INSS

The stance on Israel has emerged as a key test at the ballot box during the Democratic primaries. How does this manifest, how does it impact Washington-Jerusalem relations, and does Israel have any recourse? >> inss.org.il/publication/is…

Will Yemen Once Again Become Saudi Arabia’s Nightmare? Yoel Guzansky, Head of the Gulf States Program at the Institute, writes: The Saudi airstrikes in Yemen and the rapid Houthi response may signal the beginning of a new and dangerous phase in the conflict, precisely after years in which Riyadh seemed to have successfully distanced itself from the Yemeni quagmire. If, until now, Saudi Arabia had invested significant effort in exiting the war, reducing tensions with Iran, and creating the conditions necessary to focus on "Vision 2030" – recent events demonstrate just how fragile these achievements truly are. From the Saudi perspective, the move was likely intended to draw a red line against Iranian entrenchment in Yemen and to make clear that dialogue with Tehran does not grant the Houthis immunity. However, from the Houthis' perspective, this is a direct blow to their status and their connection with Iran, which is why they were quick to respond with threats and fire toward Saudi Arabia. The primary concern for Riyadh is not merely another strike on airports or energy facilities. The more significant danger is that the Houthis will revert to using their strongest strategic card – threatening shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. For Saudi Arabia, this is a critical vulnerability: a substantial portion of its oil exports, particularly shipments destined for customers in East Asia, relies on these shipping routes. A prolonged disruption of maritime traffic could raise shipping and insurance costs, shake market confidence, and demonstrate once again that even the world’s largest energy superpower remains vulnerable to asymmetric threats. Recent events serve as a reminder of a strategic truth that the Gulf states know all too well: Yemen is not just a local arena, but a regional lever of pressure. Even after years of détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Houthis continue to possess the capability to threaten the world's most vital trade and energy arteries. Therefore, the key question is not only whether the conflict will escalate, but whether Riyadh will succeed in containing it without being dragged back into a war of attrition from which it spent years trying to extricate itself.

From Oil to Al Jazeera: The Emir Who Reshaped Qatar—and the Middle East Head of the Gulf States Program at the Institute, Yoel Guzansky, writes: The death of the Father Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, at the age of 74, marks the end of an era in the Middle East. It is hard to think of a single Arab leader, since the 1990s, who has reshaped his country so dramatically. When he came to power in a bloodless coup against his father in 1995, Qatar was a small Gulf state, wealthy but relatively marginal. When he handed over power to his son, Tamim, in 2013, it was already a global gas powerhouse, one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita, an international mediator, and a nation possessing regional and international influence that far exceeds its size. His greatest achievement was identifying the strategic potential inherent in Qatar's gas reserves and turning them into an engine of national power. The investment in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry gained Qatar immense wealth, enabling it to conduct an independent and ambitious foreign policy. Through its sovereign wealth fund, massive global investments, and active diplomacy, Qatar transformed from a marginal actor into a central regional and international player. Hamad understood that power is not measured solely in money, but also in influence. The establishment of Al Jazeera in 1996 turned Qatar into a media empire, and subsequently into a mediation powerhouse, maintaining communication channels with almost every player in the Middle East—from the United States to Iran, and from Israel to Hamas. From Israel's perspective, his legacy is complex. During his tenure, official communication channels were opened with Israel, the Israeli mission in Doha was established, and economic cooperations took place. Simultaneously, however, he laid the foundations for a policy that made Qatar the central patron of Hamas and the most influential force in Arab discourse through Al Jazeera, which for years adopted a critical and sometimes even inciting tone towards Israel. For him, there was no contradiction: Qatar sought to talk to everyone, thereby positioning itself as an indispensable mediator that cannot be bypassed. Despite his great influence, his death is not expected to bring about a change in Qatari policy. Although Hamad continued to exert influence even after transferring power to his son, the strategy he built has already been deeply embedded within the state's institutions. Emir Tamim continues the outlines drawn by his father almost unchanged: reliance on gas power, regional mediation, a close alliance with the United States alongside ties with Iran—driven by apprehension—and preserving Qatar's relations with Hamas, mainly as a means to influence the Palestinian arena and gain political points. The death of Hamad bin Khalifa does not signal a change of direction for Qatar. It marks the passing of the man who shaped its strategic identity. The Qatar of today—with its achievements, its aspirations, and its complex relations with Israel—is largely his creation. Anyone expecting his death to bring about a change in its policy toward Israel is bound to be disappointed. Qatari policy, for better and mainly for worse, is expected to continue.

