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What explains the limited response of the Gulf states to Iranian attacks on their soil? 🎧 New episode of Brief.IL by INSS is now available across all platforms

Amid a severe crisis in Israel–Jordan relations, the war against Iran broke out, and its repercussions could alter the nature of relations between Amman and Jerusalem >> inss.org.il/publication/is…

How does the Kremlin interpret developments in the Iranian arena, what lessons does it derive from the course of the war, and what implications do these developments hold for the Russian sphere? >> inss.org.il/publication/ru…

Why, to date, has Beijing refrained from adopting a resolute stance in support of Tehran? >> inss.org.il/publication/ch…

Missiles, refugees, Kurds, and eroding regional standing: The challenges Ankara faces during the war in Iran, its actions, and the opportunities it may seek to exploit >>inss.org.il/publication/tu…

Not Isolated Incidents: The Campaign Against Diaspora Jewry Ofir Dayan, a researcher at INSS, writes: Last week, several terrorist attacks shook Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Liège in Belgium, and West Bloomfield in Michigan, United States. All four attacks occurred at distinctly Jewish institutions—synagogues, Jewish schools, or, in the case of Michigan, at a building used as both a synagogue and a Jewish school. It was easy for the local media in those countries, and to some extent the Israeli media as well, to be shocked but quickly move on to a subject perceived as larger and more important—the ongoing campaign between the United States and Israel against Iran and that between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, these are not two contradictory pieces of news; rather they are closely linked. According to publications in the United States, the assailant from Michigan is a citizen of Lebanese descent who carried out the attack to avenge the deaths of his relatives in Lebanon, two of whom were terrorists in Hezbollah’s rocket force. The three attacks in Europe were carried out by the Ashab al-Yamin organization, which, according to European sources, was established during the recent round of escalation with Iran and is supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to harm Jewish targets in Europe. Although there were no fatalities in any of the attacks, they all conveyed a sharp and clear message to Jewish communities in Europe and the United States: You are responsible for Israel’s actions, whether you support them or not. Accusing Jews as a collective of responsibility for Israel’s actions is an antisemitic accusation, according to the accepted definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), a definition that all three affected countries have adopted. However, as stated, these attacks occurred only over the past week, and they join dozens of other attacks and incidents of vandalism in many countries aimed at restricting the actions of the Jewish community and at dissuading those who support Israel from doing so. Countries should not treat these events as isolated and context-free incidents but as part of an intense campaign against Jewish communities in the diaspora, which endangers not only the communities but the state as a whole.

Trump's decision point on whether to continue the war in Iran — and the implications for Israel >> inss.org.il/publication/tr…

The campaign against Iran has expanded to the economic front, centering on Tehran’s attempts to harm the global energy market in order to force the United States to end the fighting. Yet an analysis of market conditions reveals a surprising picture. Click For the full article >> inss.org.il/publication/ec…

Learning from Their Experience: How Shahed Drones Are Strengthening the Linkages Between Russia and Ukraine and the War With Iran Georgi Poroskoun, a researcher at INSS, writes: The war with Iran is also drawing in Russia and Ukraine. At this stage, their involvement is indirect, through expertise, intelligence, and military-technological advice, with an emphasis on operational experience with suicide drones. But the trend is clear. According to publications and assessments by Western intelligence, Russia is assisting Iran in three practical ways. The first is the sharing of intelligence about US assets across the Middle East, most likely based on satellite imagery. The second is technological and operational guidance on improving the employment of drones—those same Shaheds that Russia purchased from Iran and upgraded for the purposes of its war in Ukraine—and even supplying them to Iran itself, apparently in limited quantities, as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy claims. This claim has been supported by Russian components found at impact sites in Gulf states. The third is logistical and diplomatic assistance, as reflected in a Russian operation to evacuate more than one hundred Iranian diplomats from Lebanon, amid questions as to whether some of them were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. At the same time, Russia is publicly refraining from taking steps that would be interpreted as direct military participation and is trying not to cross the threshold that would lead to direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, Russia’s political positioning is sharp and unmistakable. Moscow has harshly criticized the Israeli–American campaign and, on March 14, publicly condemned Israeli strikes near the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where Russian experts are also employed. At the same time, the Kremlin is benefiting economically from the conflict: The spike in oil prices and the temporary weakening of US sanctions are improving the condition of Russia’s budget, which is facing a deficit of tens of billions of dollars. Ukraine, in contrast, finds itself on the other side of the conflict. Kyiv is actively sharing with the United States and the Arab Gulf states the experience it has accumulated in combating those same Iranian drones. Accordingly, Ukraine has sent expert teams to the region to assist in organizing and calibrating defense arrays against the Shaheds, including advice on interception tactics and technologies. In practice, Ukraine is one of the few countries with real combat experience in coping with mass attacks by suicide drones, and that experience has proven especially valuable in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, Israel’s prime minister has requested a rare conversation with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, which is expected to take place at the beginning of the week. Iran has already responded at the political level: Members of the Iranian parliament have accused Kyiv of assisting Israel, on which basis Ukraine could be regarded as a “legitimate target.” Beyond that, the very scale of the war in the region poses a risk for Kyiv: The more US forces and their allies use interceptor missiles to defend bases and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, the greater the likelihood that these rare systems will become harder for Ukraine to obtain. From Israel’s perspective, it is important to internalize the linkages between our war and Russia and Ukraine. The most prominent aspect, although not the only one, is the willingness of both countries to bring their extensive combat experience in unmanned technologies—those same Shahed drones—to the Middle Eastern theater, with Russia coming to Iran’s aid, while Ukraine is effectively becoming part of the camp confronting Iranian capabilities.

