Felix Brandt

I don’t want to stay on a social network whose owner pushes factually incorrect statements (aka lies) to my phone’s lock screen—or anyone else’s. I will keep my X account for now, but I’ll remove the app from my phone. I am on Bluesky: felix-brandt.bsky.social

I’m outta here. Since Musk bought Twitter, it became clunkier, rebranded with a silly name and logo, and eventually turned into a platform for his political agenda. This isn’t about politics—it's about principles. As a researcher, I value neutrality and the pursuit of truth.

This video is incredible. Everyone should RETWEET it so the whole *world* sees it.

The socialist/Marxist comments are especially absurd. In any other country, Harris would be considered a center-right conservative.

I also get notified about „breaking news“ informing me on Harris‘s alleged cocaine addiction and her attending Diddy‘s Freak Off parties. WTF?

I mean he tweeted that Democrats are „importing“ massive numbers of illegal immigrants to swing states in order to turn America into a socialist state. Why do I get to see these tweets? I am certainly not following him.

Unsure whether I want to stay on a social network that was bought by a sociopath to spread false propaganda for a dangerous lunatic.

IMS Program “Algorithmics of Fair Division and Social Choice” (Singapore, Nov./Dec. 2024) agtb.wordpress.com/2024/10/19/ims…

Someone tried hard to bypass NotebookLM's safety measures in an attempt to get the hosts to admit they are not human. [German article: sueddeutsche.de/kultur/podcast…]

Scarily convincing: youtu.be/AR4dRtzFvxM

All that Google NotebookLM needed was a PDF of the paper.

AI-generated podcast (drive.google.com/file/d/1JNBC1_…) on our consistent probabilistic social choice paper (pub.dss.in.tum.de/brandt-researc…). Pretty impressive.

The limits of p are known. When m→ ∞, p goes to 0 for any n. When m=5 and n→ ∞, the limit is:

They conclude that "the more general case will be extremely difficult to resolve" and may require "entirely new techniques that we cannot now foresee." Kelly (1988) writes that this "is one of the oldest unsolved problems in social choice theory."

Let p be the proportion of preference profiles that admit a Condorcet winner. If you fix the number of voters n and increase the number of alternatives m, one would expect that p decreases. Similarly, when fixing m and increasing n (by two). Both statements are open since 1974!

New Article: "On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings" by Brandt and Wilczynski jair.org/index.php/jair…

@ShengwuLi Thanks. Apparently, the Econometrica editor thought differently ;-)

This is cool. (And I think deserved to be published in Econometrica!) One man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens. My interpretation is that if standard Nash refinements don't satisfy the axioms, then the axioms aren't so innocent.

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies consequentialism, consistency, and rationality. @FlixBrandt econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

@nsrg_shah @RichardMCNgo However, for candidates in a political election, none of these cases seem to apply.

@FlixBrandt @RichardMCNgo At the same time, simple ordinal comparisons miss intensities that my preferences very definitely have. Sometimes I'd prefer A > B >> C. I'm a strong believer that exact intensities exist but we (humans) are just very poor at estimating them.

You know all those impossibility results in voting theory? Turns out most of them only apply to deterministic voting systems, and there’s a unique probabilistic voting system with a bunch of the most desirable properties: maximal lotteries.