What can the establishment of Syria’s interim parliament tell us about President al-Sharaa’s intentions and the future trajectory of the country as it rebuilds? >>inss.org.il/publication/sy…

Saudi Policy in the Wake of the War Head of the Institute’s Gulf States Program, Yoel Guzansky, writes: The war has brought three lessons into sharp focus for Saudi Arabia. First, while Iran has been harmed, it has not lost its ability to threaten the Gulf states and their energy infrastructure. Second, the Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran's most important point of strategic leverage; even following American military intervention, Washington struggles to ensure it remains fully open and that freedom of navigation is maintained. Third, while the American commitment to Gulf security remains vital, it no longer provides a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the countries of the region. From this stems the Saudi hedging policy. On one hand, Riyadh continues to promote dialogue with Iran and even seeks to bring the rest of the Gulf states on board, understanding that reducing tension is a paramount security and economic interest. On the other hand, it turns to China — not as a substitute for the United States, but because Beijing is currently the only major power that holds significant leverage over Tehran. China is the primary target market for Iranian oil, its most important economic partner, and the very mediator that brokered the 2023 reconciliation agreement between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Foreign Minister's recent visit to Beijing is an expression of this policy. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, leveraging Chinese influence over Iran may be one of the few tools available to help restrain Tehran and prevent further disruptions to the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Turning to Beijing does not, as noted, represent a distancing from Washington, but rather a recognition that, in the current regional reality, the United States alone cannot provide the stability the Gulf requires. In this sense, the outcomes of the war have not weakened Saudi Arabia's hedging policy — they have actually reinforced it. As confidence in Washington's sole ability to shape the regional security order erodes, Riyadh will increase its efforts to diversify risks: maintaining its alliance with the United States, deepening its ties with China, and continuing dialogue with Iran. From Riyadh's point of view, these are not contradictory moves, but rather three pillars of the exact same strategy.

Israel finds itself in a continuous stagnation, wherein impressive tactical military achievements are not translating into political and strategic victory. How can this 'limbo' be resolved across the various fronts? >> inss.org.il/publication/st…

A special real-time dashboard tracking security incidents in the Judea and Samaria sector — covering the scope of Palestinian terror attacks, clashes, casualties, thwarted attacks, and arrests in the region >> inss.org.il/publication/we…

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the historic framework agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon, and what are its implications for Israel? >> inss.org.il/publication/is…

How can we better frame the conversation to protect Jewish communities? 🎧 New episode of Brief.il is available to watch and listen to on all platforms.

INSS June Survey: In the northern arena, 81% assess that the current security situation does not provide safety for residents, and 57% oppose a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, even if Hezbollah adheres to the ceasefire agreement. For the full results >> inss.org.il/publication/in…

How should Israel address the fact that more and more aspects of the conflict are being debated and decided in the international arena? >> inss.org.il/publication/co…

What Can Be Learned from Banning Wikipedia's Founder from the Platform? Dudi Siman Tov, INSS Researcher, writes: The Wikipedia editor community has permanently banned Larry Sanger, one of the encyclopedia's co-founders. This is an exceptional event that exposes how authority operates in the digital age. Behind the ouster was Sanger’s initiative to establish a group of editors to restore conservative viewpoints to Wikipedia, which he claims have been pushed out. The initiative is part of a broad reform plan he formulated, centered on the claim that Wikipedia’s core mechanisms are what generate the bias: the source-ranking system, which labels mainstream institutions as reliable and excludes conservative sources; aggressive blocking procedures; and decision-making by consensus among anonymous editors. Hence his call to expand the variety of legitimate sources, curb blockings, expose the identities of decision-makers, and establish an elected and transparent governance. Criticism of Wikipedia's progressive bias is not unique to Sanger. Another co-founder, Jimmy Wales, demanded a neutral wording in the entry "Gaza genocide." However, unlike him, Sanger did not settle for internal debate: he turned to his followers on platform X (Twitter) and directed them to participate in the discussion taking place on the site. The community felt attacked by what was perceived as an external mobilization of activists that bypassed the rules, and expressed concern that the move would expose the editors' identities. The community fiercely opposed the proposal regardless of its content, because it challenges the way decisions are made on the platform. The decision-making process constitutes the heart of Wikipedia's institutional credibility, and therefore a threat to it is perceived as an existential threat. After being banned, Sanger attacked the move. He claimed it was an unfair process and added that "Wikipedia has become 'mob rule' more than ever, and that same mob is now blocking me for trying to bring a diverse group of thinkers and editors to the site." The ban marks Wikipedia's transition from an open encyclopedia to a body fiercely defending itself. The community was not interested in whether Sanger was right, but was rather deterred by the structural risk he posed to it. The affair of Sanger’s suspension teaches us that in an era of information wars, the character of a system is determined by the community mechanism that guards it, and not by its founders. When a leading figure, and even the founder himself, is perceived as a threat to that very mechanism—the system will act to remove them.