Ballistic Missiles with High-Explosive Payloads or Cluster Munitions Dr. Yehoshua Kalisky, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: Some of the ballistic missile ordnance launched from Iran at Israel does not carry a warhead with a high-explosive payload. Instead, it contains numerous small bombs, often referred to as “cluster munitions” or “bomblets.” These bombs disperse in the air and fall over a wide area, creating a double danger to buildings, infrastructure, and civilians when they strike. Generally, the ballistic missiles launched at Israel carry warheads containing hundreds of kilograms of explosives. When such a missile strikes its target, it causes damage to both the target itself and to the surrounding area as a result of the explosion, the accompanying blast waves, and the kinetic impact on the target. The purpose of ballistic missiles carrying large quantities of cluster munitions, which Iran launched during Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and in the current war, is to cause widespread environmental damage over a large area, strike numerous targets, and cause indiscriminate casualties. The ballistic missile carrying the warhead, which contains the cluster munitions, is most likely the Khorramshahr or Emad missile, although there is no publicly available information on the matter. It is launched toward its target, and when it is at an altitude of 7–10 km above the target, its warhead opens and the ordnance—small bombs each containing 2.5–5 kg of explosives—scatters and falls over a large area. The explosion occurs when the arming mechanism is triggered and the explosive material is activated upon impact with the target or the ground. The casing of the bombs is made of special materials to prevent thermal or mechanical damage during passage through the atmosphere on the way to the target. The dispersal of the bombs is not symmetrical, but it can be estimated that the average impact radius is between several hundred meters and up to a range of 10 km. The extent of dispersal depends primarily on wind and turbulence in the atmosphere, the altitude at which the ordnance is released, and the speed of the missile carrying the munitions. A certain percentage of these bombs do not explode upon reaching the target but instead remain as unexploded ordnance—a kind of mine that may be triggered and explode upon human contact, causing severe injuries and even death. For this reason, the use of cluster munitions was prohibited under the Dublin Convention, which entered into force in 2010. What can be done? On a personal level, it’s essential to follow the protective instructions issued by the Home Front Command and the police. On the security level, interception systems should be upgraded in order to strike and intercept the missile carrying the cluster munitions far from the territory of the State of Israel.

