Fireblade

Chat Control 1 is back. Despite the European Parliament voting down the legislation twice this year, the Council of the European Union and parts of the Parliament today managed – through an urgent procedure – to extend it for another two years. The law was originally introduced as temporary legislation, so that its effectiveness could be evaluated. At the end of 2025, the European Commission itself concluded that it was not possible to determine whether the law had any measurable effect. Even so, it has now been pushed through. Some of today's amendments could have stopped the law. And a majority of the voting MEPs wanted to do so. By a margin of 314-276, the Parliament voted to reject the proposal through these amendments. However, since it was an urgent procedure, 361 votes were required. As a result, the majority lost today and Chat Control 1 was passed. The urgent procedure was a dirty play by the Council and parts of the Parliament – it’s a procedure not meant to be used on legislation already rejected by the Parliament. For now, Chat Control 1 will remain in effect. This means that tech companies may continue scanning communications without a warrant or suspicion. However, the real battle is Chat Control 2. Unlike Chat Control 1, it would require all providers to scan communications, and to do so far more extensively than Chat Control 1 ever has.

This is such a beautiful and honest answer from Cristiano Ronaldo from today's press conference. ❤️

🇧🇬🇪🇺 Bulgarian FM delivered one of the clearest institutional responses so far regarding Sofia’s position on North Macedonia's EU accession path, reaffirming that Bulgaria considers the July 2022 European Consensus fully binding and rejects any attempt to reinterpret or bypass it. In a formal parliamentary reply to MP, the Bulgarian MFA stated that implementation of the 2022 compromise remains a “priority task” and confirmed that Sofia continues to strictly follow the decisions adopted by the Bulgarian National Assembly in June 2022 and May 2025 regarding Skopje’s EU integration process. The response directly addresses growing efforts from within North Macedonia to challenge the legal and political status of the so-called Second Protocol under Article 12 of the 2017 Friendship Treaty — a document Bulgaria insists is an inseparable component of the EU negotiating framework agreed under the French Presidency compromise in July 2022. According to the MFA, Bulgaria “categorically opposes” any attempt by Skopje to renegotiate, circumvent or reinterpret the commitments already accepted as part of the European Consensus. The ministry revealed that all available institutional and diplomatic channels have been mobilized in defense of Bulgaria’s position, including bilateral diplomacy, EU-level coordination and outreach through Bulgarian embassies across EU member states and in Skopje. The reply also provides rare insight into the operational diplomatic strategy currently being employed by Sofia. According to the ministry: • Bulgaria’s Permanent Representation to the EU maintains regular dialogue with EU institutions involved in enlargement policy; • Sofia systematically reports cases of discrimination, institutional pressure and judicial actions targeting citizens of North Macedonia identifying as Bulgarians; • Bulgarian diplomats actively brief EU member states, the and the on the state of fundamental rights concerning the Bulgarian community in North Macedonia; • The MFA regularly circulates written diplomatic non-papers to European partners detailing developments in the accession process and what Sofia describes as attempts to deviate from the agreed framework. The ministry further confirmed that Bulgaria submitted its official contribution to the upcoming 2026 European Commission progress report on North Macedonia, including assessments regarding implementation failures related to the 2017 Friendship Treaty and the associated bilateral protocols. Sofia also stated it continues to advocate for what it calls an “objective” annual European Parliament report on North Macedonia’s progress. The response is politically significant because it demonstrates that Bulgaria’s current government is maintaining full continuity with the 2022 French-brokered compromise and intends to firmly anchor the dispute within the EU institutional framework rather than treat it as a bilateral issue. The MFA explicitly reiterated that, from Bulgaria’s perspective, the matter ceased being a bilateral dispute in 2022 and is now part of the official accession architecture between the EU and a candidate country. The letter also signals that protection of the Bulgarian community in North Macedonia remains elevated to the level of a core foreign policy priority for Sofia.