Na ❁

Bareskrim Polri :Tidak ada sabotase dikasus blackout Sumatera. Aku :

does anyone have any more examples of this

JUST IN🚨: Scientists detect a 9,000 mile underwater heat structure fueling the next El Niño

Ternyata kasus 'pengamanan' anak ahmad bahar oleh anggota GRIB suruhan Hercules kemarin berujung panjang capt 😅 Gini kronologis kejadiannya: • 14 Mei 2026 (Awal Mula Konflik): Ponsel penulis Ahmad Bahar dan putrinya, Ilma Sani Fitriana (33), diduga diretas oleh pihak tidak dikenal. Akun tersebut mengirimkan pesan teks kasar dan video ancaman yang menyudutkan istri Hercules. • 17 Mei 2026 (Pengepungan & Penjemputan Paksa): Puluhan anggota ormas GRIB Jaya mendatangi rumah Ahmad Bahar di Cimanggis, Depok. Karena Ahmad Bahar tidak di tempat, massa membawa paksa Ilma ke markas DPP GRIB Jaya di Kedoya, Jakarta Barat, untuk diinterogasi. • 17 Mei 2026, Malam (Intimidasi & Telepon Din Syamsuddin): Di markas GRIB Jaya, Ilma mengaku dikelilingi pria berbadan besar, ditekan secara verbal, hingga diancam menggunakan letusan pistol sebanyak dua kali ke arah bawah. Di sela interogasi, Hercules berinisiatif menelepon Prof. Dr. Din Syamsuddin untuk memberi tahu bahwa ia sedang "mengamankan" Ilma guna memancing kehadiran ayahnya. Din Syamsuddin merespons tegas agar tidak ada kekerasan fisik maupun psikologis pada anak perempuan tersebut. • 18 Mei 2026 (Mediasi Awal & Pembatalan): Polres Metro Depok memediasi kedua pihak pada Senin dini hari. Surat kesepakatan damai sempat ditandatangani. Namun, pada malam harinya, Ahmad Bahar membatalkan kesepakatan damai tersebut sepihak setelah mendengar cerita utuh dari sang anak mengenai penodongan senjata api dan intimidasi berat di markas GRIB. • 19–21 Mei 2026 (Keterlibatan LBH Muhammadiyah): Berkat koordinasi Din Syamsuddin, LBH Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah resmi turun tangan sebagai kuasa hukum korban. LBH Muhammadiyah mendampingi Ilma mengadu ke Komnas HAM dan Komnas Perempuan terkait pelanggaran hak dan kekerasan psikologis. • 22–24 Mei 2026 (Saling Lapor ke Polda Metro Jaya): Pihak Ilma bersama LBH Muhammadiyah resmi melaporkan Hercules ke Polda Metro Jaya atas dugaan penculikan, penyekapan (perampasan kemerdekaan), dan penyalahgunaan senjata api. Pihak GRIB Jaya membantah keras tuduhan intimidasi. Mereka mengklaim penjemputan dilakukan terbuka disaksikan RW. Pihak Hercules langsung melaporkan balik keluarga Ahmad Bahar ke polisi atas dugaan penyebaran berita bohong (hoaks) dan pencemaran nama baik. • Keadaan Saat Ini (25 Mei 2026): Kasus hukum kini resmi bergulir dalam tahap penyelidikan awal oleh Ditreskrimum Polda Metro Jaya. Polisi sedang menjadwalkan pemeriksaan berkas laporan, olah TKP, serta pemanggilan saksi-saksi dari kedua belah pihak. Khawatir akan adanya intimidasi susulan, Ahmad Bahar dan putrinya hari ini telah resmi mengajukan permohonan perlindungan fisik ke Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban (LPSK). Pihak Hercules juga menyatakan siap menghadapi proses hukum tersebut. Kira2 bakal berakhir gimana nih capt? Damai? Atau jangan² 🤔

This chart is a brutal reflection of why public frustration toward political elites in many emerging markets continues intensifying because it shows that Indonesian lawmakers are compensated at levels that look extraordinarily disconnected from the underlying economic reality faced by the average citizen, with parliament salary reaching roughly 14.7x GDP per capita, among the highest ratios globally and second only to the Philippines in this dataset, despite Indonesia still remaining a country where purchasing power remains relatively weak, informal employment is massive, public service quality remains uneven, infrastructure bottlenecks persist, legal enforcement often feels inconsistent, and upward economic mobility for large parts of the population remains structurally difficult. And this is precisely why charts like this become politically toxic because citizens naturally begin asking a very simple question: what exactly are taxpayers receiving in return? In high-income countries, lawmakers may also earn very large nominal salaries, but those economies simultaneously generate far stronger productivity, higher institutional quality, better healthcare systems, stronger education outcomes, more efficient bureaucracy, higher legal predictability, and materially better public goods overall, meaning political compensation exists within a much larger and wealthier economic ecosystem. But in Indonesia, the optics become far more uncomfortable because the political class increasingly appears capable of extracting upper-middle-class or even developed-market lifestyles from an economy that still struggles to generate broad-based prosperity for much of the population itself. And perhaps the harshest part is that compensation alone is probably not even the real issue. The real issue is performance. Citizens are generally willing to tolerate highly compensated leaders if the country visibly becomes richer, more efficient, more meritocratic, less corrupt, and economically stronger over time. But when corruption scandals remain persistent, policymaking appears inconsistent, infrastructure projects repeatedly face rent-seeking concerns, and wealth creation remains concentrated among political insiders, conglomerates, and connected elites, high political compensation begins looking less like professionalization and more like institutionalized extraction. Importantly, this also helps explain why anti-elite sentiment, populism, and distrust toward institutions continue rising globally because once the gap between elite living standards and ordinary household realities becomes too visible, citizens increasingly stop believing the system operates primarily for collective national advancement and instead begin viewing politics as a mechanism for self-enrichment among those already close to power. Ultimately, this chart reflects something much deeper than salary levels alone because it exposes the uncomfortable reality that in many emerging markets, the political class often succeeds in upgrading its own prosperity far faster than the nation it supposedly represents, and over time that divergence itself becomes corrosive to institutional trust, social cohesion, and long-term political legitimacy.

Prabowo. 23 Mei. 28 tahun lalu

"Ormas bandit dan preman dipelihara rezim buat apa sih? Lumbung suara pemilu?" Bukan itu. Fungsi utama ormas adalah tentara cadangan untuk membantai dan memperkosa pendemo yang menuntut perubahan. Kalau demo kayak September kemarin meluas, ormas akan diturunkan jadi algojo untuk memburu, memukuli, membunuh, membantai, menembak, membacok, memerkosa, menculik, dan memutilasi para pendemo, juga warga random dan membakar rumah mereka supaya terlihat "chaos". Sebenarnya ini masalah eksistensial in slow motion. Sooner or later pilihannya cuma dua: 1. Gerombolan kriminal preman dan bandit jahat itu yang ditumpas, atau 2. Kita dan keluarga di rumah kita yang mati ditumpas, diperkosa, dibakar, dan dimutilasi

is indonesia lit