GassyCactus💚

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GassyCactus💚

GassyCactus💚

@EarthWindNeo

Breaking $Neo News🍉🍉🍉 https://t.co/2TCUbt3UQa

Berkeley, CA Katılım Şubat 2010
613 Takip Edilen519 Takipçiler
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Lucas 💚🌐
Lucas 💚🌐@Lucash2763·
They put on events, donated to charity, kept the community alive after Neoverse. I even have Flamingo MERCH. I don't know them personally but my EQ tells me they are great human beings. @real_Mr_google @adrianfjellberg I thought Da would discover himself after burning man all those years ago, become an altruist and I still have hope 🙏
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Flamingo Knows
Flamingo Knows@Flamingoknows·
". . . This is also about accountability. While the people at the top were publicly accusing each other of misconduct and mismanagement, both had long been aware of Flamingo’s situation and still chose not to act. From our perspective, the platform’s fragile position could have been materially improved with relatively limited support. . . " flamingofinance.medium.com/the-questions-…
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edge
edge@edgedlt·
Just dropped by to clown a pathological liar. I left Neo 4 months ago, after accepting that the total number of aligned individuals in the ecosystem had dwindled near single digits. Not planning to use this account/identity again. You will find me elsewhere if you are meant to.
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Erik Zhang
Erik Zhang@erikzhang·
Response to Da Hongfei’s Proposal 1. Neo’s legitimacy should be grounded in on-chain verifiability In the blockchain world, addresses are the easiest thing to verify and the most trustworthy. Anything that can be proven by addresses should be proven by addresses first. Assets, control, and transfer paths should be brought back on-chain as much as possible, so the community can verify them directly. Da’s proposal talks about improving transparency, yet it still leaves substantial room for off-chain structures and third-party endorsements. The authority of the restructured Foundation would depend on constitutional documents and bylaws. So-called tokenholder sovereignty would largely be embedded through off-chain governing documents. Significant fund flows could still be justified through “on-chain verification or independent third-party attestation.” My position is very clear: When on-chain addresses can directly prove the facts, addresses should be the default source of trust. The community has no obligation to trust a third party that cannot be directly verified and whose identity may not even be disclosed. That kind of arrangement is absurd in the blockchain world. 2. This proposal keeps the most important governance gate in an artificially filtered off-chain structure The proposal repeatedly uses words like “community,” “independent,” and “tokenholder powers,” but what it actually puts into the rules is a filtered governance entry point. It explicitly states that the initial board will be formed from eight candidates, four nominated by each founder, and then selected by “independent community leaders and core developers.” Community leaders are defined as the heads of established sponsored communities, while core developers are those formally recognized on Neo's website. At the same time, under the formal governance structure, tokenholders may only nominate candidates after reaching certain thresholds, while the board still retains final appointment authority. The Supervisor would also first be nominated by the board and only then submitted to tokenholders for ratification or rejection. The problem with this structure is obvious. The so-called “community” is not an open community. It is a group filtered in advance through an off-chain qualification system, and only then asked to express an opinion. What makes it even more ridiculous is that the proposal writes Neo's website “formal recognition” directly into the logic for determining the initial board. A website is already under the control of a small number of people, and then that same website is used to define who counts as a “formally recognized community leader,” and those people are then allowed to decide the initial board. A design like this cannot seriously be called fair, let alone decentralized. Neo’s existing governance logic is far more open in principle. Any individual or organization should have the opportunity to participate in governance under transparent rules, with token holders expressing their choices on-chain, instead of having some off-chain gateway decide in advance who is qualified to represent the community. 3. A technical founder must be on the board The proposal explicitly states that for the first 24 months after redomiciliation, neither Da nor Erik may serve on the board or as Supervisor. I do not agree with this arrangement. Neo’s future certainly needs narrative, business development, and real-world adoption. Neo has clearly had long-standing weaknesses in these areas, and it absolutely needs more capable people to address them. But the board cannot be composed only of people focused on narrative, business, and market expansion. The board must also include people with a deep understanding of the protocol, the architecture, and the long-term technical direction. Technical expertise is indispensable on Neo’s board. I will serve on the NF board as a technical expert. There is no legitimate reason to exclude me. Neo’s future depends on putting the right people in the right roles. If business development is weak, then someone capable should be brought in to lead BD. If technical direction is fundamental to Neo’s future, then people who truly understand the protocol, the architecture, and the long-term roadmap must take part in governance decisions. Only then does Neo have a real chance to change its current trajectory. At the same time, we also need to face another reality: the person currently responsible for business development is not competent in that role. Since everyone already recognizes that Neo has long-standing weaknesses in narrative, BD, and adoption, that area should be entrusted to someone who is actually capable of solving those problems. The board can absolutely bring in a new and suitable person to take charge of business development and address one of Neo’s clearest long-term weaknesses. Neo only has a real chance to change its current situation when the right people are placed in the right positions. 