Until now, American support for Israel has often been understood through a party lens: Democrats were becoming more critical, while Republicans remained reliably supportive. That framework is no longer sufficient. An examination of the various factions within the Republican Party and their stance toward Israel >> inss.org.il/publication/in…

The Lebanese Adventure al-Sharaa Does Not Want (For Now) Dr. Carmit Valensi, Senior Researcher at the Institute, writes: In a recent interview with the Al-Mashhad channel, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa once again rejected the idea of opening a military front against Hezbollah in Lebanon, as proposed in President Trump’s controversial initiative. Al-Sharaa’s reluctance stems from a combination of domestic and regional considerations. Domestically, the Syrian army remains in the process of reconstruction and rebuilding; its capabilities are limited, and it faces significant security and political challenges. A confrontation with Hezbollah could drag Syria into the Lebanese quagmire, divert resources from the internal front, and potentially undermine regime stability. Moreover, such a move could be perceived by the Syrian public as serving Israeli interests — an image al-Sharaa is keen to avoid. At the regional level, most actors have expressed reservations regarding Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Al-Sharaa, who is investing considerable effort in restoring Syria’s international standing, is unwilling to jeopardize his diplomatic gains. Even within Lebanon, there is little appetite for renewed Syrian intervention, given the painful legacy of Syria’s presence in the country between 1976 and 2005. Turkey, Damascus’s key ally, is also concerned about the potential destabilization of Syria and the implications for its own influence there. In Israel as well, despite the shared interest in weakening Hezbollah, there appears to be growing opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. The Israeli establishment remains wary of al-Sharaa’s character and intentions, given his jihadist past and in light of the trauma of October 7. Such a move raises concerns about the spread of Sunni extremism into Lebanon, possibly as part of a broader Syrian ambition to revive the vision of “Greater Syria” (al-Sham), encompassing Lebanon. From the perspective of some Israeli actors, it is preferable to contend with the familiar Shiite adversary than to face a new jihadist threat. Although a rational assessment suggests a low likelihood that al-Sharaa will initiate an offensive move in Lebanon, the Middle East remains a dynamic environment. According to a report in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Modon, Damascus has left the door slightly open to responding to the American proposal, while setting stringent conditions for any potential involvement against Hezbollah. These include an Israeli withdrawal from Syrian and Lebanese territory, alongside a commitment not to interfere in internal affairs. It was also reported that Damascus demanded military assistance and funding for operational activity, as well as American air support — indicating that all options remain open. For the time being, however, al-Sharaa appears to prefer avoiding the Lebanese adventure.

The Framework Agreement Between Lebanon and Israel: A First and Important Step on a Long, Bumpy Road Orna Mizrahi, Senior Researcher at the Institute, writes: On June 26, Israel and Lebanon signed a framework agreement at the conclusion of the fifth round of direct talks between them, which began two months ago under U.S. auspices. This important agreement reflects a shared vision for achieving a future peace agreement and outlines a pathway toward fulfilling the objectives of both states over time. For Lebanon, it promises the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity; the establishment of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ monopoly over weapons within the country; the non-interference of external actors in its internal affairs; the return of displaced residents to evacuated areas; and economic assistance for reconstruction. For Israel, the agreement provides an opportunity to advance the disarmament of Hezbollah, conditioning IDF withdrawal from Lebanon on progress in this regard, while allowing the IDF, for the time being, to remain in the security zone and to operate against threats. It also aims to distance Iran from involvement in Lebanon and to secure peace and safety for Israeli residents. The implementation mechanism includes the establishment of bilateral frameworks for direct military and political dialogue, mediated and supervised by the United States. It was also reported that a military annex exists, the contents of which remain classified. At the same time, despite the importance of the agreement, the path to its implementation is long and fraught with challenges. The parties’ agreement to a phased and conditional implementation signals a prolonged process. A first pilot phase has nevertheless been set to begin immediately in two areas adjacent to the “Yellow Line,” from which the IDF will withdraw and where the Lebanese Armed Forces will deploy in its place (with additional areas to be determined later). However, progress in implementation is overshadowed by a number of risks, particularly: •First and foremost, Hezbollah’s opposition to the agreement and its refusal to relinquish its weapons, independent status, and ties to Iran, along with its threats of civil war. On June 27, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has already issued an official response describing the agreement as a humiliating capitulation to an Israeli-American dictate and a betrayal by the Lebanese government. He asserted that the agreement lacks validity, called for adopting the U.S.–Iran understandings instead, and pledged to continue military efforts to achieve a full Israeli withdrawal. •The weakness of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which has been assigned a central role in implementing the agreement and confronting Hezbollah. While the agreement calls for strengthening the LAF, this will require significant resources, time, and deep structural and functional reforms. •The continued presence of IDF forces in the security zone for an undefined period, which may generate not only clashes with Hezbollah but also friction with the Lebanese Armed Forces and local residents seeking to return to their homes. •Expected interference from Iran, which seeks to preserve Hezbollah and ensure its survival, as well as to maintain its achievements within the U.S.–Iran understandings regarding its role in sustaining the ceasefire in Lebanon. In conclusion, the signing of the agreement constitutes a positive development. It is a historic agreement that creates a long-term opportunity to reshape the security reality and relations between Israel and Lebanon. At the same time, its implementation faces significant challenges. Its success will depend to a large extent on the willingness of both parties to take risks and bear the costs it entails.

