

GoPlus Security 🚦
3.7K posts

@GoPlusSecurity
Protect Your Every Transaction. User App: https://t.co/FHHKZyzH1j 🛡️ Dev Integration: Security Intelligence & SafeToken Protocol 🛡️











Two weeks ago, Ethereum researchers met in Berlin to continue charting the protocol's long-term trajectory, following along discussions with client teams in Svalbard in April. The updated strawmap is at strawmap.org, and I attached a picture of it to this post. My own high-level takeaways: * "Lean Ethereum" is not a single one-shot upgrade, it is a collection of improvements that will come online to the Ethereum network over the course of three or four years. But make no mistake, this IS the third major iteration of Ethereum in the same way that the Merge was the second. Almost every major piece of the protocol will be replaced: - Verification through recursive STARKs, rather than direct re-execution. Recursive STARKs become an enshrined first-class core component of the protocol - Replacing everything quantum-vulnerable with quantum-safe alternatives - Consensus: decoupled available chain and finality, one or two-round finality. Theoretically optimal security properties, simpler than today, and faster than today - Multidimensional gas - State: not just tree structure, but what *types* of state are available - Changes to client architecture ... At the same time, simplification, cleanup and future-proofing. And this will all be done in a way that minimizes disruption to existing application. We've done this before (the Merge), we can do it again. * H-star (aka Hegota) is probably Ethereum's last thematically "pre-Lean" fork. Starting from I-star, most of everything we do will have a very strong "Lean" feel to it in one way or another. * Privacy is no longer an afterthought, it is a first class goal. When designing Frames, the mempool, additions to the state tree, we explicitly ask the question "okay, how do quantum-safe, intermediary-free privacy protocol transactions go through this, and what is the overhead?" * Formal verification of everything for security. * FV also makes us much more comfortable with canonicalization (having pieces of the protocol that are directly defined as a piece of bytecode expressed in some language). evm-asm is being written in part to become a canonical proof system for the EVM. * Quantum safety has shifted up a LOT in priority. This adds a lot of work (eg. finalizing a quantum-safe blobs design has become urgent; this work has already been ongoing for months) * Probably the single most disruptive part of the plan is the changes to state. There is growing consensus around leaving present-day-style "dynamic state" mostly unchanged, but scaling it only a medium amount, and adding new types of state that are more scalability-friendly (eg. no need for builders to sync/store all of it) but more restrictive, and that will scale a large amount. eg. possible Ethereum in 2030: 2 TB of present-day-style (dynamic) state, and 100 TB of new-style (scalable but restrictive) state This "new-style" state would work very well for ERC20s, NFTs, many defi use cases, but not eg. highly "central" objects like Uniswap contracts, or onchain order books, or other complex things (which are crucial for Ethereum but which only take up a small percentage of state) Hence, it will not be *necessary* to rewrite any apps, but it will be *very cost-effective* to eg. rewrite an ERC20 token into a newer design that uses a new type of UTXO storage that is currently being explored, so that it will have >10x lower txfees. Design of these new state types (current ideas: keyed nonces, ring buffers, UTXOs, statically accessible state, temp state) is an area where we will need a lot of feedback from application developers (incl. privacy-friendly application developers) and probably several rounds of rethinking and iteration. * In the context of a much larger total state size, we need to figure out the incentive issues around who stores this state and what motivates them to. Even saying "each node stores 1%" is not good enough - why do they store that 1% and why are they willing to serve it? This is being elevated as a first-class research area. * Ethereum will need to have a "VM" other than EVM in one form or another - at the very least, we need something like leanISA for recursive STARKs - and the gains are large in exposing it to users so that we support programmable privacy and better scalability. Right now, the most likely contenders are leanISA and RISC-V. My own ideal is that in this world, we adjust the protocol so that the EVM becomes a high-level-language compiler-level feature, and the protocol only "sees" RISC-V / leanISA directly. But this is still far away. * Gas limit increases, blob increases and slot time decreases will happen many times over the next ~5 years. We expect a large gas limit increase with Glasterdam. Each step of increased scale or decreased slot time is a matter of getting to the point where it is safe to do it, which comes from a combination of client optimization and protocol changes. Ethereum is CROPS. Ethereum is scaling. Ethereum is reinventing itself. Onward.





BonkDAO was the target of a malicious governance proposal resulting in an estimated $20M worth of BONK tokens being drained from the BonkDAO treasury. During the investigation, BonkDAO identified the exchange wallets used to purchase BONK ahead of the proposal. BonkDAO is currently actively working with exchanges, bridges and Solana Foundation to best manage the situation. Law enforcement has been notified. BonkDAO continues to work with relevant parties to recover funds and identify those responsible.




Someone swapped 1,126.44 $ETH($2.01M) for only 5,776 $LIT($14,208), losing nearly $2M! 😱 debank.com/profile/0xff89…





@hinkal_protocol @turnkeyhq you may have been exploited for a loss of $822k Theft address: 0xbB3f01a1b1C68F3DEB36C55342b5F5706c32fc20 Stay Smart


An Update from the Edel Team Earlier today, Edel identified and contained an exploit affecting Edel Lending. The exploit involved manipulation of the wrapped xStocks exchange rate between wGOOGLx and GOOGLx, causing wGOOGLx collateral to be valued at approximately 78x its correct value. The attacker used that inflated collateral value to borrow from the protocol, creating approximately $403k in protocol bad debt. Immediately after detection, the Edel team paused all V1 contracts. Edel V1 remains paused, and users should not interact with the V1 deployment while protocol activity is suspended. The team has preserved the relevant protocol records and is using them to determine affected balances for restoration. No depositor will bear any loss from this incident. The Edel team will absorb the bad debt and restore affected depositor balances 1:1. Edel V2 is being deployed with a redesigned oracle architecture intended to prevent this class of exchange-rate manipulation. Once deployment and balance restoration are complete, restored balances will be available directly in the Edel application. We will share timing as soon as it is finalized. We have traced the attacker’s transactions and are coordinating with exchanges, ecosystem partners, and other relevant stakeholders. In parallel, we have extended a formal whitehat settlement offer to the responsible party, providing a defined window to return the remaining funds in exchange for an authorized security bounty. A full technical post-mortem will follow with the exploit path, root cause, and the changes introduced in Edel V2. This incident also reinforces the importance of EIP-01, which will introduce governance over protocol risk parameters, supported collateral, and future market configuration while preserving the team’s ability to respond immediately to security-critical events. Our immediate priorities are containment, user restoration, and transparent follow-up. We will continue updating users until affected balances have been restored in full. The Edel Team












