
Geoff Walker
8.9K posts

Geoff Walker
@GeoffWalkerNZ
In Wairarapa, Aotearoa after Gulu, Uganda 2016/23 . Twin boys with 2 siblings. Human Being, Creative, Visionary, Photographer. Adobe Community Expert..







Last hope to save Apache sacred land fizzles out at Supreme Court Trump has transferred the land to a private mining company that will obliterate this ancient land A massive copper mining project to turn a sacred religious site into a 2-mile-wide crater courthousenews.com/last-hope-to-s…



Picture this: 500–2000-year-old trees—carbon vaults, biodiversity homes, flood shields—reduced to stumps & sawdust for shareholder value. Our descendants? They'll stream documentaries about what we erased. Humans can be despicable. Choose better. 🌿⚖️ #ClimateJustice





"I thought I was not hearing right ... even George Orwell could not make this up." Jeffrey Sachs explains why some countries can only condemn Iran, but not Israel or America…. "They host U.S. bases ... they are not sovereign countries."

Attacks on fuel tankers and energy infrastructure in the Middle East are leading directly to higher fuel prices for Kiwis. That’s why we have joined the United Kingdom and other countries in condemning Iran’s attacks in the Gulf. Iran has forced the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz to ships carrying fuel and other critical goods to places like New Zealand. New Zealand has a longstanding record of working with like-minded partners to ensure open supply lines for global trade. Obviously, any future decision for New Zealand to support multilateral efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz would need to be considered by Cabinet.

