Marko Mihkelson 🇪🇪🇺🇦🇪🇺@markomihkelson
Unfortunately, the current strategic picture suggests that the stronger cards are now in the hands of the regime in Tehran, while the United States - and by extension its allies - appear to lack a visible path towards a strategically favourable outcome.
Although both sides have an interest in bringing the hostilities to an end, from a strategic perspective the US now has more to lose than to gain from the course events have taken.
At the outset of the conflict, policymakers in both Washington and Tel Aviv hoped for the collapse of the Iranian regime. Slightly later, expectations shifted towards neutralising Iran as a regional and global security threat.
Yet today, it is Iran that appears to have achieved its principal strategic objective: survival - and, through survival, the consolidation of its power. It is increasingly clear that air strikes alone will not force Iran into submission.
If 37 days of sustained bombing failed to achieve that objective, it is difficult to see how another wave of strikes would produce a different result. A ground operation, meanwhile, would carry enormous risks and offers no guarantee of success.
At the same time, Washington’s room for manoeuvre is constrained by approaching midterm elections, the risk of disruption to global supply chains, and the growing willingness of regional states to reassess their relations with the United States.
President Trump’s much-publicised Operation “Freedom”, intended to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, effectively collapsed before it even began - largely due to pressure from Saudi Arabia, which was unwilling to support an expansion of US military operations in the region.
Taken together, these developments - including Israel’s stated ambition to end its dependence on US military aid within the next decade (currently worth $3.8 billion annually) - point to the gradual erosion of the United States’ role as the primary security guarantor for the Gulf states.
The war with Iran is accelerating this trend, and its consequences will undoubtedly be global. A security vacuum never remains empty. As American global influence declines, both China and Russia - Iran’s principal backers - are likely to gain confidence and greater freedom of action.
In both Moscow and Beijing, the ongoing war in the Middle East may reinforce the perception that the United States is no longer capable of protecting its allies effectively, and that new instruments of warfare - cheap missiles and drones - are capable of leaving even the world’s most powerful military struggling to respond.