4. People who remain neutral in the face of obvious corruption and misconduct cannot be trusted This issue is fundamentally about governance. It is about fiduciary duty, transparency, loyalty, and basic moral judgment. If a board director cannot even access the most basic financial transparency, if historical investments, asset ownership, control arrangements, and the relationships among off-chain entities remain unclear for years, then any reasonable person will ask: what exactly is this governance system trying to hide? Why is this kind of governance still being tolerated? More importantly, people who remain neutral in the face of obvious corruption and misconduct simply cannot be trusted. Many people like to present “neutrality” as something noble. But when faced with obvious conflicts of interest, financial opacity, double standards, and misconduct, neutrality means evading judgment, avoiding responsibility, and allowing the problem to continue. Remaining neutral in the face of obvious wrongdoing is an act of enabling it. Anyone unwilling to speak clearly about obvious corruption and misconduct cannot be trusted to defend Neo’s interests when it truly matters. A board requires judgment. It requires responsibility. It requires a clear sense of right and wrong. People who are unwilling to say what is right and what is wrong do not deserve trust. People who pretend not to see obvious problems are not fit to govern Neo’s future. I do not have any personal grudge against Da Hongfei. What I have consistently pointed out are specific actions and concrete governance problems. I made my position clear a long time ago: I would be willing to continue working with him under two conditions. First, the Foundation’s financial matters and historical investment projects must be fully clarified. Second, he must make a clear commitment to stop researching or developing projects that compete with Neo. If those two issues were genuinely resolved, I would have no problem continuing to work with him. But the reality is that neither condition has been met. And this situation was not created by me. It was created by him. The most absurd part is this: I am a director of NF, yet I cannot even see the most basic financial reports. Is that normal? Is that acceptable governance? Does that not make people wonder what exactly is being deliberately hidden? So this has never been a private question of whether one person can sit on the same board as another. It is a question of whether a director is actually fulfilling fiduciary duty, meeting standards of transparency, and showing genuine loyalty to Neo. 5. There is no need to build a new Cayman shell in the name of a “reset” This proposal tries to package a change in legal structure as a “reset.” I do not agree with this path. NF already exists. What needs to be addressed now are governance mechanisms, transparency, accountability boundaries, asset disclosure, and constraints on power. The community needs the facts to be clarified, the rules to be established, and the oversight mechanisms to be made real. Changing the legal shell does not automatically create legitimacy. Moving to a different jurisdiction does not automatically produce better governance. If the underlying problems remain unresolved, then a new Cayman structure will do nothing more than move the same old problems into a new container. The community first needs to see a complete asset inventory, a clear control structure, a full explanation of historical investments, and clearly defined lines of responsibility. Those issues must be addressed before anyone has the standing to talk about institutional restructuring. In addition, placing hundreds of millions of dollars of Foundation assets on Binance is already highly unprofessional. More importantly, isn’t that Binance account controlled by one person? If so, then this is exactly the accusation that has been used against me all along: that I supposedly controlled most of the Foundation’s assets alone. Yet in the end, the person who actually controlled most of the Foundation’s assets alone turns out to be him. That double standard and that blatant hypocrisy are exactly what make this governance problem so unacceptable. 6. I oppose this proposal, and I will put forward one that better serves the entire community The reasons I oppose this proposal are already clear. It grounds Neo’s legitimacy in off-chain structures, hands the governance entry point to a filtered version of the “community,” excludes the technical founder from the board, and attempts to use a newly packaged institutional design to cover up long-standing problems of opacity and poor governance. Neo needs a different path. Neo needs a framework that reanchors legitimacy in on-chain verifiability. Neo needs a framework that clarifies assets, authority, and accountability before discussing governance restructuring. Neo needs a framework with a genuinely open governance entry point, where the community can verify and supervise directly. Neo needs a framework that can strengthen narrative, BD, and adoption while also keeping technical expertise at the center of governance. I will present my own proposal in the coming days. It will be a proposal that better serves the entire Neo community.
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Tyler
Tyler@TylerDurden·
Real ones remember
Tyler tweet media
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GassyCactus💚 retweetledi
jimmy.neo
jimmy.neo@r3ejimmy·
So so so so tired everyday: - neo3scan-Explorer - neo-devpack-rust - neo-rust-sdk - neo-solidity - neo-decompiler - neo-nexus - neo3fura-indexer - neo-n3-mcp - neo-zig-sdk - neo-abstract-account - neo-miniapps-platform - neo-morpheus-oracle - neo-nft-card-studio - neo-nexus - neo-rs - neo-riscv-vm - neo-js-sdk - neo-riscv-core - neo-riscv-node - neo-riscv-devpack - secure-sign-service-rs - neo-zkvm
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nDapp.org
nDapp.org@ndapp_org·
📈 Neo N3 Daily Network Activity Report 👇 • 2001 transactions 🤝 • 37 new addresses 👤
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wolf of.Neo - ₿ ( Web3 enthusiast )
The $NEO founder doing yet another live AMA tomorrow Be sure to tune in, this one looks like its not to be missed $ETH $BTC $LTC $BNB $PEPE $DOGE $LINK $BCH $ADA $XRP
Tanzeel Akhtar@Tanzeel_Akhtar

Tomorrow: Live AMA with @dahongfei, co-founder of @Neo_Blockchain, on the restructuring proposal he published for the Neo Foundation. We'll cover the foundation redomicile, governance redesign, Giveback II, staked voting, and asset consolidation. All five measures, plus timelines. @virtualbacon joins as the community and investor voice. April 10, 10AM SGT. Streaming here on X.

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Lucas 💚🌐
Lucas 💚🌐@Lucash2763·
@dahongfei In addition, would be nice to reward long term holders based on wallet age and the Neoverse N3 NFT token holders. 🙏
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Da Hongfei
Da Hongfei@dahongfei·
All my thoughts on the Neo Foundation restructuring are here. I invite everyone to review them, form your own judgment, and share your feedback.
NGD (Neo Global Development)@ngd_neo

.@dahongfei has published a full restructuring proposal for the Neo Foundation. The plan moves governance from founder dependence to tokenholder sovereignty. Five measures: foundation redomicile, governance redesign with an independent Supervisor, Giveback II returning 49.5M NEO to the community, staked voting replacing the current liquid model, and full asset consolidation under one treasury. 12-month implementation timeline. All commitments are public and verifiable. The community is invited to review, challenge, and improve this proposal.

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