INSS

“I Shall Walk Alone”: The UAE’s Independent Path in the Middle East Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: In recent years, the United Arab Emirates has been shaping an increasingly independent policy line toward its Gulf neighbors. This trend is evident in a series of strategic moves: from signing the Abraham Accords, to competing with Saudi Arabia, withdrawing from OPEC, expanding its geopolitical activity across various regions, and more. Behind this shift lies a combination of growing self-confidence among the leadership in Abu Dhabi, a desire to become a regional power, and disappointment with its partners. The UAE’s policy direction distinguishes it not only from regional rivals such as Iran, but also from its Gulf neighbors, foremost among them Saudi Arabia. Tensions with Riyadh are present in nearly every strategic arena: from competition over leadership in the Arab Sunni world, through rivalry for global capital and investment, to differing approaches toward regional foreign policy. The UAE’s independent line became even sharper during the confrontation with Iran, in which the country absorbed more Iranian missile and drone attacks than any other Gulf state. Abu Dhabi was disappointed by the lack of a unified front against Iran and by the weak response of some of its neighbors to Iranian aggression. In this context, the depth of the UAE’s relationship with Israel stands out in particular. While other Arab states that normalized relations with Israel maintained relatively limited cooperation, the UAE developed broad ties with Israel in the fields of security, cyber, technology, and intelligence. Cooperation reportedly intensified during the war with Iran, when Israel is said to have provided the Emirates with air defense systems and intelligence assistance. For Abu Dhabi, the relationship with Israel is not merely diplomatic, but part of a broader strategic vision: building a network of partnerships that will allow it to operate as an independent regional actor — even if this at times creates friction with its closest Gulf partners. For the UAE, continued divergence from the Gulf collective line could strengthen its position as an independent global “brand-state,” deepen frictions with Saudi Arabia, and even create tensions within the GCC. For Israel, deepening ties with the UAE constitute a significant strategic asset — especially vis-à-vis Iran — but also a source of challenges. Stronger relations enhance Israel’s position on multiple fronts due to the UAE’s status as a key regional player, yet they may also create the perception that Israel has effectively chosen a side within the complex intra-Arab regional dynamic.

“Operation Roaring Lion,” the war against Iran and its proxies, has not yet reached its conclusion. Although the final outcome remains unclear and the current situation may soon shift, the campaign’s distinctive characteristics allow for an interim assessment. This is the most extensive war fought in the Middle East since the Second Gulf War, and the first in which Israel is fighting as an active partner in a coalition with the United States. While its global implications have yet to fully emerge, it is already clear that the war carries significant implications for the Gulf States, the global energy market, Israel’s international standing, and great-power competition. Click to read >> inss.org.il/publication/ro…

Why and how Cairo worked to achieve and maintain the U.S.-Iran ceasefire — and what conclusions should be drawn in Israel? >> inss.org.il/publication/ir…

Today we were honored to launch our new memorandum, "American Jewry is Changing: What Israel Must Do to Preserve the Partnership", in the presence of Shira Ruderman and representatives of Diaspora Jewry. Written with the generous support of the Ruderman Family Foundation, the paper examines the changes taking place within American Jewry that are challenging its ability to support Israel and offers concrete policy recommendations to help ensure the future of the relationship between the world’s two largest Jewish communities. Click for the full memorandum >> inss.org.il/publication/us…

US-Iran negotiations: What happens if the talks fail? 🎧 New episode of Brief.il is available to watch and listen to on all platforms.

