had formally moved from a lane confrontation to bilateral military strikes. 9. Escalation was inevitable - but neither side wants a full war Objectively, escalation was unavoidable, because the two sides’ core demands are irreconcilable. Iran wants to lock in permanent control of the Strait; it cannot tolerate the existence of the southern route and must strike any vessel that defies its rules. America does not want Iran to monopolise the Strait and wants to retain a limited presence; it therefore cannot abandon the southern route. And when Iran attacks, America must respond to demonstrate capability and save face. Both sides’ behaviour is logically self-reinforcing, making clashes almost certain. Initially, both sides tried to limit the intensity, avoid rapid escalation, preserve the possibility of negotiations, and prevent a return to all-out war. But the structural opposition of their strategic aims makes it hard to escape the spiral of rising conflict. As a result, confrontation keeps intensifying, contradictions grow sharper, and communication becomes ever harder. 10. Shipping, insurance and everyone else caught in the middle While America and Iran play their game above, the merchant ships, shipping firms, marine insurers and all other stakeholders in between are the victims. Shipping companies face a dilemma: take the northern route, submit to Iranian controls, pay future fees, and risk offending America; or take the southern route, please America, but risk being attacked by Iran, with little apparent protection from the US Navy. After several vessels were hit, many firms suspended operations in the Persian Gulf and returned to a wait-and-see posture. The insurance market reacted even more sharply. Premiums fell briefly after the MoU was signed, then shot up again as conflict resumed; some insurers stopped writing policies altogether. Many insurers have chosen to co-operate with the Iranian authorities: only vessels holding a permit from the Persian Gulf Strait Authority can buy marine insurance; and Iran allows only vessels with such insurance to use its designated lanes. The shipping-insurance system is caught between two masters: either comply with Iran’s rules or stay on the sidelines. Any renewed outbreak of fighting would force insurers to reset all their calculations and arrangements. Without a functioning insurance framework, traffic through the Strait cannot return to pre-war levels. 11. The spiral: the MoU is dead, and America introduces tolls Just as fears grew over the economic impact of the Strait disruption, the conflict accelerated rapidly, threatening a full resumption of war: On July 8th, Mr Trump declared the ceasefire MoU “dead”, calling Iran a bunch of “scums” and saying dealing with them was “a waste of time”. On July 10th, he formally notified Congress of the resumption of military operations against Iran, including a naval blockade, launching a new 60-day action period. On July 12th, America launched another (third) wave of large-scale strikes on Iran; Iran retaliated by striking American facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Jordan. Also on July 12th, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz until America halts all military operations and the blockade. On July 13th, Mr Trump suddenly posted on social media, declaring that America would become the “Guardian of the Strait of Hormuz”, reinstating the blockade of Iranian vessels, and imposing a 20% fee on all cargo carried by other countries’ ships passing through, as “compensation for security guarantees”. 12. Why Mr Trump wants to charge: three layers of calculation Mr Trump’s announcement of a Strait toll caused global uproar, even though he backtracks from this plan later. His reasoning probably has three dimensions. First, envy: if Iran can make money from the Strait, why cannot America, with its mighty navy? If I don’t let you pass, you earn nothing. Second, the revenue could offset America’s huge Middle Eastern military expenditures and ease domestic political pressure. Third, it paves the way for some form of joint US-Iran management. Crucially, by asserting a right to charge, Mr Trump implicitly endorsed the concept Iran had advanced: that a “guardian” of the Strait has the right to collect reasonable fees (“protection money”). His ultimate vision may be a US-Iran condominium over the Strait, jointly managed and jointly tolled—giving American taxpayers something to cheer about, and avoiding the appearance that America had “handed over” the Strait to Iran. 13. Iran’s clever reply: charging is exactly right! Mr Trump showed his hand, and the Iranians swiftly seized the advantage. Foreign Minister Araghchi posted on X: “POTUS is absolutely right. Whoever provides secure and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz should be compensated for this service. Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER. 20% is of course too much. We will be fair.” These Persians are sharp operators. 14. The core dispute has shifted from the nuclear file to the Strait Let us summarise the logic. Mr Trump originally agreed to sign the ceasefire MoU because the Strait blockade had created an economic and political crisis he could no longer withstand. Now conflict has flared again for the same reason: the fundamental disagreement over who controls the Strait was never resolved. The MoU only temporarily papered over the contradiction, without offering an implementation plan that satisfied both sides. America wants a “free international waterway”; Iran wants a system of “Iranian-led oversight, registration, approval and tolls”. The two sets of rules are completely incompatible, and as soon as implementation began, the contradiction erupted. In the end, the two sides made peace over the Strait and went to war over the Strait. At this point, the Strait dispute has effectively replaced the nuclear issue as the sharpest point of contention between Washington and Tehran. The nuclear question can be delayed: inspections, enrichment levels, nuclear capabilities—all can be negotiated in phases over a longer horizon, with little connection to the global economy. Not so the Strait. Commercial ships must pass every day. Disputes over routes and tolls arise daily. Oil, gas, fertiliser and other goods cannot be shipped out, affecting the entire global economy. The Strait problem cannot be dodged or ignored. Everyone is a stakeholder. It must be solved. 