X.Labs

⏳ The 888-day #TITANX stakes are about to mature… and this is the biggest moment yet. Massive #ETH rewards are coming. From $TITANX → to stakers → to the public. But the real question is 👇 What happens NEXT? Will the $ETH stay in the ecosystem… or flow out? 🌊 CONT..

You're right that EIP-8037 raises the state creation gas component by roughly 10x but that's only part of what a $XEN VMU costs. Once you add up everything (CREATE + 6 SSTOREs + reads + computation), the actual total gas per VMU goes up about 3–5x, not 10x, because not every operation is state creation. But more importantly, #Glamsterdam also increases the block gas limit from ~36M toward 100–200M. Bigger blocks means more room, more room means less congestion, and less congestion means Ethereum's base fee (the gwei price per unit of gas) drops automatically. It's just supply and demand, more block space available, same usage, lower price for everyone. So you end up with: 2.6x more gas units × 2.8x cheaper gwei = roughly the same #ETH out of your wallet. I ran the numbers against a real Cointool 50-VMU batch mint tx and it actually comes out ~7% cheaper per VMU after Glamsterdam, not 10x more expensive. Chart attached showing the full breakdown.

Summary of Razvan’s statement re: #DBXEN exploit on Telegram: An exploit occurred affecting the DBXEN staking component, specifically staking rewards and benefits. $DXN mining itself is not affected. The core smart contracts cannot be changed, because DBXEN was designed to be fully immutable: - No admin keys - No upgradeability - No ability to pause or modify contracts Why it happened: The exploit resulted from the interaction between the immutable contract logic and changes in the Ethereum ecosystem over time. New standards like EIP-712 and EIP-2612 introduced off-chain approvals and signature-based transactions, changing how transactions and signatures are handled. Because the contracts were written years ago and cannot be updated, these newer infrastructure changes created an unexpected exploit path that didn’t exist when the protocol was built or audited. Smart contracts are immutable, but the surrounding infrastructure (wallets, signing standards, tools, EIPs) keeps evolving. This mismatch makes it very difficult to predict future security conditions when writing permanent code. Next steps: As per Razvan, his team is continuing to investigate, document the exploit, and they'll communicate updates to the community. -- Note: We've posted a banner on all XEN.PUB DBXEN related pages, informing users about the issue.

HOLY SHIT - DBXEN STAKING HACK. A Thread 🧵... DBXEN staking contract was drained for 65.28 ETH in a single exploit. The attacker combined a permissionless trusted forwarder with a fee accounting bug for fresh addresses, spoofed _msgSender(), called burnBatch(5560), and walked away with the entire fee pool built up over 1,085 cycles. etherscan.io/tx/0x914a5af79… Attacker EOA: 0x63150ac8e35c6c685e93ee4d7d5cb8eafb2f016b Beneficiary: 0x425d3ec2dcebe2c04ba1687504d43afc6be7328d Exploit TX: 0x914a5af790e55b8ea140a79da931fc037cb4c4457704d184ad21f54fb808bc37

@elonmusk Me explaining to my kids about WWIII 👀

#Titanx exclusive: 👉 These three Twitter accounts belong to the same person. He pretends to be a tech guru and successful person, known as a pile of shit💩 by the Chinese community.🤣 万字长文撕开币圈伪神的画皮 app.binance.com/uni-qr/cart/36…

#Titanx exclusive: 👉 These three Twitter accounts belong to the same person. He pretends to be a tech guru and successful person, known as a pile of shit💩 by the Chinese community.🤣 万字长文撕开币圈伪神的画皮 app.binance.com/uni-qr/cart/36…