José Ramón Orta Rotger
9.8K posts

José Ramón Orta Rotger
@JoseRamonOrta
Abogado. Padre de familia numerosa, católico, monárquico y madridista. Nacido en Palma de Mallorca, (España) en 1964. La familia es lo mejor





La Junta Electoral suspende el uso del DNI digital en las elecciones andaluzas del 17-M. theobjective.com/espana/politic…

El PSOE sobre la eutanasia de Noelia: "Es legal" shorturl.at/HcqzA

Noelia, un ángel de 25 años, abandona este mundo. Maldito mundo que considera que matar a una chica apartada de sus padres por el Estado y violada por un grupo de criminales es un acto de compasión. Maldito mundo que considera que matar a los violadores es un acto de crueldad.

He leído su historia y me parece una barbaridad que esto esté pasando en España. En 2022 sufrió una violación múltiple en un centro tutelado. Tras intentar quitarse la vida, quedó parapléjica. Ahora, el sistema le da luz verde para morir en vez de garantizarle apoyo, tratamiento y dignidad para vivir. En 24 horas, Noelia será la primera persona en recibir la eutanasia por depresión en España. Esto también es un fracaso colectivo.

⚖️ Patxi López vuelve a atacar a Vito Quiles y le llama “matón y acosador de mujeres” larazon.es/espana/patxi-l…






If you want to understand how Islamization of a country happens, there are actually two great, modern examples. Lebanon and Iran. Lebanon and Iran didn’t suddenly “collapse" one day. They were methodically reshaped. Lebanon was founded as a Christian country. It had a system that was built on a frozen moment in time. In 1932, Christians were just over half the population, so every part of the state was designed around that reality. President, parliament, military; all allocated by that snapshot. The problem? The snapshot never changed, even as the country did. Over the next few decades, the Christians who built Lebanon slowly left. They were the most educated, and also the most mobile. At the same time, the Islamic rural communities grew faster demographically and became more politically active. Then came waves of Palestinian muslims expelled from Jordan, who plunged the country into civil war. By the time the war ended, the balance the country depended on was already broken. Every militia disarmed after the war, except one. Hezbollah didn’t need to “take over” Lebanon in a dramatic sense. It just filled the vacuum. It built its own welfare system, kept its weapons, and tied itself directly to Iran. From that point on, real power didn’t sit with the state. It sat with the most organised force inside it. And that was the Islamists. Iran shows a different path. This path was faster, but built on the same principle. The Shah tried to modernise Iran rapidly, but in doing so, he crushed every organised opposition group through his security apparatus. All except one. The mosques. So when unrest hit in the late 1970s, there was only one network left that could actually mobilise people at scale. Khomeini used that network to unite a coalition that didn’t agree on anything except removing the Shah. And once the Shah was gone, that coalition stopped mattering. Within two years, the same groups including leftists that helped bring down the regime were either imprisoned, or executed. What replaced it was a theocracy built by the only organised structure left standing. Islamism. That’s the pattern in both cases. Lebanon changed because its demographics shifted and one group out-organised the rest. Iran changed because every alternative was crushed, leaving one network to take everything. Both countries today serve as a warning to Western countries facing its biggest civilizational challenge.