15. The fundamentals have not changed: a full-scale war remains unlikely Right now, the two sides are rattling sabres, looking ready for all-out war. But barely a month has passed since the constraints that forced Mr Trump back to the table and into signing the ceasefire MoU still apply. Militarily, the US military still cannot clear Iran’s mines, missiles and drones; it cannot retake the Strait, nor protect the southern corridor it opened. Economically, America cannot sustain a long, high-intensity conflict; continued fighting would push oil prices and inflation higher, roil capital markets, and undermine the White House’s domestic economic agenda. Politically, the Middle East war is deeply unpopular; restarting it could make the Republican Party’s mid-term defeat even worse. The closer November gets, the fewer options Mr Trump has. Negotiation and compromise remain the White House’s best option. Iran faces similar pressures. Although the Persians want to control the Strait, they do not want a renewed war either. They need the ceasefire to rebuild infrastructure, resume oil exports, revive the economy, and meet popular demands for better living standards. Sustained confrontation is not in their long-term interest either. 16. Fight and talk: fighting is for leverage; talking is the eventual destination Given both sides’ constraints and interests, the conclusion is clear: they may briefly escalate, but they do not want to restart all-out war and will not let the spiral run unchecked. Eventually, they will have to seek de-escalation actively. The same factors that drove them to the table in mid-June will drive them back there in the coming weeks. Iran will not close the Strait permanently: a prolonged shutdown would weaken its moral case for negotiation, cut off its own oil exports, and accelerate global energy transitions—not a sustainable strategy. America will not keep up massive airstrikes, let alone launch a ground invasion; oil prices and electoral pressures will push the White House back to diplomatic channels. Ultimately, fighting is just a way to increase bargaining leverage. Once the price is right, both sides will return to the table and hammer out a new compromise to cool things down. 17. Iran is more aggressive, more willing to escalate As the saying goes, “the barefoot man is not afraid of the one wearing shoes.” Compared with America, Iran is tougher and more radical, and more willing to take the initiative in escalation. After several months, Tehran has seen clearly: Mr Trump has few cards to play. Even if his rhetoric is harsh and he launches short military strikes, he eventually bows to reality and retreats (TACO—Take A Consensus Option). The closer the mid-terms, the stronger his incentive to pull back. So Iran grows bolder, testing America’s limits. Whether facing Israeli operations in Lebanon or American “sand in the gears” in the Strait, Iran is ready at any moment to suspend talks, launch retaliatory strikes, close the Strait, and keep the initiative firmly in its own hands. America can only react. One side presses; the other responds. That is the basic dynamic of US-Iranian confrontation today. 18. Three obstacles to peace remain Some will ask: what about Israel? Indeed, the path to peace will not be smooth. Three obstacles persist: Mr Trump’s pride, Persian stubbornness, and Israeli sabotage. Mr Trump can compromise privately but cannot admit defeat publicly. Any agreement must be packaged as an “American win”. Setbacks in the Strait will make negotiations more tortuous. Iran has shown that on core interests like the Strait, its room for concession is extremely narrow; at the table, it gives no quarter and is exceptionally hard to crack. Israel has never wanted a US-Iran rapprochement for even a second. It cares nothing about the Strait; it will only keep creating trouble to spoil progress—whether by launching operations in Lebanon and Gaza or feeding intelligence to Mr Trump (such as exaggerating Iranian assassination plots against the president). For now, Mr Trump is keeping the Netanyahu government in check, but the Jewish variable always lurks. 19. A new normal for the Middle East—and for global energy Over the long term, Mr Trump will eventually have to accept Iranian dominance of the Strait, hoping only for some symbolic concessions that give him enough cover for domestic and foreign consumption. But the Persians are stubborn; a comprehensive solution acceptable to both sides will be difficult to reach in the short term. The US-Israel-Iran conflict is destined to lurch between fighting and talking, repeating endlessly, becoming a “new normal” in the Middle East. Brent crude has already climbed back above $80 a barrel; further escalation could push it higher. For global markets, the second half of the year and beyond requires a reassessment of Middle Eastern geopolitical risk. The stand-off over control of the Strait will persistently disrupt oil and gas prices, raise shipping and manufacturing costs. High energy volatility is shifting from a short-to-medium-term shock to a medium-to-long-term norm. Countries everywhere must adjust their energy security strategies to this new reality.

