Daniel

Jesus.....?

If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the “there”, is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly.

The fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the “there”, the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. In understanding, there lurks the possibility of interpretation—that is, of appropriating what is understood.

In epic hero's bravery, A vantage point of suspension, a shudder of dissatisfaction, With unrewarded efforts, Waiting for acknowledgement, To feel powerless, Insignificant, Impotent, And everything went blank,

Hand-held American flags, graveside implants, Veteran markers, littered the highway… streaming in parade… floated feather-like… across the asphalt surface of the Catataconic…

The alien environment of immaculate post-modern ground provoked desires to abandon to search out soft asylum…

The possibility and impossibility of getting an analytical understanding of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις—of the ‘relation’ in judgment generally—is tightly linked up with whatever the current status of the ontological problematic and its principles may be.

Binding and separating may be formalized still further to a ‘relating’. The judgment gets dissolved logistically into a system in which things are ‘co-ordinated’ with one another; it becomes the object of a ‘calculus’; but it does not become a theme for ontological Interpretation.

Along with the formal structures of ‘binding’ and ‘separating’—or, more precisely, along with the unity of these—we should meet the phenmenon of the ‘something as something’, and we should meet this as a phenomenon.

In the λόγος an entity is manifest, and with a view to this entity, the words are put together in one verbal whole. Aristotle saw this more radically: every λόγος is both σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, not just the one (call it ‘affirmative judgment’) or the other (call it ‘negative judgment’). Rather, every assertion, whether it affirms or denies, whether it is true or false, is σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις equiprimordially.

Why does the understanding—whatever may be the essential dimensions of that which can be disclosed in it—always press forward into possibilities?

Kant’s insecurity with the content is essentially conditioned by his insecurity with the method. Kant vacillates between psychology and logic. To be sure, he realizes that with empirical psychology he will not get anywhere, but also that the problem cannot even be seen therewith. He also realizes that a formal logical consideration is not enough. But instead of an unclear combination of psychology and logic, what is needed is a clear insight that we are dealing here with a purely phenomenological interpretation of human knowing Dasein—with a phenomenology which supports psychology and logic. But fortunately Kant’s actual procedure is far better than his own knowledge of it. And this remains necessarily the same in every productive thinker: Even where a greater transparency in the knowledge of method is alive, even there this knowledge does not know the actual driving concerns of the inquiry. The less these concerns are troubled and hampered by reflections on method, the more instinctively secure they are. Complete clarity of method can be gained only when the inhering problems are settled. But then the method is reduced to a technique which is accessible to everyone, and the moment arrives where one leads philosophy back to the darkness of phenomena. From this point on we must realize that the elaboration of the transcendental deduction in the first edition shows far more unclarity of direction and animation and a far more concrete proximity to phenomena than the elaboration in the second edition. The latter elaboration often achieves very sharp formulations, but it equally often loses the really crucial direction. Therefore, for the time being we place the major emphasis on the elaboration of the first edition, which is a sample of the force of Kant’s phenomenological seeing.

[it's] like a "wave", overflowing [out], to all, like the flame, catching — igniting [itself] upon, [a] wave, as a mighty expression, the song, the look, the glance, the seeing, the seen

[One]knowing; [One] knowing, Of the Event; ἓν , [en], Ancient and modern Greek within [en]Knowning, in the [Ev]ent; ἓν and en, Greek [both] ancient and modern [ἐν and en], different but the same; Being fully present–fully revealing, in-being fully present in-being fully there

Words are proximally present-at-hand; that is to say, we come across them just as we come across Things; and this holds for any sequence of words, as that in which the λόγος expresses itself. In this first search for the structure of the λόγος as thus present-at-hand, what was found was the Being-present-at-hand-together of several words. What establishes the unity of this “together”?

With the progress of knowledge about the structure of the λόγος, it was inevitable that this phenomenon of the apophantical ‘as’ should come into view in some form or other. The manner in which it was proximally seen was not accidental, and did not fail to work itself out in the subsequent history of logic.

When an assertion has given a definite character to something present-at-hand, it says something about it as a “what”; and this “what” is drawn from that which is present-at-hand as such. The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification.

In its function of appropriating what is understood, the ‘as’ no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements. As regards its possibilities for Articulating reference-relations, it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality. The ‘as’ gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand. It dwindles to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way. This levelling of the primordial ‘as’ of circumspective interpretation to the “as” with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the possibility of exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it.

When an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied; but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving.

We make no advance restriction upon the concept of “meaning” which would confine it to signifying the ‘content of judgment’, but we understand it as the existential phenomenon already characterized, in which the formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding and Articulated in interpretation becomes visible.

Being fully present revealing in Spirit Holy in Spirit fully in being fully present in being fully there