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Karl 12½1/4❾¾™
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Karl 12½1/4❾¾™
@GHOSTRIDINGX
For dumb users: Russia = PISS-SHIT, Ukraine = GREAT. Not much more to discuss unless you're an argumentative FUCKER. My 11th account, Elmo ows me €10.
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How major FIMI influencers are funded
Foreign influence networks do not need to pay every visible participant directly. Russian operations have used salaries, covert contracts, front companies and commercial intermediaries to conceal the source of political content.
The clearest recent example is the US case involving RT and an apparently independent American media company. According to the Department of Justice, RT employees covertly channelled nearly $10 million into the company to commission and distribute political content while hiding the Russian source of the funding. Some recruited influencers may not have known who ultimately financed them.
US Department of Justice: RT covert-funding case
justice.gov/archives/opa/p…
US Treasury documentation
home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
Russia also works through influence contractors. The Social Design Agency and Structura, associated with the Doppelgänger operation, used cloned news sites, fabricated personas, tailored narratives and amplification networks to weaken support for Ukraine and undermine confidence in democratic institutions
Beyond Operation Doppelgänger
mpf.se/psychological-…
US DOJ: Doppelgänger disruption
justice.gov/archives/opa/p…
The basic structure is often:
Russian state or state-media source → contractor or intermediary → domestic media company → major influencer → wider audience.
This allows externally financed messaging to appear independent, domestic and organic.
Narrative alignment alone does not prove payment. But hidden intermediaries, unusual contracts, coordinated output, common sourcing and repeated integration with documented FIMI infrastructure are all relevant indicators.

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