U.S. Primaries: Israel Critics Sweep the Blue Districts Dr. Avishai Ben Sasson-Gordis, Senior Researcher at INSS, writes: The results of the Democratic Party primaries across a range of races in the United States in recent days — particularly in New York City — reflect the growing strength of the party’s left wing. Among the defining positions of this camp and its candidates is sharp criticism of Israel, alongside the use of Israel’s influence on American politics as a tool for fearmongering and voter mobilization. In several races held yesterday, candidates backed by the Democratic establishment and by the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC emerged victorious, with such support in some cases becoming a central campaign issue. For example, in Maryland, Adrian Boafo won the primary to replace veteran Congressman Steny Hoyer, with backing from the pro-Israel lobby and the crypto industry. In New York’s 15th district, Congressman Ritchie Torres, known for his support for Israel, defended his seat against a challenger who sought to turn Torres’s support for Israel into a central line of attack. At the same time, the number of Democratic members of Congress holding critical positions toward Israel is expected to grow. This follows the victories of candidates from the party’s left wing in Democratic primaries in “blue” districts — where the Democratic Party is highly likely to win in the general election. Among them are three candidates in New York City who were endorsed by the popular mayor and outspoken critic of Israel, Zohran Mamdani. The three are: Brad Lander, Mamdani’s Jewish ally, who identifies as a liberal Zionist but has criticized what he describes as “genocide” committed by Israel in Gaza and attacked his opponent for receiving funding from AIPAC; Darializa Avila Chevalier, who was among the organizers of anti-Israel protests at Columbia University after October 7, 2023; and Claire Valdez, who served as a legislator in New York State. All three defeated candidates favored by the Democratic Party establishment, in areas where Mamdani himself won a majority of the vote in last year’s mayoral election. In addition, Janeese Lewis George — who also belongs to the DSA, the socialist left wing of the party — won the Democratic primary for mayor of Washington, D.C. a week ago. George’s victory came against the backdrop of tensions between the Democratic-led city and the Trump administration in the White House, which sits at its center and has the power to shape many aspects of life there. George, like the other candidates mentioned above, described Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide and criticized U.S. support for Israel. The election results reflect several trends that should concern Israel: 1.In some races, Israel was a central issue, while in others it remained relatively marginal. In either case, because these are safe Democratic districts, the results are likely to significantly increase the number of Israel critics in elected office — and accordingly, the pressure to reduce and condition U.S. support for Israel. 2.If during Mamdani’s campaign for mayor of New York the question was whether he was elected despite or because of his positions on Israel, it is now clear that for part of the Democratic base, harsh criticism of Israel — even to the point of repudiation — constitutes a basic condition for supporting a candidate. 3.This phenomenon reflects Israel’s transformation into a moral litmus test for part of the party’s electorate. In the eyes of these voters, those who do not view Israel’s actions in the war as genocide, and those willing to accept funding from AIPAC, are considered beyond the bounds of political and moral legitimacy. 4.Part of the growing strength of the party’s anti-Israel faction is linked to anger at the party establishment and what some voters perceive as its weakness in confronting the Trump administration and its domestic and international policy agenda. In this sense, Israel has become collateral damage to intensifying anti-establishment sentiment. 5.At least for now, however, despite the growing power of anti-Israel voices within the Democratic Party, as also reflected in public opinion polls, their influence is still felt primarily in the party’s safe districts. In more competitive districts, or in those where incumbent candidates — even if they are pro-Israel — enjoy strong popularity, Israel-related attacks alone are insufficient to unseat them.

How have the war and the subsequent worsening economic crisis accelerated the ongoing erosion of Iran's middle class — and what are the social and political implications of this process? >> inss.org.il/publication/ir…

What does the MOU between the United States and Iran include, and what are its strategic implications for Israel? >> inss.org.il/publication/us…