In much of China, for most people, and much like most East Asian societies, people see religion through a highly pragmatic, even transactional lens and approach. People engage in worshipping largely to pray for blessings and good fortune. This worldview of religion is inherently secular and even materialistic, standing in stark contrast to those faith-centered religions as commonly understood in the Western perspective .

Comment: This WSJ report is attributing the current conflict in the Srait of Hormuz to “poor wording” in the key clauses of the memorandum, as if it were simply a drafting error at the time. In reality, over the past several months, both sides have known exactly what those clauses meant. The agreement was signed in that form as the outcome of a contest of strength, not because American negotiators were momentarily careless. At the time, the US side merely hoped to secure a ceasefire first and figure out the rest later, harboring wishful thinking about Iran’s next moves. Facts have now proven that by signing the agreement, the United States displayed weakness and failure. Iran seized the opportunity, advanced steadily, pressed its advantage further, and is now working to fully establish control over the Strait. In hindsight, if the Trump administration had known Iran would pursue today’s strategy, would it have acted differently? Probably not. Because the US had no other choice. Today, the American side can only feign innocence, express “surprise” and "anger" at Iran’s control of the strait, carry out symbolic counterstrikes to save face, and then continue muddling through one step at a time. "One paragraph of text in President Trump’s Iran deal is at the root of the latest violence over the Strait of Hormuz" wsj.com/world/middle-e… via @WSJ

Paraguay plays dirtiest football. also Uruguay and to less extent, Argentina.

President Trump spoke a lot about anti-communism in this speech. Yet there is no meaningful communist movement in today's United States. When Trump speaks of "communism," he is really talking about the Democratic Party and any domestic dissenting force. By lumping all opposition - especially opposition to himself - into the basket labeled "communist," he is fabricating a bogeyman and stoking anxiety to rally his conservative base and manipulate the upcoming midterms and presidential election. This is "anti-communism without communists." Yet at a time of political dysfunction, social fragmentation, widening inequality, and workers facing displacement by AI, the last thing America needs to fear is "communism". On the contrary, addressing the economic distribution problems driven by AI and automation will require embracing economic policies with elements of socialism, and eventually, communism. E.g. Bernie Sander's proposed public ownership of AI companies. Making "anti-communism" the theme of America's 250th anniversary is absurd enough, but believing such rhetoric will strike a chord with the broader public is an even greater miscalculation: those younger generation who oppose Trump, will become thoroughly desensitized to his constant invocation of "communism" - and may even adopt it as a rebellious, fashionable political label.

African Francosphere will dominate football for the next few decades.

Cristiano Ronaldo should be replaced by Erling Haaland

JD Vance has made the right calls on these critical issues, which should significantly boost his standing among the "America First" advocates (let's distinguish that from the more Trump-centered MAGA base). First, he firmly backed the release of the Epstein files. Second, he opposes waging war against Iran. Third, he has openly criticized Israel. In addition, he opposed strikes against Houthi forces at an earlier stage. For adherents of the America First agenda, JD Vance is the one who truly upholds its core principles.

remove "thinks it". and can remove "government" too. good that FT is using the word "government" instead of "regime" now.