Exposé: How the United States is quietly tightening its grip on the Pacific through Aotearoa New Zealand’s Military A quietly released Official Information Act document from the New Zealand Defence Force reveals a pattern of strategic alignment beneath the polite language of “interoperability” and “defence cooperation.” It exposes how Aotearoa New Zealand’s armed forces are being drawn ever closer to the global reach of the United States military. The OIA release on 16 September 2025 (OIA-2025-5517) details lots of meetings held across multiple countries since the start of this year, organised quietly and kept from the public’s eye. These meetings were between New Zealand defence officials and counterparts in the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. Each country has since been subtly growing the Five Eyes alliance which is a decades-old intelligence pact now evolving into a full-spectrum military structure. The document contained references to groups with technical-sounding names like the Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council, the Combined Communications-Electronics Board, and the ABCANZ Armies. To the untrained eye, these all might appear as normal meetings between defence committees. In reality, they are the mechanisms through which Washington is quietly exporting its military influence and technology deep into the Pacific. Personnel have travelled extensively this year for what appear to be highly coordinated sessions across North America and Europe. In March, officers met with allies in Oxford and Ottawa to discuss air mobility and logistics. A few weeks later, another team attended meetings in Canberra under the banner of the Maritime Information Warfare Organisation. Previously known as the AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4 Organisation, its new title reflects a shift toward cyber and digital operations. By April, the NZDF hosted a session in Wellington for the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative (OIA-2025-5426), this is a U.S.-designed system that links every branch of an allied military into one shared digital command network. The same pattern has appeared surrounding decision-making, surveillance, and targeting data that flows through shared systems the United States controls. America is quietly gaining more influence over Aotearoa New Zealand. It is interoperability with strings attached. In recent months this has been extended far beyond exercises or information sharing. It influences how budgets are written and what industries receive contracts within policy-making. In the Pacific, that shift has allowed the United States to guide defence procurement among smaller partners, ensuring that their systems remain compatible with American command structures. That influence extends beyond policy and into shaping what technology and machinery the Defence Force buys. The same pattern has appeared in the Combined Communications-Electronics Board, where meetings in Washington, Hawaii, and Virginia focused on communications infrastructure and electronic warfare. These workshops have formed the nervous system of modern military power and Aotearoa New Zealand’s presence at the table suggests its armed forces are being wired directly into America’s digital command structure. Once such systems are in place, stepping back from them becomes almost impossible. Parliamentary committees rarely scrutinise the details of interoperability agreements meaning there's less accountability and public knowledge surrounding these meetings. Many of the relevant memoranda are shielded by classification in OIA releases. So, without regular public oversight, technical cooperation can evolve into strategic commitment without explicit consent from elected representatives. Throughout the OIA the word “interoperability” appears as a kind of mantra which is a term that implies partnership but masks dependency. In military terms, interoperability often means adopting the technology, tactics, and protocols of a dominant partner. For Aotearoa New Zealand that military partner is evidently becoming the United States, indicating independent foreign policy has been compromised. This integration comes at a time when Washington is reasserting its influence across the Pacific. With China expanding its diplomatic and military reach, the United States has sought to lock in the allegiance of traditional partners through intelligence sharing and technology exchange. The OIA shows that Aotearoa New Zealand, despite its reputation for an independent foreign policy, has been quietly folded into this architecture. Across the Pacific smaller nations are watching Aotearoa New Zealand's choices closely. Wellington’s deepening defence integration is part of a broader contest for influence between the United States and China. It risks narrowing Aotearoa New Zealand’s ability to act as a neutral mediator in Pacific forums; a role that has long earned the country diplomatic respect far beyond its size. The establishment of a permanent FBI office set up in Wellington earlier this year marks another step in this expanding network of U.S. presence. It was described as part of a broader “law enforcement partnership.” While publicly framed as cooperation on transnational crime and cyber threats it also places an American security agency directly inside Aotearoa New Zealand’s intelligence landscape. It risks diluting independent oversight and making domestic security policy responsive to the priorities of larger powers. When Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Kash Patel visited Wellington for the opening of the FBI office, the trip was arranged quietly and surprised media reporters and the public. Few outside a small circle of ministers and officials even knew it was happening. The visit symbolised how deeply American influence now reaches into the machinery of Aotearoa New Zealand’s security network. Defence Minister Judith Collins approved Patel’s travel costs and hosted closed-door meetings during his three-day visit. Patel met with Collins, Foreign Minister Winston Peters, and senior intelligence officials from the SIS and GCSB. Collins later described the meetings as part of a law-enforcement partnership focused on cybercrime and regional stability. Patel framed the engagement differently, saying it was about countering China’s growing presence in the Pacific. Collins has positioned herself as the architect of closer military and intelligence cooperation with Washington. Her public remarks focus on modernisation and the need to keep pace with technology but the decisions taken under her watch have bound Aotearoa New Zealand’s security systems to American infrastructure. Her framing makes the process sound like an upgrade when it is in fact a realignment that raises serious questions. Peters has played a quieter role. He met Patel during the same visit and later told reporters the talks were focused on Pacific crime and development. He rejected claims that China was discussed. Peters’ language was careful and pragmatic. He presented the encounter as part of normal diplomatic engagement, not a strategic alignment. His involvement nonetheless gave the meetings a layer of legitimacy that extended beyond defence. When both the foreign and defence ministers participate in U.S.-led initiatives they further signal to allies that Aotearoa New Zealand’s political leadership stands behind the shift, but was the decision made in the people's interest? Their actions have shown how Washington’s influence through routine cooperation. By approving travel budgets, hosting private meetings, and shaping public statements, Collins and Peters have enabled a quiet transformation of Aotearoa New Zealand’s defence and intelligence structure. The FBI’s new office is a foothold that embeds U.S. priorities directly within our institutions, advancing interoperability under the banner of partnership while reducing space for independent oversight. Recent media reports from Stuff and RNZ, on Aotearoa New Zealand's defence policy under Defence Minister Judith Collins, have added a political edge to these developments. Several mainstream outlets noted that Collins recently promoted closer military cooperation with the United States as a practical step toward modernising the New Zealand Defence Force and maintaining regional stability. Her public statements often echo Washington’s language about shared democratic values and collective security in the Pacific. In those reports they describe the shift as subtle but significant ties with U.S. command systems and shared technology networks. Aotearoa New Zealand is starting to move further inside Washington’s strategic orbit. It is a stark warning that erodes Aotearoa New Zealand's ability to act independently for the foreseeable future. Defence briefings covered in the media point to new contracts for U.S. communications and surveillance systems designed to improve interoperability. These tools make coordination with allies easier but they also bind Aotearoa New Zealand’s security and military forces to American supply chains and software infrastructure. This is particularly concerning because reliance could blur the line between partnership and dependence. The growing dependence on imported defence technology also carries economic weight within Aotearoa New Zealand. Large U.S. contractors with long-term maintenance and data-management rights now largely hold the power. Aotearoa New Zealand’s ability to develop its own defence technology base is reduced, locking the country into long supply chains that are both expensive and politically sensitive. Foreign suppliers, for example, may limit innovation at home and tie future budgets to exchange-rate fluctuations and overseas policy decisions. Effectively new military technology defines who controls the flow of information. In that sense, every new network or platform integrated into the Defence Force extends the reach of U.S. influence deep within our military operations. Some of the most sensitive information in the OIA was withheld under national security exemptions, including job titles and specific working group names. The redactions themselves are telling. They conceal who exactly represents Aotearoa New Zealand at these meetings and what decisions are being made on its behalf. The secrecy is officially justified as protection for “the security and defence of [Aotearoa] New Zealand.” Yet to anyone reading this, it appears to protect the architecture of U.S. influence from public scrutiny. The lack of parliamentary debate in the chamber surrounding these new partnerships develops a telling argument that closer alignment with powerful allies must require stronger oversight mechanisms, including regular briefings to select committees. Without transparency, everyday Kiwis cannot assess whether these arrangements serve our security interests or primarily advance the strategies of larger states. What remains unclear is how far these arrangements have already advanced and if anyone outside defence circles is monitoring them. The unanswered questions in the redacted pages point to a larger issue at-play surrounding transparency in a democracy that prides itself on independence. Our military architecture becomes more tightly bound with troubling terms and conditions. That decision is being made quietly, far from public view. Military and law-enforcement ties now underscore a larger concern about Aotearoa New Zealand’s position in the world. The deeper the integration, the harder it becomes to preserve independence. Whether that balance can still be maintained remains an open question. *This article is published exclusively to thisquality for the purpose of fair reporting and public interest in matters relating to democracy, transparency, and national security in New Zealand. All information referenced is drawn from publicly available sources, including Official Information Act documents, media reporting, and official public statements. The analysis presented reflects commentary and interpretation for the sake of informed public debate. Any images, screenshots, or excerpts reproduced in this exposé are used under the principles of fair dealing for reporting, criticism, and review under New Zealand copyright law, and are protected by the defence of public interest journalism. All intellectual property remains the copyright of its original owners. #nzpol