Is the stability of the Iranian regime in danger? Dr. Raz Zimmt, a senior researcher at the Institute, writes: Since the beginning of the military campaign in Iran, the Israeli and U.S. air forces have continued to attack infrastructure of the Basij militia, the Revolutionary Guards, and domestic security forces throughout the country. These strikes against dozens of headquarters and bases are intended to degrade as much as possible the capabilities of the Iranian security forces in order to impair their ability to maintain the regime's control and undermine their suppression capabilities. However, it appears that the ongoing strikes are not affecting—at least at this stage—the Iranian regime's ability to maintain a significant degree of control over the situation throughout the country. Reports published in news channels and social networks, including those identified with the Iranian opposition, indicate that domestic security forces and the intelligence mechanisms of the Islamic Republic, including the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, domestic security forces, and the Ministry of Intelligence, continue to operate extensively with the aim of maintaining the regime's stability. These reports suggest, among other things, that domestic security forces continue to deploy many checkpoints in central cities to monitor civilian movement and deter the population from renewing anti-regime protests. Thus, for example, security forces established an extensive network of checkpoints and inspection stations in Tehran. Additionally, security forces use civilian infrastructure, especially schools, for military purposes. In several cities across Iran, the presence of units in schools or various government buildings has been reported, to allow them to continue operating despite the damage to the headquarters and bases they usually use. At the same time, the authorities, led by the security and intelligence agencies, continue to adopt a policy of zero tolerance toward any sign of opposition to the regime. This is accompanied by the ongoing blocking of internet access. In this framework, dozens of citizens have been arrested in recent days for offenses of espionage, incitement, cooperation with foreign communication networks (such as "Iran International"), or photographing sites hit in the Israeli and American strikes. Simultaneously, senior Iranians published explicit warnings stating that any citizen who cooperates with "the enemy" and participates in protests will be considered a collaborator with the enemies of the Islamic Republic in a time of war. The commander of the domestic security forces, Ahmad Reza Radan, even warned that his forces received an explicit order to shoot directly at anyone perceived as exploiting the conditions of the war, including thieves and rioters. The Israeli and American strikes against governmental and security targets in an attempt to influence the regime's stability may wear down the regime's capabilities over time and make it difficult for it to successfully deal with internal challenges, especially in a scenario of renewed popular protest. However, it seems that at this stage, these strikes are not sufficient to undermine the internal cohesion among the security forces, their ability to function, or their practical control throughout the country.

AI Use in Operation Roaring Lion Ido Karp and Dr. Yehoshua Kalisky, researchers at INSS, write: In Operation Roaring Lion against Iran, the Americans have made extensive use of artificial intelligence. According to a report in Responsible Statecraft, the US military used the AI model Claude to prioritize and strike 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours of the war and to prioritize targets at a pace that is not humanly possible. Claude is a large language model trained on vast quantities of text and information. It can analyze, summarize, and generate new text in natural language, cross-reference numerous information sources, and suggest rationales and scenarios. The model calculates the probabilities of likely words and ideas in a given context. The use of AI in war is not new: the Russia–Ukraine war was the first international conflict in which the opposing sides actively developed and used AI for military purposes. These developments included solutions for geospatial intelligence, operations involving unmanned systems, military training, logistics, and cyber warfare, and they were a key factor in Ukraine’s relative success on the battlefield. An analysis published by the New York Times on the use of AI in the operation against Iran adds that some functions are now performed autonomously, including takeoff or hovering without GPS, navigation to strike areas, as well as target identification, tracking, pursuit, and ultimately target neutralization. What Claude adds to warfare is a layer of analysis and inference that makes the decision-making process faster and more automated. There’s an assumption that Claude is integrated into a system called Maven Smart, an operational platform developed by Palantir. According to a report by the Soufan Center, the system collects data from various sources, including satellite imagery, sensor data, and more, into a single interface for commanders and military planners. The article adds that Claude assisted analysts in identifying patterns and providing the intelligence and guidance required for the operation. Data centers affiliated with the United States and located in the Gulf states have become targets in Iran’s retaliatory strikes. The Financial Times notes that Iranian drone attacks on Amazon facilities in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain underscore the vulnerability of cloud facilities, which are prominent symbols of American technological power in the region and are difficult to defend against aerial attack. This may also indicate the rising importance of data centers as targets in wartime. The extensive use of AI in the current campaign illustrates its technological and sophisticated character and underscores the fact that the battlefield is fertile ground for the emergence of innovative weapons technologies.

What are the expected consequences of the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the Supreme Leader of Iran? 🎧 New episode of Brief.IL by INSS is now available across all platforms