Fewer Incidents, More Violence: The Anti-Defamation League’s Annual Report Ofir Dayan, INSS Researcher, writes: Last week, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) published its annual report tracking antisemitic trends in the United States. For the first time since the October 7 attacks, there is also some good news: the number of antisemitic incidents has declined — from roughly 9,000 incidents in 2024 to about 6,000 in 2025. However, this decrease in the number of incidents has not been accompanied by a decline in their severity — quite the opposite. While in 2024 there were 196 incidents classified as assaults (2% of all incidents), the following year saw 203 such incidents (more than 3% of all incidents). Thirty-two of those incidents involved deadly weapons, compared to 23 the year before. In other words, while fewer antisemitic incidents occurred, the likelihood that those incidents would be more severe increased. This may reflect the growing boldness of antisemites in the United States to translate their antisemitic views into physical attacks against Jews. Despite all this, there is still a clear pattern according to which most incidents are classified as “harassment,” followed by “vandalism,” which requires perpetrators to take greater risks, while only a minority of incidents are classified as “assaults.” Most incidents — including most assaults — take place in public spaces visible to all, a reality that may cause Jews to feel uncomfortable displaying visible signs of their Jewish identity, as reflected in surveys conducted among American Jews. Ironically, antisemitism on university campuses, which received extensive coverage in Israel, is actually showing a very positive decline of 83%. This appears to be due to the cooling of public protests at those institutions following the dismantling of anti-Israel encampments established on some campuses. This fact may point to the line between anti-Israel protest and antisemitism — a line that was crossed repeatedly during those demonstrations. The absence of such protests, therefore, also contributed to a decline in antisemitic incidents. In contrast, the number of antisemitic incidents in schools remained relatively stable, standing at 825 compared to 860 in 2024. These incidents stem both from anti-Israel actors and from white supremacists, and include the harassment of Jewish students and the spraying of swastikas, among other acts. This trend suggests that efforts should focus not only on university campuses, but at a much earlier stage in young people’s development — schools — while also addressing the convergence of interests between far-right and far-left actors, both of whom have found this arena to be a convenient outlet.

How the campaign in Iran shattered the Kremlin’s conception — and what conclusions and lessons has Moscow drawn from the recent events? >> inss.org.il/publication/ru…

What are the significance and implications of the historic visit to China by the leader of the Taiwanese opposition? >> inss.org.il/publication/ta…

Dubai Junction: Can the UAE Disconnect from Iran? Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: Over the years, Dubai has served as an important hub in the economic interface between Iran and the global economy, and at times as an indirect pipeline for easing the impact of international sanctions on Tehran. This development was not a mere byproduct of globalization, but rather part of a financial-economic structure based on the United Arab Emirates' role as an open regional trade and services center, characterized by flexible regulation and high connectivity between markets. Dubai—home to many Iranians—served as an intermediary arena where Iranian companies operated, some legitimate and others with indirect or direct ties to regime elements, utilizing trade mechanisms, currency exchange, and financial transfers that enabled the movement of capital and goods outside the formal frameworks of sanctions. Dubai, in particular, functioned as a central junction in Iranian sanctions-circumvention networks, including through front companies and financial intermediaries, and at times for entities linked to the Revolutionary Guards. This phenomenon can be framed within the broader context of an Emirati balancing strategy, which combines the need to maintain good relations with Iran as a form of "insurance policy" with the preservation of Dubai's status as a trade hub. The result is that over the years, a kind of mutual interdependence has developed between Iran and the Gulf states, especially the UAE (a primary trading partner for Iran), and despite the strategic rivalry, a pattern of economic coexistence has persisted. The UAE's strategic dilemma, against the backdrop of the war between the United States and Israel and Iran, concerns the ability to preserve the Emirati economic advantage based on financial openness and flexibility, without assisting a country that unjustifiably attacked strategic and civilian infrastructure within its territory with missiles and UAVs. A complete and immediate severance of trade would cause damage to Iran, and would therefore be a moral step and an appropriate response to Iranian aggression. However, it is unclear whether such a move is feasible given its high economic price for the Emiratis. In light of the structural dependence that has developed between the economies of the two countries, the move would severely harm the UAE economy. Therefore, any change in Emirati economic policy toward Iranian activity within its territory will require difficult decisions, as it is not merely a question of financial regulation, but a component of a broad effort to confront Iran.

The Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies presents a real-time situation report regarding the military campaign on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts. The report includes a dedicated dashboard featuring selected data, accompanied by an interactive map depicting the situation on the ground. The data is updated continuously and as accurately as possible, based on intelligence assessments, open-source information, and media reports. Click here >> inss.org.il/publication/li…

A new interactive map by INSS provides a situational overview of the Lebanese arena during Operation Roaring Lion (Epic Fury) and following the ceasefire agreement that came into effect on April 16, 2026. The map displays the Israeli security zone, IDF strikes in the vicinity, as well as IDF outposts and UN bases. The map is updated continuously with the highest possible precision, based on open-source intelligence and media reports. Click for the full map: inss.org.il/publication/le…

