John E.

The thesis that capitalism is artificial intelligence was, is, and will be Nick’s fundamental theoretical contribution. He is correct about this and it is in this precise sense that I am a Landian.

“He [Thomas Aquinas] was lame in everything since he theologized according to the innovations of the Latins .., because he mixed Aristotle with the Gospel, and thought that his foreign and absurd doctrines were deduced from external wisdom.” Blessed Dositheus of Jerusalem

Franco Burgersdijk contra transubstantiation: XVII. The Pontificians acknowledge that, although an accident cannot exist without a subject—which is evident for various reasons—it can exist separately and, in fact, truly exist in the Eucharist, thanks to the power of Almighty God, who takes the place of the removed substance and supplies the necessary causality to preserve the accident through extraordinary concurrence. However, this evasion is too narrow: for those things that involve contradiction cannot be done by God. Yet, for an accident to exist separately involves contradiction. Since the being of an accident is to exist in something, it cannot be an accident if it is not in a substance. Therefore, an accident that exists separately would be a non-accidental accident; indeed, it would not only be a non-accident but a substance. For that which is not in a subject subsists by itself, and what subsists by itself is substance. If they say that accidents are not substances for this reason—because, although they are not in a subject, they can be in a subject—they do not resolve the argument. For everyone defines substance as that which subsists by itself, and they do not ask whether what subsists by itself can be in a subject or not, but presuppose that what subsists by itself cannot be in a subject. This is correct, for subsisting by itself and being in a subject are opposites, and one necessarily negates the other. To subsist by itself means not being in a subject, and to be in a subject means not subsisting by itself. Furthermore, if an accident is not an accident because it is in a subject, but because it can be in a subject, then neither would a substance be a substance because it subsists by itself, but because it can subsist by itself. However, according to them, every accident can subsist by itself, at least by divine power, and yet still remain an accident. Therefore, every accident can, by divine power, be a substance and still remain an accident, which is even more absurd. XVIII. What they say about the extraordinary concurrence of God, which supplies the causality of the deficient substance to preserve the separate accident, is absurd. For I ask whether God, to preserve the separate accident, uses the causality of matter, which is exercised by every created substance to preserve the accidents naturally infused into it, or whether He employs the causality of production. The first cannot be said, because the causality of matter or the subject implies an imperfection unworthy of God. For it would follow that God would become the subject of the accidents if He Himself preserved the separate accidents through material causality. Nor can the second be said, because the causalities are opposed to one another, and one cannot be the other. XIX. From what has been said, it follows that the same accident cannot migrate from one subject to another. For that which depends on a subject in such a way that its being consists in being in that subject cannot move except in and with the subject, and therefore with the movement of the subject. Hence, an accident cannot carry its subject with it, nor migrate to another subject. Sometimes accidents seem to migrate, as with odors and similar cases, but in reality, they do not carry the subject with them; rather, they move with it and are transported to another place. However, because the subject is so subtle that sense and sight may be deceived, it only seems that the accident transfers to another place or subject. XX. An accident cannot be the subject of another accident. For, since every accident exists in a subject, if one accident were the subject of another, the subject would exist within a subject, which is absurd. It is often said that one accident is added to another, as when heat increases in moisture with water. However, the first accident is not the subject of the other; rather, the substance is the subject of both. Thus, when water is heated, the heat is not in the moisture as its subject but in the moist water. This is so true that it might even be thought that accidents cannot exist in substantial forms as subjects, but rather that all accidents exist in formed matter. XXI. Just as accidents behave concerning their reason for existence, they behave similarly concerning their reason for action. Therefore, they do not act by themselves; rather, they all act as instruments and by the power of the substances in which they reside. Indeed, if I speak properly, accidents do not act; rather, substances clothed with accidents act. Accidents modify and determine substances for action and serve them in their actions. This is true not only when substances act but also when accidents are produced. For just as an occurring accident depends on some substance for its occurrence, so it is necessary that an acting accident depends on some substance for its action. The reasoning is the same for both occurrence and action. Hence, I conclude that no accident acts in virtue of a substance in which it is not present, much less in virtue of a substance that does not exist in the nature of things. VI. The distinction that pertains to things by their own nature occurs without the intervention of the intellect. This distinction is recognized through separation, for everything that can be separated is distinguished by its own nature. Things are said to be separate when they exist in different places or times or reside in different subjects within reality. However, this is not said of those whose existence does not depend on another, as this principle also applies to cases distinguished by reason. For example, Alexander and the son of Philip are not distinguished by their own nature, even though Alexander ceased to be the son of Philip without ceasing to be Alexander. However, I do not believe that this distinction by nature can be confused with the distinction by reason, although many have carelessly asserted this. Not all things distinguished by nature can be separated, nor are those that cannot be separated always distinguished by nature.

Sproul said that Van Til's entire thesis effectively channels and appropriates Kantianism. That's wild (and, I'm convinced Sproul was right).

I wonder if those who follow Aquinas's "auctoritas" in all things agree with this. Or this--do you think women are not ordered to intellectual operation and are defective and misbegotten as regards individual nature?: ST I.q92.a1 "But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" (Genesis 2:24). Reply to Objection 1. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female."

Now the monitor! Just the boot drive to come and we're golden. Hoping to build at the end of the month.