From Australia to America: Commemorating Khamenei in Western Mosques as Part of the Iranian Influence Network Dr. Elad Ben David, a researcher at INSS, writes: The recent assassination of Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, led to commemoration ceremonies in mosques and Islamic centers across the West. Although parts of the Iranian diaspora in the West oppose the regime and Khamenei's actions, certain Shiite circles—especially more radical factions—honored him and his legacy. In Europe, for example, the Shiite Center of England in North London expressed condolences over the death of the “martyr” Khamenei, and photographs of the leader illuminated by candles were placed outside the building. Additionally, the Imam Reza Mosque in Berlin—known for its affinity with Hezbollah—held a mourning ceremony for Khamenei, similar to the one held there in 2020 after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. In the United States, mosques in Virginia and Dearborn, Michigan, held events in memory of Khamenei, and a flyer published for a Ramadan Iftar meal referred to him as “our leader,” alongside sharp accusations against the United States that its actions are being driven by “Israel first” considerations. Ceremonies to commemorate Khamenei also reached the Shiite community in South Africa. Members of the community in Cape Town gathered for a mourning ceremony for Khamenei's death, where Iranian flags were waved and strong criticism was voiced against Israel and the United States. Even in distant Australia, the Al-Rahman Center in Sydney held a mourning gathering in memory of the “pure soul” of Khamenei and for the martyrs who stood against the American–Israeli aggression toward the Islamic Republic of Iran—which aroused the anger of the Jewish community. The commemoration of Khamenei in various mosques in the West illustrates the depth of the ties between parts of the Shiite diaspora and the Iranian regime. Even when Iran’s regional status is being attacked and challenged, Islamic institutions in the diaspora continue to serve as an arena for preserving its ideological legitimacy. This demonstrates Iran’s soft power in the West—a religious influence network that helps the regime maintain its influence even in times of crisis—a reality that may also affect the continued tension between Jews and Muslims in the diaspora after October 7.

Contrary to conventional expectations, the Houthis are demonstrating a notable reluctance to intervene in Tehran’s defense. What explains the lack of documented projectile launches from Yemen toward Israel? >> inss.org.il/publication/ho…

A protracted war or a freeze in the campaign: What options are available to the US president in the Iranian arena, what might influence his decision—and how should Israel prepare? >> inss.org.il/publication/tr…

A clear majority of the Israeli public supports the Israeli–US attack on Iran (Operation Roaring Lion). In addition, 63% believes the campaign should continue until the fall of the Iranian regime.  Click for the Findings of the Flash Survey on Operation Roaring Lion >> inss.org.il/publication/su…

Operation Roaring Lion—Initial Insights Dr. Yehoshua Kalisky, a researcher at INSS, writes: The IDF’s opening strike in Operation Roaring Lion demonstrates the integration of impressive military and intelligence capabilities, together with the use of advanced technological means and sophisticated strategic and political thinking. The objective of this preemptive attack was to remove an existential threat from the State of Israel, and it relied on force buildup and military and technological capabilities characteristic of a major power. The opening blow, remarkable in its intensity, was a masterpiece in synchronization, involving 200 attacking aircraft, dozens of refueling planes, and command-and-control aircraft, while continuously processing and fusing data. The strike employed precise and lethal munitions against selected targets, continuous real-time monitoring of strike effectiveness, and, of course, flawless execution of the mission without losses to the attacking forces—all while maintaining operational cooperation with the United States, which requires the highest professional capabilities. As in the previous operation against Iran, the space domain was utilized through the IDF’s satellite array, which provides real-time monitoring, warning, intelligence collection, and damage assessment. On the nuclear issue, the Israeli Air Force once again struck nuclear sites that had been targeted in the past—Natanz and Isfahan—as well as a covert nuclear weapons development facility, known as Min Zadai. In the various strikes against ballistic missile targets, fire arrays, and Iranian command-and-control systems, long-range heavy bombers of the US military—B-1, B-2, and B-52—are also taking part, and some have struck and destroyed the dangerous Iranian nuclear reactor in Arak. So far, Iran has launched approximately 200 ballistic missiles and a number of UAVs toward Israel. Despite some casualties, Israel’s air defense system successfully intercepted them. In addition to the standard 400–500 kg high-explosive warhead, some of the missiles are equipped with cluster munitions that disperse over a wide area and cause extensive secondary damage. The Israeli and US air forces control the arena and are carrying out intensive strikes around the clock against government centers, storage and launch sites for ballistic missiles, fire arrays, command-and-control systems, radar sites, and air defense systems, while maintaining impressive operational coordination. This campaign may continue for some time to achieve the objective of eliminating the axis of evil, but the IDF, in impressive operational and political coordination and cooperation, is conducting offensive operations at a high professional level on the Iranian front and on the northern front in order to remove an existential threat from the State of Israel.