The Intelligence Report on Putin: A Prophecy Designed to Fulfill Itself? Georgy Poroskoun, a researcher at INSS, writes: On May 4, journalists from several media outlets, including CNN, published details from an intelligence report by one European country, according to which the Kremlin had significantly tightened security arrangements around President Putin out of concern over leaks, an assassination attempt, or an internal conspiracy. This publication is important not only because of its content, but also because of the very fact that it appeared. The context matters: in recent months, it has become difficult to ignore a shift in Russia’s internal climate. The sense of security and certainty is eroding on four fronts at once. First, the authorities are taking unprecedented measures to restrict the use of the internet and popular online services, above all Telegram, thereby disrupting the daily routine of ordinary citizens. Second, Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia are intensifying and becoming a factor in the everyday lives of a growing share of the population, including in major cities. Third, public criticism of the regime’s decisions is being voiced not only by the persecuted opposition, but also by actors loyal to the regime: prominent bloggers and even representatives of the political system, including regional governor and members of parliament. Fourth, the sense of personal security among the elites is being shaken, both by the arrests and imprisonment of senior establishment figures who had previously seen themselves as “protected” by their close ties to Putin’s inner circle, and by Ukrainian assassinations of generals on the streets of Moscow. The report focuses on the sense of insecurity around Putin, which is being translated into stricter security procedures as a result of these same trends: the intensification of the Ukrainian threat and growing distrust among different groups within the security elite. Unusually, it describes a situation in which the president’s security apparatus treats not only a Ukrainian attack as a reference threat, but also an internal coup or assassination attempt by members of the very elite groups that feel harmed by the current situation. Beyond the report’s credibility, since most of the facts cited in it cannot be independently cross-checked, the more interesting question is why such a report was published at all. It is unlikely that its purpose was to warn Putin, and it is also unlikely that this was merely an attempt to show “what the West knows.” It is more plausible that the publication itself was intended to exert influence. The very act of making the report public intensifies internal distrust and amplifies the tensions it describes. If Russian elites realize that conflicts and the violation of guarantees have become public, and that all players within the system are aware of them, they are forced to reassess their own position. Have the rules of the game changed? Is personal security still guaranteed? Is passive waiting safer than early action? In this sense, the publication may be an interesting example of a psychological influence operation: an attempt to stoke the fire and accelerate processes undermining internal stability in Russia that are already taking shape within the system. The publication should therefore be read on two levels: as evidence that the strains inside the Putinist system have become deeper and qualitatively different, and as a possible instrument designed to intensify them. It is not only a source of information about Russia. It may also be a tool designed to influence the reality within it and bring closer the very internal confrontation that Putin’s security apparatus fears so much.

The Institute for National Security Studies pays its respects following the passing of senior Institute researcher Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran. Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dr. Elran joined the research staff at the Jaffee Center (later the Institute for National Security Studies – INSS) in 2003. He served in the IDF as a career officer for 24 years in senior command and staff positions, primarily in the Military Intelligence Directorate. His last post was deputy director of Military Intelligence (1987-1989). Elran took an active role in the peace talks with Egypt and was an active member of the military delegation to the peace talks with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Following his retirement from the military, Elran served as the deputy chief of staff of the Tel Aviv municipality and afterwards as a senior consultant for strategic planning for government offices, including the Ministry of Defense, Education, Internal Security, and the National Security Council. Elran's primary research areas at the INSS were homeland security, disaster management, and societal resilience in the face of protracted terrorism. Dr. Elran has published numerous papers on these subjects and edited several memoranda and volumes. Elran earned a B.A. degree from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in Political Science and Middle East Studies (1965), an MA degree from Indiana University in International Relations and Russian Studies (1970), and a PhD in Political Science from Haifa University (2017). Dr. Elran also taught at the University of Chicago in the Committee on International Relations (CIR). May your memory be blessed.

While it is premature to assess the full implications of the war, prominent trajectories can already be identified across several key domains, including the nuclear program, the missile array, and Iran’s proxy network. What can be learned from the current status quo, and what questions stand before Israel? >> inss.org.il/he/publication…