Iran’s Situation Iran entered the talks from a position of unexpected strength. It had survived the worst America and Israel could throw at it, and emerged with its regional network intact. The Islamic Republic’s standing at home and abroad has been boosted. It secured a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon, without having to make any real concessions on its nuclear programme. It won the partial lifting of sanctions, the unfreezing of assets and the promise of reconstruction funds. Most important, it now holds effective control over the Strait of Hormuz—a weapon it had only theorised about before the war, but has now turned into a tangible economic lever. Yet Iran is under no illusion about the durability of this arrangement. Its leaders remember the JCPOA of 2015, which was signed with multiple great powers and backed by international guarantees. This time, only America sits across the table—and the American president is Donald Trump, who unilaterally tore up the last deal. Trust is non-existent. Iran will demand concrete, enforceable assurances before agreeing to anything permanent. It knows that the 60-day window could become a trap: talks could drag on indefinitely, sanctions could remain in place, and America could use the pause to regroup. If negotiations stall, Iran faces a dilemma. It cannot easily escalate on the nuclear front without losing international sympathy. It cannot reimpose a full blockade of the Strait without provoking a new war. It may resort to limited fees on shipping through the Strait, or to calibrated pressure via its proxies. But its best option may be simply to accept the status quo—an open Strait, partial sanctions relief, and no final deal—as long as it keeps the upper hand. Domestic politics also constrain Tehran. The parliament, the president and the foreign minister have all been vocal on Persian social media and television, promising hardliners that the fruits of war will be defended. Any perceived weakness in negotiations could trigger backlash at home. For now, Iran can afford to be patient. But patience has limits when the other side seems content to talk forever.

Trump’s game plan: stop the fighting, reopen the Strait, then stall With regard to the latest US-Iran peace deal, Donald Trump’s strategy is simple: secure a ceasefire first, worry about the details later. His priority is getting the Strait of Hormuz back in business. Once oil flows freely again, energy prices will fall, easing inflationary pressures at home and calming financial markets. That alone could improve his party’s electoral prospects. He calculates that once the immediate crisis fades, Americans will lose interest. The public does not care much about Iran. If the issue disappears from the headlines, so will the political cost of what looks like a strategic defeat. He can manufacture new distractions elsewhere - Cuba, Greenland, Europe, or any political infighting at home. The 60-day window for talks suits him. It can be extended indefinitely, as long as the Strait stays open. He can drag negotiations out for months or even years, well past the midterms. As long as there is no collapse and no war, he considers it a win. He believes he can always threaten to resume hostilities if talks veer off course. On nuclear matters, he obviously wants a deal tougher than Barack Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That is a high bar, given Iran’s stronger bargaining position. But if talks go nowhere, he can simply refuse to sign anything - and claim he never agreed to a bad deal. As for Israel, Trump correctly believes that Benjamin Netanyahu is a liability, for Israel, for the US, and for Israeli-US relationship. He may try to persuade the Israeli/Jewish groups to abandon the Israeli prime minister and back a more pliable successor. He can still promote himself as championing the course of Israel. Just dump Bibi. And all along, he keeps the option of restarting the war on the table - especially after the midterms. In short: buy time, declare victory, and hope nobody notices the retreat.

People with experiences can immediately tell, from body language, that if a man and a woman have intimate relations before - through their interaction at very subtle level. and this is a classic sample.

Trump is pressuring Iran, but mostly addressing domestic audience. But this doest work with the Persians. It will only backfire. You never rush into deals.

Perhaps this German journalist tailored his writing to align with the sharply critical stance of Germany’s media toward China, too critical indeed,resulting in an article rife with rpolitical accusations against China. In fact , he is repeating all these anti-China political propaganda himself. And this matters because he is sitting in China, so people are supposed to believe he is fair. To be honesty I’m a bit shocked to see this negative. It really has been a while since the last time I come across content and rhetoric like this in Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times. Not even The Economist. So good luck Germany.

Well, now is the time to visit DPRK.