Qatar Against Iran Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at INSS, writes: For years, Qatar has been accused, primarily by Israel, of maintaining overly close relations with Iran; some even included it within the Iranian axis. Doha, for its part, has consistently rejected these accusations, arguing that its policy is based on diplomacy and maintaining proper relations with all its neighbors. However, this balancing policy didn’t shield it from Tehran’s anger amid the escalating war between Iran and the United States and Israel—and now Qatar is seeking to make clear that it’s also capable of defending itself. Last week, one of the most unusual incidents in the conflict to date occurred: In the first manned aerial engagement of the war, Qatari fighter jets shot down two Sukhoi Su-24 aircraft that were en route to Al-Udeid air base—the largest American base in the Middle East—as well as toward the liquefied natural gas complex in Ras Laffan, the center of Qatari gas production. According to reports, the Iranian aircraft were flying at low altitude in an attempt to evade radar and were only minutes away from striking their targets when Qatari F-15 jets intercepted and destroyed them. Qatar also reported that it arrested at least two members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who were gathering intelligence on its territory. Following these events, Qatar’s tone toward Iran has shifted. While Qatar had previously accepted the possibility that it might bear some of the consequences of the war between Israel and Iran, in a conversation with the Iranian foreign minister, Qatar’s prime minister emphasized that the recent attacks indicate that Tehran isn’t interested in de-escalation but rather seeks to drag its neighbors into the war. The relatively sharp Qatari message reflects the consolidation of prolonged hostility between the Gulf states and Iran, even though the two countries had little affection for one another prior to the war. The Gulf states did not need convincing that Tehran’s drone and missile array, as well as its regional proxy network—in other words, the Iranian regime itself—constitute a direct regional threat that cannot be managed solely through diplomacy and negotiations and that requires active and coordinated action on their part.

Short-Term Advantages, Strategic Weakening, and Inability to Intervene: The Impact of the War in Iran on Russia Georgy Poroskoun, a researcher at INSS, writes: President Putin conveyed his condolences over Khamenei’s death to Iranian President Pezeshkian—but without mentioning who was actually behind the elimination. Putin avoided criticizing Trump. Over the past year, the Kremlin’s strategy has been to preserve dialogue with the administration in Washington in order to ensure that its practical support for Ukraine (and Europe) remains limited. This allows Russia to continue its war effort against Kyiv, despite long-term negative domestic trends of a weakening economy and a shrinking pool of human resources available for mobilization. In the short term, Russia can benefit from the war in Iran, as oil and gas prices rise, attention and resources are diverted to the Middle East at the expense of the Ukrainian front (the number of interceptors available on the market remains limited, and supply to Ukraine could be affected), and the Russian–Ukrainian negotiations are currently not at the top of the US president’s agenda. However, if the war ends in the coming weeks, all these advantages will dissipate. Conversely, the elimination of a sovereign state’s leader—one that, in Putin’s view, refuses to cooperate with the “Western hegemon”—especially following the American operation in Venezuela, further reduces Russia’s network of global partners. Moreover, Putin himself appears to carry a lasting trauma from the downfall of authoritarian leaders (which he also projects onto himself). The killing of Gaddafi in 2011 was the first, and since then, Putin has taken care to provide refuge to friendly leaders who lose power, such as Ukraine’s Yanukovych and Syria’s Assad. It should be noted that toward his enemies, Putin does not apply the same principle. According to testimonies from Kyiv, Russia attempted several times to assassinate Ukrainian President Zelenskyy during the war. In any case, Russia’s reputation as a defender of independent states continues to erode. As we saw last year during the previous operation against Iran, it is unable to save its allies, certainly not to assist them militarily. Planned arms deliveries under long-term contracts have indeed continued in recent months, but these do not constitute the allocation of emergency resources for immediate assistance. What remains is the international diplomatic stage, including the UN Security Council, which for now has no impact on developments on the ground. Russia will likely continue rhetorical condemnations at levels below Putin against the conduct of the United States and Israel, such as framing the operation by Foreign Ministry officials as “aggression,” a “dangerous adventure,” and even “recklessness” toward international law. At the same time, Moscow will seek to exploit opportunities and present itself as a mediator between the sides (as evidenced by its promise to convey to Iran the “concerns of the Gulf states for their security” following Putin’s talks with Arab leaders in the region), although the United States and Israel have so far expressed no interest in this. In addition, it should be taken into account that if and when the regime in Tehran weakens or falls, Moscow will likely adapt itself to the new reality in Iran—similar to what happened with the new Syrian authorities.