Municipal Elections in the Palestinian Authority Prof. Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: The municipal elections held on April 25 in the Palestinian Authority are an important political event, but they must be analyzed with great caution—primarily due to the context in which they were held and the fact that Hamas did not participate in them. The findings indicate that the local elections do not reflect a full democratic system, but rather a hybrid mechanism that combines a formal procedure with political and structural constraints. The gap between the official narrative—emphasizing democratic success—and the reality on the ground, which includes a lack of competition and political exclusion, points to the fragility of the Palestinian political system. The elections represent a logistical and political step of significance in the eyes of the Palestinian Authority, particularly in the context of incorporating Gaza into an electoral framework for the first time since 2006. Fatah’s victory, in its view, strengthens the Palestinian Authority’s position in the current round of negotiations and in the eyes of its international partners. However, these cannot be considered a reliable measure of genuine Palestinian public opinion, whether on questions of internal leadership or on major strategic issues. Elections that exclude the most popular organization from competition, that are conducted in hundreds of towns without any real contest, and that take place under military occupation and in the shadow of war, cannot be considered a reliable reflection of Palestinian public preferences. The absence of general elections for nearly two decades reinforces the sense that local elections serve more as a tool of image management than as a full democratic mechanism. Alongside the deep fragmentation in Palestinian society that the elections reflect, they also reveal the duality within the Palestinian public. Alongside a desire for stability and improvement in everyday life, there is deep despair toward the Palestinian Authority and a strengthening of family- and clan-based frameworks. Low voter turnout reflects a sense of a lack of real influence. Alongside the desire for change, elections, and democratization, there is apathy and low turnout due to a loss of faith in the ability to effect change. Hope exists alongside despair, but at present, despair appears to outweigh hope. The election results point to a politically fatigued society, one that prefers to rely on traditional family structures in the absence of a clear national horizon. The findings indicate that the elections reflected a procedural democratic process under constraining structural conditions, producing outcomes that do not reflect genuine political competition. Three central processes can be clearly identified: erosion of institutional legitimacy, disintegration of party politics, and a rise in local, clan-based political organization. Therefore, rather than serving as evidence of democratization, the elections function as a façade of governmental and structural reforms and as a mechanism of controlled political reproduction within the framework of a non-democratic regime lacking broad public legitimacy.

The United Arab Emirates in the Line of Fire: When the Struggle over Hormuz Becomes a Regional Confrontation Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: The Iranian attack on the United Arab Emirates yesterday reflects a combination of strategic considerations that place Abu Dhabi at the heart of the escalating confrontation in the Gulf. The trigger for the escalation is the American effort to reopen maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz and ensure freedom of navigation. From Iran’s perspective, this move is seen as an attempt to deprive it of its main remaining lever of pressure. At the same time, the decision to target primarily the UAE (including damage to the key oil terminal at Fujairah Port, which bypasses Hormuz) also stems from its sensitive geographic position as a state located adjacent to the strait and as part of the economic and logistical system surrounding it. From Iran’s point of view, the UAE is not only a geographically proximate target but also part of the strategic environment that enables the strait’s functionality - ports, energy infrastructure, and trade networks that connect the Gulf to the global economy. Another possible reason is the firm strategic stance adopted by Abu Dhabi in favor of restoring the pre-war status quo - namely, full freedom of navigation in the strait. Among Gulf states, the UAE has been the most outspoken in supporting the American effort to restore maritime control and reopen the strait, even declaring its willingness to assist. As such, it is perceived in Tehran as an active player encouraging the consolidation of American maritime hegemony in the region. A third dimension is the deepening security cooperation between the UAE and Israel throughout the war. According to various reports, Israel has been actively involved in the defensive effort to protect the UAE, including safeguarding critical infrastructure from missile and drone threats. For Iran, this growing alignment is not merely security cooperation - it signals the emergence of a broader regional front, potentially increasing Iran’s motivation to “punish” the Emiratis. In this sense, the attack on the UAE serves multiple purposes simultaneously: an attempt to disrupt the American initiative in the Strait of Hormuz, to punish a key regional actor supporting the reopening of the strait and the maritime status quo, and to send a clear message against the deepening security axis forming between Gulf states and Israel. As a result, the UAE finds itself on the front line of the confrontation not only because of its geographic proximity, but also due to its strategic role in shaping the regional order that Iran seeks to challenge.

How has the decline in the scope of Chinese investments in Israel manifested itself, and what are the implications for Israel? >> inss.org.il/publication/ch…

A joint INSS-ISIR (Somaliland) study: How the Yemenite threat impacts Jerusalem and Hargeisa, and how to address the shared challenge >> inss.org.il/publication/is…

How can Hezbollah’s financial resilience, based on a complex and sprawling global system that enables it to withstand IDF infrastructure strikes in Lebanon, be undermined? >> inss.org.il/publication/he…